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Zvenyhorod in Galicia: An Archaeological Survey (Eleventh–Mid-Thirteenth Century)

Roman K. Kovalev

Introduction

Zvenyhorod was one of the most important Galician towns during the age of Kyivan Rus' (ca. 900–1240). Located between two branches of the Bilka River near what is today the village of Zvenyhorod in Pustomyty raion southeast of Lviv, it was the principal centre of the Galician land before the rise of Halych as a princely capital in the 1140s. Zvenyhorod was first mentioned in the Rus' Primary Chronicle under the year 1086 in connection with the assassination of the Volhynian prince Iaropolk Iziaslavych on his way there from Volodymyr.¹ In 1124 Prince Volodymyrko, the son of Volodar Rostyslavych of Peremyshl, made Zvenyhorod the capital of his breakaway principality. Two years later he annexed Peremyshl principality, and in 1141 Terebovl and Halych principalities also became part of the domain that he ruled from Zvenyhorod. In 1144, and again in 1146, Grand Prince Vsevolod Olhovych of Kyiv tried to take Zvenyhorod by force.² It was also in 1144 that Volodymyrko made Halych his new capital,³ possibly because of that town's more favourable location on one of the

1. *Povest vremennykh let*, ed. D. S. Likhachev (St. Petersburg: Nauka, 1996), 225. For an English translation, see *The Russian Primary Chronicle*, trans. and ed. S. H. Cross and O. P. Sherbowitz-Wetzor (Cambridge, Mass.: Medieval Academy of America, 1973), 168. Other translations of the chronicle date the event as occurring in November 1087. See, e.g., *Litopys ruskyi za ipatskym spyskom*, trans. Leonid Makhnovets (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1989), 126.

2. *The Kievan Chronicle*, trans. & commentary by L. L. Heinrich (Ann Arbor: University microfiche, 1978), 37–9, 43–4.

3. I. K. Sveshnikov, "Issledovaniia prigoroda drevnerusskogo Zvenigoroda," 142, in *Trudy V Mezhdunarodnogo kongressa arkheologov-slavistov: Kiev, 18–25 sentiabria*

most important trade routes (the Dniester River and the road to Hungary) and near large deposits of salt that was mined and exported, bringing great profits to the prince.⁴ But even after Zvenyhorod lost its status as a princely seat, it remained an important economic, political, and military centre in southwestern Rus' until the Mongols destroyed it in 1241.

Although Zvenyhorod is mentioned several times in the Rus' chronicles in connection with political events and battles, very little is known about its history and culture. Written sources tell us nothing about how people lived in the medieval town. Consequently scholars have to rely on archaeology to reconstruct its history. Systematic archaeological study of Zvenyhorod began only in the 1950s.⁵ Some of the most interesting results, however, came from the excavations conducted during the 1980s.⁶ In 1982 Ihor K. Svieshnikov began digging in the northeastern section of the lower, commercial part of the medieval town. According to an eighteenth-century map, the area that he excavated had been inundated by a pond, and in more recent times it was covered by a swamp. Under the sterile, moist, 0.7–0.8 m layer of chernozem, archaeologists uncovered the remnants of items made of wood, leather, bone, and other organic substances normally not preserved and therefore not found in the excavations of other

1985 g., vol. 2, ed. P. P. Tolochko (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1988).

4. V. V. Aulikh, "Galich," in *Arkheologiiia Ukrainskoi SSR*, vol. 3, ed. I. I. Artemenko (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1986), 291.

5. See I. K. Svieshnikov, "Arkheolohichni roboty Lvivskoho istorychnoho muzeiu v 1952–1957 rr.," in *Arkheolohichni roboty muzeiu v 1952–1957 rr.* (Lviv, 1959), 14–17; G. M. Vlasova and B. G. Voznitsky, "K issledovaniiu severo-zapadnoi chasti gorodishcha letopisnogo Zvenigoroda," in *Kratkie soobshcheniia o polevykh arkheologicheskikh issledovaniiaakh Odesskogo Gosudarstvennogo arkheologicheskogo muzeia v 1960 g.* (Odessa, 1961); O. A. Ratych, *Drevnoruski arkheolohichni pam"iatky na terytorii zakhidnykh oblastei URSS* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1957); idem, "Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod," *Arkheolohiia* (Kyiv), no. 12 (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1973), 87–94; and V. S. Tersky-Shelomiantsev, "Doslidzhennia posadu litopysnogo Zvenyhoroda," *Arkheolohiia*, no. 27 (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1978), 86–93.

6. See O. M. Ioannisian, I. R. Mogitich, and I. K. Svieshnikov, "Tserkov Paraskevyy-Piatnitsy," in *Pamiatniki kultury: Novye otkrytiia. 1981* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1983), 494–507; S. V. Shevchenko and I. K. Svieshnikov, "Botanichni znakhidky XII st.," *Ukrainskyi botanichnyi zhurnal*, 1984, no. 6: 41–4; I. K. Svieshnikov, "Doslidzhennia davnoho Zvenyhoroda u 1982–1983 rr.," *Arkheolohiia*, no. 57 (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1987): 94–101; idem, "Issledovaniia prigoroda," 142–7; idem and O. A. Braichevska, "Shkiriane vzuttia iz Zvenyhoroda Halyskoho," *Arkheolohiia* (Kyiv) 3 (1990): 122–9; P. I. Mohytych, "Vulytsia litopysnogo Zvenyhoroda," *Arkheolohiia*, no. 4 (1995): 140–3; and I. K. Svieshnikov, "Drevnerusskii gorod Zvenigorod i ego torgovye svyazi s Vostokom," in *Arkheologicheskoe obshchestvo "Drevnosti," Slavianskaia arkheologiiia, 1990: Rannesrednevekovyi gorod i ego okrug. Materialy po arkheologii Rossii*, issue 2 (Moscow: Nauka, 1995), 43–57.

southern Rus' towns. The survival of these materials can be explained by the unique circumstances in which they were deposited and later preserved: the water-logged soil kept the artifacts moist and prevented oxygen from reaching and thus spoiling them. All of them date from the late eleventh century to 1186,⁷ when habitation of this part of Zvenyhorod came to an end for reasons not yet determined.

Many of the artifacts unearthed in Zvenyhorod are unique, and they provide invaluable information about the material culture and daily life of southern Rus' in general, and of the inhabitants of this important southwestern Rus' centre in particular. Before these rare discoveries, only Kyiv—mainly the Podil district⁸—yielded comparable archaeological artifacts of southern Rus' origin, and historians were much better informed about the material culture of northern Rus'.⁹

Topography and Architecture

Zvenyhorod was surrounded by natural barriers that facilitated the defense of the town—lakes, swamps, and the two branches of the Bilka. Consequently, when Vsevolod Olhovych tried to take the town in 1144, he had to order two log

7. Sveshnikov, "Drevnerusskii gorod," 44.

8. See M. S. Sahaidak, *Davno-kyivskiy Podil* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1991); and P. P. Tolochko, ed., *Starodavniy Kyiv: Arkheologichni doslidzhennia, 1984–1989* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1993).

9. The overwhelming majority of archaeological items from the Rus' period have been discovered during the excavations of northern Rus' towns now in Russia and Belarus, such as Novgorod, Smolensk, Brest, Mstislau, Slonim, Polatsk, Pskov, Staraiia Ladoga, and Beloozero. See A. V. Artsikhovskiy and B. A. Kolchin, eds., *Trudy Novgorodskoi arkheologicheskoi ekspeditsii*, vols. 1–4, *Materialy i issledovaniia po arkheologii SSSR*, nos. 55, 65, 117, and 123 (Moscow: Nauka, 1956, 1959, 1963); M. G. Rabinovich, *O drevnei Moskve: Ocherki materialnoi kultury i byta gorozhan v XI–XVI vv.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1964); L. A. Golubeva, *Ves i slaviane na Belom ozere: X–XIII vv.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1973); G. V. Shtykhov, *Drevnii Polotsk, IX–XIII vv.* (Minsk: Nauka i tekhnika, 1975); idem, *Goroda Polotskoi zemli (IX–XIII v.v.)* (Minsk: Nauka i tekhnika, 1978); V. V. Sedov, ed., *Arkheologicheskoe izuchenie Pskova*, issue 1 (Moscow: Nauka, 1983); P. F. Lysenko, *Bereste* (Minsk: Nauka i tekhnika, 1985); V. V. Sedov, ed., *Srednevekovaiia Ladoga: Novye arkheologicheskie otkrytiia i issledovaniia* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1985); B. A. Kolchin, *Wooden Artifacts from Medieval Novgorod*, pts. 1–2, ed. A. R. Hands and D. R. Walker (Oxford: BAR International Series, 1989); Ia. G. Zverugo, *Verkhnee Ponemane v IX–XIII vv.* (Minsk: Navuka i tekhnika, 1989); D. A. Avdusin, ed., *Smolensk i Gnezdovo* (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1991); *The Archaeology of Novgorod, Russia*, ed. R. Huggins, trans. K. Judelson, The Society for Medieval Archaeology Monograph Series, no. 13 (Lincoln: The Eastern Press, 1992); V. V. Sedov, ed., *Arkheologicheskoe izuchenie Pskova*, issue 2 (Pskov: Pskovskii gosudarstvennyi nauchno-issledovatelnyi arkheologicheskii tsentr, 1994); and P. F. Lysenko, *Turovskaia zemlia, IX–XIII vv.* (Minsk: Belarускаia navuka, 1999).

bridges to be built so that his two armies could cross the Bilka.¹⁰ Zvenyhorod's three-hectare citadel (*dytynets*) was located on an elevated rectangle (400 by 350 m) in the southwestern part of the town. It was protected by ramparts and a moat, the southern and western sections of which have been preserved. The commercial area of the town (*posad*) was located north, east, and west of the citadel and occupied about twelve hectares. Unfortified suburbs and two cemeteries lay outside the fortifications.¹¹

Zvenyhorod's main church and the princely palace stood in the central part of the citadel. They and the town's stone fortifications were probably built in the late 1120s and 1130s and were demolished by the Mongols in 1241. The comparatively small church (12.5 by 10.6 m) had been made of stone and set on lime mortar with an admixture of sand and crushed brick. It had three naves and three semicircular apses supported by four pillars that were topped by a dome. Wooden stairs led to the choir gallery. The church's floor had been covered with glazed ceramic tiles. A rectangular stone annex (7.5 by 6.4 m) stood adjacent to the southern part of the church's western wall. The remnants of a stone sarcophagus found inside this structure suggest that it was the burial crypt of Zvenyhorod's princes. About 6.3 metres east of the church archaeologists discovered a rectangular (2 by 1.8 m) stone column from another structure. It may well have functioned as a passage connecting the church with the palace.¹²

Some fourteen metres northeast of the church stood a building shaped like the Cyrillic letter Г and constructed of ashlar blocks embellished with carved details (e.g., a fragment of a stone carving representing a human head was discovered).¹³ It had three rooms (9.4 by 8.05 m; 9.4 by 3.5 m; and 9.4 by 5.05 m) and a square chamber (5.0 by 4.6 m, possibly the remains of a tower). Unearthed remnants of triangular and rectangular yellow, brown, and green ceramic tiles indicate that this building had decorative, multicoloured mosaic floors. Archaeologists believe that this edifice had been the princely palace.¹⁴

Although the roofing materials of these monumental buildings have not been unearthed, it is likely that they were covered with lead sheets. A fragment of such a sheet, probably dating from the first half of the twelfth century, was found

10. *The Kievan Chronicle*, 37.

11. A. A. Ratich [O. A. Ratych], "Novye dannye o Zvenigorode na Belke," in *Arkheologicheskie otkrytiia* [hereafter AO] 1969 goda (Moscow: Nauka, 1970), 290; and idem, "Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod," 87–8; Sviesnikov, "Doslidzhennia," 94–5.

12. Ratych, "Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod," 88.

13. Ibid., 89; I. R. Mogitich and A. A. Ratich, "Issledovaniia v drevnem Zvenigorode na Belke," in AO 1971 goda (Moscow: Nauka, 1972), 389; and idem., "Raboty v letopisnom Zvenigorode na Belke i v Karpatakh," in AO 1972 goda (Moscow: Nauka, 1973), 313.

14. Mogitich and Ratich, "Issledovaniia," 389; and idem, "Raboty," 313.

at one of the homes in the commercial part of town.¹⁵ It is possible that when the citadel's monumental buildings were being constructed or repaired, someone took this lead sheet to be made into jewellery at one of the workshops in the lower part of the town.

Like many other medieval towns, Zvenyhorod had its own artisan districts. To control the spread of fire, the blacksmiths' quarter was located immediately behind the citadel's western fortifications. The tanners' quarter was situated in the lower part of town and alongside the river, because tanning required ready access to water and created a stench; the location was typical of Rus' towns. Because jewellers and bone carvers were much less likely to cause fires and did not produce caustic fumes, their quarters were located at the eastern end of the citadel near the palace.¹⁶ It is quite possible that they lived inside the citadel because they relied on the commissions they received from the princes. But, as will be discussed below, jewellers also lived in the commercial part of the town. Inside the citadel archaeologists also unearthed the remains of forty-four ovens that had lain in a row along the western ramparts. It has been suggested that these ovens were used for baking bread and cooking food for the princely retinue.¹⁷

The main market was located in the lower part of the town. It was likely there that the town's merchants resided and the citizens held their *viche* (town assembly).¹⁸ The twelfth-century wooden Good Friday Church of St. Parasceve (6.5 by 9.25 m) stood in the market square (see Fig. 1).¹⁹ Along with most of Zvenyhorod, the church was destroyed by the Mongols.²⁰ Its floor was embellished with yellow, brown, and green triangular, rectangular, and figured glazed ceramic tiles. Remnants of the floor (set in a circular pattern) in the central nave suggest that the church had a dome. A fragment (with the representation of two male figures) of a large icon was also found in the church. It was

15. Sveshnikov, "Issledovaniia prigoroda," 146.

16. V. S. Shelomentsev-Tersky, "Nekotorye itogi arkheologicheskogo izucheniia drevnego Zvenigoroda," in *Drevnerusskii gorod* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1984), 149.

17. A. A. Ratic and V. S. Shelomentsev-Tersky, "Osobyie pechi v drevnem Zvenigorode na Belke," in *AO 1971 goda*, 388.

18. From the entry for the year 1146 in the Primary Chronicle we learn that Zvenyhorod had a *viche*; see *The Kievan Chronicle*, 43.

19. Churches with this name were commonly found in the trade and craft districts and markets of Rus' towns. See M. Tikhomirov, *The Towns of Ancient Rus'*, trans. Y. Sdobnikov (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956), 126 and 405.

20. I. K. Sveshnikov et al., "Issledovaniia na Lvovshchine," in *AO 1977 goda* (Moscow: Nauka, 1978), 385; O. M. Ioannisian, I. K. Sveshnikov, and I. R. Mogitich, "Raboty Zvenigorodskogo otriada," in *AO 1978 goda* (Moscow: Nauka, 1979), 333; and idem, "Tserkov Paraskevyy-Piatnitsy," 494–507.




FIGURE 1

Source: Ratych, "Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod," 92.

made of rose-coloured slate (pyrophyllite), which was extracted near Ovruch in Volhynia and exported throughout Rus' for use in construction, decoration, artistic carving of bas-reliefs and figures, icons, and spindle whorls.

Zvenyhorod's stone architecture was very similar to that of other south-western Rus' towns, such as Peremyshl and Halych. From the early twelfth century on master builders had imported the Romanesque style of building from Poland to Galicia, where it exerted a strong influence on the local manner of construction, including that of Zvenyhorod's stone monuments.²¹

21. For more on the monumental architecture of Zvenyhorod, see P. A. Rappoport, *Drevnerusskaia arkhitektura* (St. Petersburg: Stroiizdat, 1993), 64; O. M. Ioannisian, "O rannem etape razvitiia Galitskogo zodchestva," *Kratkie soobshcheniia Instituta arkhologii* (Moscow), no. 164 (1981): 35–42; idem, "Osnovnye etapy razvitiia galitskogo zodchestva," in *Drevne-russkoe iskusstvo: Khudozhestvennaia kultura X–pervoi poloviny XIII v.*, ed. A. I. Komech and O. I. Podobedova (Moscow: Nauka, 1988), 41–58; and V. M. Petegirich, "Iz istorii ekonomicheskikh i kulturnykh svyazei Galitsko-Volynskoi Rusi v X–XIII vv.," in *Slavianskie drevnosti*, ed. V. D. Koroliuk (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1980), 160–2.




FIGURE 2

Source: Mohytych, "Vulytsia litopysnoho Zvenyhoroda," 141.

Like many other Rus' towns, Zvenyhorod had log pavements (see Fig. 2).²² Archaeologists uncovered and studied about seventy metres of one such pavement, which ran north from the citadel down into the town's lower part.²³ The archaeologists believe that it had to be rebuilt three times during the first half of the twelfth century because the first two layers of logs sank into the moist soil. Each time a new layer was put down, its manner of construction became more complex and secure. By the time the third layer was built, in 1146, it was about 6 to 6.5 metres wide.

Because sections of the pavement were made of the same types and sizes of planks and logs that were used in the building of the adjacent homes, it is likely that the street's residents were responsible for providing the timber and labour for the pavement in front of their domiciles. Since the entire pavement was built during the same period—a major communal undertaking that required considerable organization and planning—all of the street's residents probably participated in its construction and at the same time.²⁴

Zvenyhorod's pavements were made of oak and other kinds of wood. Their foundation consisted of three massive logs placed next to each other parallel to the pavement's axis, across which vertically split logs were placed flat side up. Grooves were made on the undersides of the split logs so that they would fit flush with the logs underneath them and thus give the pavement greater stability. This construction technique had three main purposes: (1) to raise the pavement above the soggy ground and thus protect it from rotting; (2) to divert rain and surface water away from the adjacent homes; and (3) to channel this water underneath the pavement and in the direction of the Bilka River. Thus the pavement facilitated not only transportation by foot, horse, or carriage, but also the draining of water away from the town and into the river.²⁵

Similar wooden pavements have been uncovered in Kyiv, Novgorod, Berestia (now Brest), Moscow, Mstislau, Slonim, Polatsk, Staraia Russa, Pskov, Staraia Ladoga, Beloozero, Smolensk, and many other Rus' towns.²⁶ They were especially important in the northern regions, where rainwater and run-off from melting snow caused significant obstacles to traffic mobility and structural damage to buildings during much of the year. Although the climate in Zveny-

22. See my article "Bridges, Pavements, and Roads in Kievan Rus'," forthcoming in *The Supplement to the Modern Encyclopedia of Russian, Soviet, and Eurasian History* [hereafter *SMERSH*] (New Orleans: Academic International Press).

23. Mohytych, "Vulytsia," 140–3.

24. *Ibid.*, 143.

25. Kovalev, "Bridges, Pavements, and Roads in Kievan Rus'."

26. *Ibid.*

horod was much drier than it was in northern Rus', the town needed pavements because its lower part lay in a wetland.

Although the pavements solved some drainage problems, the town's lower part had an additional drainage system, which was made of hollowed-out oak logs.²⁷ The latter system is still being studied, and therefore little information about it has been made available thus far. Similar systems are known to have existed in several northern Rus' towns (e.g., Novgorod, Pskov, Smolensk),²⁸ but the remains of the system in Zvenyhorod is the only one that has thus far been unearthed in the lands of former southern Rus'. Perhaps that is because Zvenyhorod was located in a very marshy area, unlike most other towns in southern Rus'. But it is also possible that remnants of the systems in the other southern towns did not survive because they were usually built on drier soils, which are less conducive to the preservation of wood. If Zvenyhorod's system was like the ones found in Novgorod (whose twelfth-century system was up to 100 m long) and other northern Rus' towns, it may have extended for a significant distance.²⁹

Dwellings and Residences

Inside the citadel, archaeologists unearthed the remains of a row of sixteen square-shaped, southward-facing hovels about fifteen sq m in area. They had been built half underground, and had round ovens made of clay and stone, earthen benches for sleeping and sitting, and root cellars. Nearby stood four square-shaped above-ground wooden buildings with an area of ten to fifteen sq m and larger ovens. It is believed that these buildings were the dwellings and workshops of bone-carvers and jewellers during the twelfth and the first half of the thirteenth century.³⁰

In the commercial, lower part of the town near the two branches of the Bilka, the houses were larger, ranging from sixteen to 52.6 sq m. The largest dwellings had two levels, and some had ovens on both floors.³¹ In general, the houses in Zvenyhorod were similar in size to the boyars' homes discovered in Novgorod, although some of the buildings in twelfth-century Novgorod were more than 130 sq m.³² Unlike the princely, monumental stone domiciles inside

27. Parts of it have been discovered. See I. K. Sveshnikov, "Raskopki v Zvenigorode pod Lvovom," in *AO 1985 goda* (Moscow: Nauka, 1987), 409.

28. See R. K. Kovalev, "Drainage Systems, Water Supply, and Hydro-Engineering Works in Kievan Rus'," in *SMERSH* (forthcoming).

29. Ibid.

30. Ratych, "Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod," 89–90.

31. Sveshnikov, "Doslidzhennia," 96; and idem, "Issledovaniia prigoroda," 144.

32. P. I. Zasurtsev, "Usadby i postroiki drevnego Novgoroda," in *Zhilishcha drevnego Novgoroda*, vol. 4 of *Trudy Novgorodskoi arkheologicheskoi ekspeditsii*, 57–9. See also

the citadel, the houses in Zvenyhorod's commercial district were part of larger residential complexes (*usadby*). As in other Rus' towns, these complexes consisted of one or several large dwellings, a number of smaller buildings or workshops, animal stalls, sheds, and household gardens or orchards.³³ There archaeologists have unearthed the remains of smithies and jewellers' or glass-working shops dating from the second half of the eleventh century to the second half of the twelfth century.³⁴ Another workshop belonged to a painter (see below). The residences faced the pavement but were set off from it by one to 1.5 metres. They were separated from neighbouring households by fences made of wattle, logs, or planks (see Fig. 2).³⁵ Archaeologists have not yet determined the average size of these *usadby*. However, it is already clear that their general layout and function was very similar to the complexes found in many other Rus' towns. It is very likely that Zvenyhorod's boyars and members of the prince's retinue (*druzhyna*) lived in them.

The dwellings had foundations made from up to three horizontal layers of logs, and walls of vertically placed beams,³⁶ all of which were joined together with nails, spikes, or braces (see Fig. 3: 16).³⁷ Moss was used as insulating filler between the logs. The larger houses had wooden plank floors, while the smaller homes and workshops had clay floors or ones only partly covered with planks. Clay floors were also found in the corners of buildings where the clay or stone ovens stood.³⁸ Excavated carved planks and window and roof beams indicate that some of the buildings were adorned with carved exterior panels.³⁹ The find of an iron lock suggests that some of the houses also had

P. A. Rappoport, *Drevnerusskoe zhilishche*, issue E1-32 of *Arkheologiya SSSR: Svod arkeologicheskikh istochnikov* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1975), 68–9, 125–43; G. V. Borisevich, "Khoromnoe zodchestvo Novgoroda," in *Novgorodskii sbornik: 50 let raskopok Novgoroda*, ed. B. A. Kolchin and V. L. Ianin (Moscow: Nauka, 1982), 269–4; and M. I. Petrov and A. N. Sorokin, "O razmerakh usadb drevnego Novgoroda," in *Novgorod i novgorodskaya zemlia: Istorii i arkhologii* (hereafter *NNZ*), vol. 11, ed. V. L. Ianin (Novgorod: Novgorodskii gosudarstvennyi obedinennyi muzei-zapovednik, 1997), 54–63.

33. Sveshnikov, "Issledovaniia prigoroda," 144–5.

34. Ibid., 145. Also see below.

35. I. K. Sveshnikov, "Raboty v Zvenigorode," in *AO 1983 goda* (Moscow: Nauka, 1985), 352; and idem, "Issledovaniia drevnerusskogo Zvenigoroda pod Lvovom," in *AO 1986 goda* (Moscow: Nauka, 1988), 335.

36. Sveshnikov, "Issledovaniia prigoroda," 144.

37. Ratych, "Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod," 90; I. K. Sveshnikov, "Raskopki v Zvenigorode na Belke," in *AO 1982 goda* (Moscow: Nauka, 1984), 328; and idem, "Raskopki v Zvenigorode pod Lvovom," 408.

38. Sveshnikov, "Issledovaniia prigoroda," 144.

39. Ibid.; Sveshnikov, "Doslidzhennia," 97–8. Houses elsewhere in Rus' (e.g., in Kyiv,




FIGURE 3

Source: Ratych, "Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod," 91.

Novgorod, and Staraiia Russa) had similar panels and window casings. See E. Iu. Pukhnacheva, "Dereviannye khudozhestvennye izdeliia v ansamble Novgorodskogo zhilishcha," in *NNZ*, vol. 7, ed. V. L. Ianin, (Novgorod: Novgorodskii gosudarstvennyi obedinennyi muzei-zapovednik, 1993), 170–8; Sahaidak, *Davno-Kyivskiy Podil*, 102, fig. XX: 1–5; Kolchin, *Wooden Artifacts*, pt. 1, 181–3; and A. F. Medvedev, "Usadby rostovshchika i iuvelira v Staroi Russe," in *AO* 1977 goda, 23–4.




FIGURE 4

Source: Ioannisian, Mogitich, and Sveshnikov, "Tserkov Paraskevy-Piatnitsy," 503.




FIGURE 5

Source: Ratych, "Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod," 93.




FIGURE 6

Source: Sveshnikov, "Drevnerusskii gorod Zvenigorod i ego torgovye sviazi s Vostokom," 50.

lockable shutters.⁴⁰ The remains of iron padlocks and keys to them (see Fig. 3: 9, 13, 20) found inside several buildings illustrate that the townspeople locked their doors. They also use metal hooks to secure their doors from the inside (see Fig. 3: 14–15).⁴¹ The finds of glass oil lamps (Fig. 6: 12, 14; imported from Kyiv and possibly Byzantium) and candlesticks (Fig. 6: 10) show how some of the town's wealthy inhabitants illuminated their homes.⁴² Field-mouse and snake bones found inside several residences reveal that the inhabitants had problems with pests.⁴³

During the first half of the twelfth century, three major fires (ca. 1100, ca. 1137, and in 1146) destroyed the lower part of Zvenyhorod. As in most other Rus' towns, after the fires were extinguished, the citizens repaired their buildings or rebuilt them at the same sites after piling up the soil, mixing it with various rubbish, and leveling the ground there.⁴⁴ In general, larger and more dwellings were built in the commercial district after each of the above fires.⁴⁵ This indicates that the town grew in size, wealth, and population.

Daily Life and Activities

Various finds dating from the eleventh to the mid-thirteenth century indicate that Zvenyhorod's population included agriculturists. The items uncovered include sickles and scythes (Fig. 3: 1–2),⁴⁶ remnants of wheat and millet grains,⁴⁷ cucumber seeds,⁴⁸ and a variety of fruits (peaches, plums, apples, Bing cherries).⁴⁹ While cucumbers, peaches, apples, plums, and Bing cherries were most likely grown in town in the household gardens and orchards, wheat, millet, and other grains were grown in fields beyond the fortifications. Excavated bones of cattle, sheep, goats, swine, horses, dogs, and chickens and chicken

40. Ratych, "Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod," 90–1.

41. Ratich and Shelomentsev-Tersky, "Osobyie pechi," 388; and Ratych, "Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod," 90–1; Sveshnikov, "Raskopki v Zvenigorode na Belke," 328.

42. Sveshnikov, "Drevnerusskii gorod," 52–3.

43. Sveshnikov, "Issledovaniia prigoroda," 147; and idem, "Doslidzhennia," 100.

44. Svieshnikov, "Doslidzhennia," 96.

45. Sveshnikov, "Issledovaniia prigoroda," 144–5.

46. Ratych, "Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod," 90; and Tersky-Shelomiantsev, "Doslidzhennia posadu," 92.

47. Tersky-Shelomiantsev, "Doslidzhennia posadu," 89–94; and Sveshnikov, "Raskopki v Zvenigorode pod Lvovom," 409.

48. Sveshnikov, "Raskopki v Zvenigorode pod Lvovom," 409; and idem, "Doslidzhennia," 100.

49. Sveshnikov, "Raskopki v Zvenigorode na Belke," 328; idem, "Raskopki v Zvenigorode pod Lvovom," 409; idem, "Issledovaniia prigoroda," 147; idem, "Doslidzhennia," 100; and Shevchenko and Svieshnikov, "Botanichni znakhidky XII st.," 41–4.

eggshells throughout the town indicate that the inhabitants also raised and kept domesticated animals.⁵⁰ In addition, covered stables (with layers of horse manure), stalls for pigs, sheep, goats, and cattle,⁵¹ and special scythes (*kosy-horbushy*; Fig. 3: 3) for cutting fodder were also uncovered at a number of residences.⁵² Excavated horseshoes (Fig. 7: 1), a horsewhip handle (Fig. 7: 8), spurs, bridle bits (Fig. 3: 23, 17), and a bone cheek piece (Fig. 4: 7) from a harness⁵³ indicate that the inhabitants rode horses and probably also used them for pulling vehicles and plows.

Fishing, hunting, and gathering were major sources of food for the residents. Bone needles for making fishnets, and parts of wicker fish traps, metal fish-hooks, and iron smoking hooks (Fig. 3: 21) have been discovered; all of them date from the eleventh to the first half of the thirteenth century.⁵⁴ Analyzed fish-bone remains indicate that various species of carp, perch, and sturgeon fish were caught and consumed. The remains of wild-animal bones indicate that the inhabitants hunted wisents, deer, wild boars, bears, roe deer, hares, woodgrouse, wild ducks and geese, and partridges.⁵⁵ The bones, antlers, and hides of wild animals, like those of domesticated ones, were used by bone carvers and tanners. The townsfolk also gathered hazelnuts, walnuts (although they also might have been imported from Byzantium, the Crimea, or the Balkans), moss (for log-house insulation), and mushrooms.⁵⁶ There is little doubt, though no evidence, that they also gathered wild berries, medicinal herbs, and roots for making dyes.

Kitchen utensils dating from the eleventh to the first half of the thirteenth century have been unearthed in the town: clay pots and their lids, bowls, and pitchers (Fig. 5: 1–9); turned wooden bowls, dishes, and plates; bronze plates,

50. Ratych, "Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod," 90; and Sveshnikov, "Issledovaniia prigoroda," 147; idem, "Doslidzhennia," 100.

51. Sveshnikov, "Raskopki v Zvenigorode na Belke," 328; and idem, "Raboty v Zvenigorode," 354; and idem, "Raskopki v Zvenigorode pod Lvovom," 409.

52. Ratych, "Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod," 90.

53. Ibid., 89–94; Tersky-Shelomiantsev, "Doslidzhennia posadu," 91; Sveshnikov, "Raskopki v Zvenigorode pod Lvovom," 408; and idem, "Issledovaniia prigoroda," 146 and fig. 2:8.

54. Shelomentsev-Tersky, "Nekotorye itogi," 148; and Tersky-Shelomiantsev, "Doslidzhennia posadu," Ratych, "Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod," 92.

55. Ratych, "Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod," 90; Tersky-Shelomiantsev, "Doslidzhennia posadu," 92–3; Sveshnikov, "Raskopki v Zvenigorode pod Lvovom," 409; idem, "Issledovaniia drevnerusskogo Zvenigoroda," 335; idem, "Issledovaniia prigoroda," 147; and idem, "Doslidzhennia," 100.

56. Sveshnikov, "Raskopki v Zvenigorode na Belke," 328; idem, "Raboty v Zvenigorode," 352; and idem, "Raskopki v Zvenigorode pod Lvovom," 409. A mushroom (*opiat*) patch was found underneath the bark of a log at one residence.




FIGURE 7

Source: Sveshnikov, "Drevnerusskii gorod Zvenigorod i ego torgovye sviazi s Vostokom," 47.

bowls, and vessels; wooden ladles and scoops; bone and wooden spoons; whetstones, knives and their bone handles (Fig. 4: 9), and strike-a-lights (Fig. 3: 12); buckets and basins made by coopers; wooden mortars (including ones for grinding poppy seeds); and millstones.⁵⁷

Large quantities of imported Kyivan, Byzantine, and central European glassware (including the remains of four well-preserved twelfth-century Byzantine goblets⁵⁸) or their fragments have been unearthed throughout Zvenyhorod.⁵⁹ The significant number—460—of eleventh- to early thirteenth-century Byzantine amphorae shards found in the town (including artisans' homes and the palace)⁶⁰ indicate that its inhabitants consumed Byzantine wine and olive oil (the usual items carried and stored in amphorae).⁶¹ Some drank the wine from fashionable imported glassware (Fig. 6: 9, 13).⁶²

Some remains of medieval wooden furniture have survived in Zvenyhorod: benches for sitting and sleeping, and the back part of a painted (red) armchair,

57. Ratych, "Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod," 90; Tersky-Shelomiantsev, "Doslidzhennia posadu,"

92; Ratich, "Novye dannye o Zvenigorode na Belke," 290; Sveshnikov, "Issledovaniia prigoroda," 146–7; idem, "Raskopki v Zvenigorode na Belke," 328; idem, "Raskopki v Zvenigorode pod Lvovom," 408–9; idem, "Issledovaniia drevnerusskogo Zvenigoroda pod Lvovom," 335; and idem, "Raboty v Zvenigorode," 354. Many similar items were discovered in other Rus' towns (Novgorod, Berestia, Beloozero, Staraia Russa). See Kolchin, *Wooden Artifacts from Medieval Novgorod*, 1: 37–80; Lysenko, *Bereste*, 312–19; Golubeva, *Ves i slaviane*, 174–5; A. F. Medvedev, "Novye materialy o Staroi Russe," in *AO 1971 goda*, 38; idem, "Raskopki v Staroi Russe," in *AO 1972 goda*, 25–6; and idem, "Usadby rostovshchika i iuvelira," 23–4.

58. Sveshnikov, "Issledovaniia drevnerusskogo Zvenigoroda pod Lvovom," 335.

59. Sveshnikov, "Raskopki v Zvenigorode pod Lvovom," 409; idem, "Raboty v Zvenigorode," 352; idem, "Issledovaniia drevnerusskogo Zvenigoroda pod Lvovom," 335; and idem, "Drevnerusskii gorod," 52.

60. Ratych, "Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod," 93; idem, "Novye dannye o Zvenigorode na Belke," 290; idem, "Nadpis na amfore iz Zvenigoroda na Belke" in *AO 1970 goda* (Moscow: Nauka, 1971), 295; Mogitich and Ratich, "Raboty," 313; I. K. Sveshnikov, "Raskopki prigoroda letopisnogo Zvenigoroda," in *AO 1984 goda* (Moscow: Nauka, 1986), 307; and idem, "Raskopki v Zvenigorode pod Lvovom," 408.

61. See T. S. Noonan and R. K. Kovalev, "Prayer, Illumination, and Good Times: The Export of Byzantine Wine and Oil to the North of Russia in Pre-Mongol Times," in *Byzantium and the North: Acta Byzantina Fennica* (Helsinki) 8 (1995–6): 73–96; and idem, "Wine and Oil for All the Rus'!: The Import of Byzantine Wine and Oil to Kievan Rus'," *Byzantium and the North: Acta Byzantina Fennica* 9 (1997–8): 87–121.

62. The inhabitants of many other Rus' towns shared this taste for wine. In addition, both wine and olive oil were used in religious services, and the oil was also used by jewellers. See *Ibid.*

probably of local manufacture.⁶³ A variety of trinkets and religious artifacts have also been unearthed: a miniature glazed clay figurine of a mounted warrior;⁶⁴ glazed ceramic Easter eggs (Fig. 4: 24);⁶⁵ a wooden cross with the inscription “СВ Д IC X,” i.e., “Святое древо Иисуса Христа” (Holy Cross of Jesus Christ);⁶⁶ a stone icon frame;⁶⁷ a small metal icon (six cm in diameter) with the representation of two mounted warriors (possibly SS. George and Demetrius of Thessaloniki);⁶⁸ and several small copper and bronze icons.⁶⁹ Remains of weapons have also been uncovered: iron spearheads and arrowheads, a decorative bone plaque from a quiver (Fig. 4: 8), bone and lead bludgeons (Fig. 7: 9), a battle-ax (Fig. 3: 8), fragments of a sword, and a bronze part of an ornamented scabbard.⁷⁰ In addition, combs made of bone and wood (Figs. 4: 1–3; 7: 7), cosmetic instruments for cleaning ears and nails (Fig. 4: 6), and small glass toiletry vessels (possibly for perfume) have been found at several sites.⁷¹

The finds of two almost whole wooden flutes (*sopilky*) made of elder, part of another such flute, a psaltery (*husli*), an unfinished wooden toy sword, a bone piece used in the game “The Mill” (*babky*), and four wooden balls used in the game *kulia-mazlo* (in which the players tried to guide a ball into a hole in the ground with a stick while running) shed light on some of the ways Zvenyhorod’s citizens entertained themselves.⁷²

63. I. K. Sviesnikov, “Zvenyhorodski hramoty na beresti,” *Dzvin* (Lviv), 1990, no. 6: 130–1.

64. Sviesnikov, “Issledovaniia prigoroda,” 146.

65. Ibid.; and Ratych, “Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod,” 93.

66. Sviesnikov, “Issledovaniia prigoroda,” 146.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid., 147; and Sviesnikov, “Issledovaniia drevnerusskogo Zvenigoroda pod Lvovom,” 335.

69. Ratych, “Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod,” 90, 93.

70. Ibid.; Tersky-Shelomiantsev, “Doslidzhennia posadu,” 91; Sviesnikov, “Issledovaniia prigoroda,” 146–7; and Ratych, “Novye dannye o Zvenigorode na Belke,” 290.

71. Ratych, “Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod,” 93–4; and Sviesnikov, “Raskopki v Zvenigorode pod Lvovom,” 409.

72. Sviesnikov, “Issledovaniia prigoroda,” 146; idem, “Doslidzhennia,” 99; and idem, “Raboty v Zvenigorode,” 354; idem, “Drevnerusskii gorod,” 45. Similar items were also discovered in other Rus’ towns (e.g., Novgorod, Berestia, and Beloozero), where the soil is notable for having kept them well preserved. On the toys and games found there, see B. A. Kolchin, A. S. Khoroshev, and V. L. Ianin, *Usadba novgorodskogo khudozhnika XII v.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1981), 111; Lysenko, *Bereste*, 279, fig. 190: 11–13, and p. 284; Golubeva, *Ves i slaviane*, 107, fig. 38: 12; V. P. Darkevich and G. B. Borisevich, *Drevniaia stolitsa Riazanskoi zemli* (Moscow: KRUG, 1995), 210; N. A. Morozova, “Igry srednekovovogo Novgoroda,” in *NNZ*, vol. 3, ed. V. L. Ianin (Novgorod: Novgorodskii gosudarstvennyi obedinennyi muzei-zapovednik, 1990), 69–71; E. A. Rybina, “Children’s

Leather footwear has been excavated at different locations in the town.⁷³ The four almost entire shoes and 125 fragments that have been discovered indicates that the inhabitants wore three types of footwear: soft leather (sheepskin) shoes or hard (pigskin or cowhide) shoes or boots. Many of them were embroidered with patterns.⁷⁴ Some of the boots had metal heeltaps.⁷⁵ All of the footwear was most likely locally made, but it was very similar to the footwear found in other Rus' towns (e.g., Novgorod, Smolensk, Beloozero, Polatsk, Toropets, Pskov, and Berestia).⁷⁶

Large quantities of jewellery, dating from the eleventh to the first half of the thirteenth century, were found in Zvenyhorod. In the citadel and the commercial district archaeologists found jewellery made from precious stones and metals: bronze, marble, and marl-stone cross pendants (Figs. 4: 12–13, 15, 17, 19; Fig. 7: 4); glass beads and bracelets; paste enamel beads; rock-crystal (Fig. 6: 3), onyx, and silver beads; silver and bronze temple rings (*skronevi kiltsia*); gold, bronze, and glass finger rings (Fig. 4: 14); bronze bracelets (Fig. 7: 11); earrings of "Kyivan manufacture"; bronze belt buckles and rings (Figs. 3: 10–11, 18–19; Fig. 4: 18), a metal neck ring (*hryvna*); a crescent-shaped pendant (*lunnytsia*); and, sixteen enamel encolpions (Fig. 4: 11).⁷⁷ Not only members of the princely and boyar elite, but also ordinary townsfolk, wore a great variety of jewellery

and Adults' Games," in *The Archaeology of Novgorod*, 171–6; and A. S. Khoroshev, "Detskie igrushki iz Novgoroda," in *NNZ*, vol. 12, ed. V. L. Iainin (Novgorod: Novgorodskii gosudarstvennyi obedinnnyi muzei-zapovednik, 1998), 82–94. On the musical instruments, see V. I. Povetkin, "Musical Finds from Novgorod," in *The Archaeology of Novgorod*, 213–14; idem, "Novgorodskie gusli i gudki," in *Novgorodskii sbornik*, 295–322; and idem, "Muzykalnye drevnosti Novgoroda," in *Novgorodskie arkhelogicheskie chteniia*, ed. V. L. Iainin and P. G. Gaidukov (Novgorod: Novgorodskii gosudarstvennyi obedinnnyi muzei-zapovednik, 1994), 69.

73. Sviesnikov and Braichevska, "Shkiriane vzuttia," 122–9.

74. *Ibid.*, 123–8.

75. Sviesnikov, "Doslidzhennia," 98.

76. See Sviesnikov and Braichevska, "Shkiriane vzuttia," 123–4, and 126–8; M. Iu. Polonskaia, "Kozhanaia obuv drevnego Smolenska," in *Smolensk i Gnezdovo*, 105–17; D. I. Fotianov, "Obuv i drugie kozhanye izdeliia iz raskopok Toroptsa," *Kratkie soobshcheniia Instituta arkhologii*, no. 195 (1989): 85–90; E. I. Oiateva, "Obuv i drugie kozhanye izdeliia drevnego Pskova," *Arkheologicheskii sbornik Gosudarstvennogo Ermitazha*, issue 4 (Leningrad: Iskustvo, 1962); S. A. Iziumova, "K istorii kozhevennogo i sapozhnogo remesla Novgoroda Velikogo," in *Trudy Novgorodskoi arkhelogicheskoi ekspeditsii*, 2; E. A. Oiateva, "Belozerskaia kozhanaia obuv," in Golubeva, *Ves i slaviane*, 199–205; Shtykhov, *Drevnii Polatsk*, 72–80; and Lysenko, *Bereste*, 287–300.

77. Ratych, "Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod," 93–4; Mogitich and Ratich, "Issledovaniia," 389; idem, "Raboty," 313; Tersky-Shelomiantsev, "Doslidzhennia posadu," 92; and Sviesnikov, "Drevnerusskii gorod," 46.

and other ornaments every day.⁷⁸ In addition to the above finds, archaeologists have discovered gold finger rings; bronze and silver beads; glass beads and bracelets of “Kyivan manufacture;” Byzantine and Rus’ glass bracelets, rings, and pendants with glass inserts (Fig. 6: 5–6; Fig. 7: 5); crosses made from slate [Fig. 6: 2] and amber; amber beads and cross pendants; a bronze encolpion and a niello cross; a Byzantine glass medallion (*eksagi*, Fig. 6: 4); a woven bronze bracelet; a “Scandinavian-type” brooch; a silver medallion; amber pendants; bronze and silver temple-rings; and a lidded amber medallion with a human portrait (both profiles).⁷⁹ Some of this jewellery may have been stored in jewel boxes; a small lock from such a box (Fig. 6: 11) was discovered in Zvenyhorod.⁸⁰

Crafts and Industry

Zvenyhorod’s artisans and manufacturers produced items for domestic consumption and for export. As mentioned above, archaeologists discovered several smithies and bone-carvers’, potters’, and jewellers’ workshops in the citadel and outer town. Most of them date from the twelfth century and the first half of the thirteenth.⁸¹ One workshop also belonged to an artist, probably an icon painter (see below). With one exception—that of Peresopnytsia in Galicia—the bone-carvers’ workshops in Zvenyhorod are the only ones from before the

78. Most of the jewellery unearthed in Zvenyhorod is similar to that found in other Rus’ towns. For an excellent discussion of the jewellery found in Novgorod (with cross-references to other towns), see M. V. Sedova, *Iuvelirnye izdeliia drevnego Novgoroda* (X–XV vv.) (Moscow: Nauka, 1981). Glass beads and bracelets have been found at practically every Rus’ site; therefore, the literature on the subject is enormous. For some important studies, see Iu. L. Shchapova, “Stekliannye busy drevnego Novgoroda,” in *Trudy Novgorodskoi arkhеologicheskoi ekspeditsii*, 1: 164–79; idem, “Stekliannye izdeliia drevnego Novgoroda,” in *Trudy Novgorodskoi arkhеologicheskoi ekspeditsii*, 3: 106–15; Golubeva, *Ves i slaviane na Belom ozere*, 94; Iu. A. Likhter and Iu. L. Shchapova, “Gnezdovskie busy: Po materialam raskopok kurganov i poseleniia,” in *Smolensk i Gnezdovo*, 244–58; and V. V. Sokhatsky and T. P. Valkova, “Busy chernigovskogo gruntovogo nekropolia,” in *Arkheolohichni starozhytnosti Podessennia*, ed. O. P. Motsia (Chernihiv: Siverianska dumka, 1995), 140–3.

79. Sveshnikov, “Raskopki v Zvenigorode na Belke,” 328; idem, “Raboty v Zvenigorode,” 354; idem, “Raskopki prigoroda letopisnogo Zvenigoroda,” 307; idem, “Issledovaniia drevnerusskogo Zvenigoroda pod Lvovom,” 335; idem, “Raskopki v Zvenigorode pod Lvovom,” 409; and idem, “Doslidzhennia,” 98.

80. Svieshnikov, “Doslidzhennia,” 51.

81. G. M. Vlasova, “Masterskie kostorezov v Zvenigorode,” *Zapiski Odesskogo arkhеologicheskogo obshchestva*, 2 (1967): 228–32; Shelomentsev-Tersky, “Nekotorye itogi,” 149; Ratych, “Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod,” 90–4; and Petegirich, “Iz istorii ekonomicheskikh i kulturnykh sviazei,” 151–2.

Mongol invasion that have been discovered so far in the lands of former southwestern Rus'. It is believed that the artifacts produced at these workshops were destined for export.⁸²

At various locations throughout the town, archaeologists unearthed numerous tools and remnants of production by jewellers, blacksmiths, tanners, carpenters, and masons: bone awls, needles, and needle holders (Fig. 4: 10); chisels (Fig. 7: 2); whetstones and pieces of chiselled rock; various scrapers, rasps, and axes (Figs. 3: 4–6; Fig. 7: 6); clay crucibles (Fig. 4: 23) and dippers for melting and pouring non-ferrous metals (such as bronze and copper) into jewellery moulds; adzes, pincers, a drill, a saw, and fragments of scissors (Fig. 3: 7); lead weights (including a 100-g. and a 200-g. weight) and a beam from a scale used for weighing precious and semiprecious metals (Fig. 3: 24); baking kilns and furnaces; iron slag and molten glass; and many other finds related to craft production.⁸³

The finds of more than two hundred Ovruch slate spindle whorls (Fig. 6: 1, 7) and many others made of clay, a wooden spindle, and a bone comb (Fig. 7: 3) for processing fibres indicate that textile working played an important role in Zvenyhorod.⁸⁴ Instruments (hammers and staves) for making cooper items also point to the existence of coopers.⁸⁵ The markings (letters of the Old Rus' alphabet and various symbols) on the bottoms of clay pots (Fig. 4: 20–1, 25–9) show that they were made not only by private potters', but also at workshops of the princely court in the citadel (i.e., some had the princely trident insignia; Fig. 4: 22, 30).⁸⁶ It has been determined that the inhabitants used oak, pine, spruce, birch, beech, hornbeam, elder, maple, and hazel wood in the construction of houses, pavements, drainage systems, and other artifacts.⁸⁷ Although very few materials (axes, a saw, and a drill) indicating the existence of carpenters, joiners, and woodcarvers have been found in Zvenyhorod, many such artisans

82. Shelomentsev-Tersky, "Nekotorye itogi," 149.

83. Ratych, "Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod," 89–94; Sveshnikov, "Issledovaniia prigoroda," 146; idem, Sveshnikov, "Drevnerusskii gorod," 45; idem, "Issledovaniia drevnerusskogo Zvenigoroda pod Lvovom," 335; and idem, "Raskopki v Zvenigorode pod Lvovom," 409.

84. Ratych, "Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod," 93–4; Tersky-Shelomiantsev, "Doslidzhennia posadu," 92; Sveshnikov, "Raskopki v Zvenigorode na Belke," 328; idem, "Raboty v Zvenigorode," 354; idem, "Raskopki prigoroda letopisnogo Zvenigoroda," 307; idem, "Raskopki v Zvenigorode pod Lvovom," 409; and idem, "Issledovaniia prigoroda," 147.

85. Sveshnikov, "Issledovaniia prigoroda," 147; and idem, "Raskopki v Zvenigorode na Belke," 328;

86. Ratych, "Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod," 92–3.

87. Sveshnikov, "Issledovaniia prigoroda," 146.

must have existed to ensure the construction of the town's houses, pavements, and drainage systems and the production of wooden consumer items and decorative carvings.

Of particular interest are the two twelfth-century jewellers' workshops located in the town's commercial district. At one of them (Fig. 2: building no. 1) the artisans manufactured items made of amber and glass; there archaeologists unearthed a kiln, raw and processed amber, molten glass and iron slag, fragments of glass bracelets and vessels, and unfinished glass bracelets.⁸⁸ Large quantities of broken glass items (beads, fragments of bracelets and vessels), finished and unfinished billon ornaments (bracelets, finger rings, pendant head ornaments [*kolty*], and other pendants), scales, three weights, pieces of raw amber, and whole amber artifacts and fragments were unearthed in the second workshop, which was nearby in building no. 35. Although a kiln was not discovered there, one was located in an adjacent building (no. 33). These finds have led scholars to believe that an artisan worked with billon, amber, and glass at the workshop.⁸⁹ At another nearby workshop of undetermined function (Fig. 2: no. 20), archaeologists unearthed upwards of 240 fragments of glass vessels of Kyivan and Byzantine origin and more than 600 whole and broken glass beads.⁹⁰ Because there was also no kiln in or near that building, it is possible that the many glass items found there were produced elsewhere but stored there by a jeweller-glassworker from a neighbouring household.

It should be noted that the large quantities of glass fragments at these three buildings may indicate that craftsmen were recycling broken glass into new products at or near these sites. As noted above, the residents of Zvenyhorod possessed large quantities of glass artifacts (beads, bracelets, rings, and various vessels) that had been imported from Kyiv, Byzantium, and central Europe. When these items broke or, in the case of glass jewellery, perhaps went out of fashion, it is possible that their owners sold them to the jewellers or exchanged them for the jewellers' products or services; hence the discovery of so many glass items inside the above workshops.

Although most of the materials found at the above three sites have not yet been described in publications, obviously some sort of glassworking was practiced at or near these buildings in the twelfth century. Traditionally experts on Rus' glassmaking have believed that Kyiv was the only, or main, centre for the production of glass items in Kyivan Rus'. A recent study has suggested, however, that, although Kyiv was a very important centre of glass production in Rus', it lost its monopoly in the twelfth century, if not earlier. From that

88. Sveshnikov, "Raboty v Zvenigorode," 354.

89. Sveshnikov, "Issledovaniia drevnerusskogo Zvenigoroda pod Lvovom," 335.

90. Sveshnikov, "Raskopki v Zvenigorode pod Lvovom," 409.

period until the Mongol conquest in the middle of the thirteenth century, many other Rus' towns had their own glassworking industries.⁹¹ The finds at the workshops in Zvenyhorod supports this general conclusion.

Trade and Other Contacts with the Outside

Although it was not as well placed as Halych was, Zvenyhorod was close enough to the trade routes linking the Byzantine Empire and the Baltic via a network of rivers (the Buh, Dniester, Zebra, and Bobrokha), portages, and roads to be able to tap into the Dnieper–Buh–Sluch–Neman commercial artery and thus maintain international and domestic commercial ties of some importance.⁹² The archaeological discoveries in the town testify that it traded not only with other major Rus' towns (e.g., Kyiv, Minsk, Ovruch, Halych, Peresopnytsia, Vitechiv, and Vaukavysk), but also with central Europe and the Byzantine Empire during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. For example, the finds of twelfth-century writing styluses in Vitechiv (on the Dnieper, below Kyiv) and Vaukavysk (located on a portage connecting the Dnieper, Buh, and Neman)⁹³ are identical to the one discovered in Zvenyhorod and point to these towns' direct economic contacts. Among the many other imported artifacts uncovered in Zvenyhorod, particularly noteworthy are objects from Kyiv (glazed ceramic Easter eggs, various ornaments, glass beads, bracelets, vessels, and oil lamps),⁹⁴ Ovruch (spindle whorls, crosses, and other slate objects), the Byzantine Empire (eleventh- to mid-thirteenth-century glass vessels, beads, bracelets, various ornaments and jewellery, olive oil and wine in amphorae, Mediterranean red coral and seashells for jewellery-making), central Europe (twelfth-century glassware), the Near East (twelfth-century luster and glazed dishes), Scandinavia (a twelfth-century bronze brooch), and Central Asia (e.g., a handle from a

91. For a brief discussion of the historiography of glassmaking in Rus', see T. S. Noonan, R. K. Kovalev, and H. M. Sherman, "The Development and Diffusion of Glassmaking in Pre-Mongol Russia," in *The Prehistory and History of Glassmaking Technology: Ceramics and Civilization*, vol. 7, ed. P. McCray and W. D. Kingery (Westerville: The American Ceramic Society, 1998), 293–314.

92. For the description of the routes passing through the lands of medieval Volhynia, see K. I. Tereshchuk, "Serednovichni torhovelni shliakhy Skhidnoi Volyni," *Arkheolohiia* (Kyiv), no. 36 (1981): 77–85.

93. Petegirich, "Iz istorii ekonomicheskikh i kulturnykh svyazei," 155.

94. Particularly interesting is the large hoard of glass bracelets that apparently belonged to a merchant. See Ratych, "Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod," 94.

twelfth-century pitcher⁹⁵ [Fig. 6: 8]).⁹⁶ A tin commercial (customs) seal also found in the town testifies to trade with some other part of Rus'.⁹⁷

Seven lead seals found in Zvenyhorod testify that Zvenyhorod's elite had ecclesiastical and political relations with other Rus' principalities. Two of the seals belonged to two Kyivan metropolitans (Fig. 4: 16); four probably belonged to Prince Vasylo Rostyslavych of Terebovl (d. 1124); and, one was that of an unidentified Rus' prince. All of the seals but the latter were discovered together with a dye and a hammer for striking lead in Zvenyhorod's citadel.⁹⁸

Literacy

One of the most interesting finds in Zvenyhorod consists of inscribed pieces of birchbark that were discovered in or near the lower, commercial district's residences discussed above. Because paper and parchment were too expensive for everyday use, people in medieval Rus' wrote various correspondence and memoranda on birchbark instead. Special etching styluses made of metal, bone, or wood were used for that purpose. Once addressees had received and read the texts, they usually threw away the pieces of birchbark; thus archaeologists were able to find them during their excavations of early Rus' towns.⁹⁹

By 1999, 999 inscribed pieces of birchbark had been discovered at the sites of eleven Rus' towns: Novgorod (916 pieces), Staraia Russa (36), Smolensk (15), Torzhok (12), Pskov (8), Tver (5), Zvenyhorod (3), Moscow (1), Mstislau (1), Riazan (1), and Vitsebsk (1). About half of these pieces date from the pre-Mongol era.¹⁰⁰ Except for the three pieces found in Zvenyhorod, all of them were discovered in northern Rus' towns. Thus, the three pieces found in

95. Commercial contacts between Rus' and Central Asia, via the lands of the Volga Bulgars of the middle Volga basin, were extensive in the pre-Mongol era. The main routes connecting the Volga Bulgars and southern Rus' passed through Kyiv or Chernihiv. See *Put iz Bulgara v Kiev*, ed. A. Kh. Khalikov (Kazan: Institut iazyka, literatury i istorii im. G. Ibragimova, 1992). The Central Asian pitcher found in Zvenyhorod may well have passed through one of these cities.

96. Ibid.; Petegirich, "Iz istorii ekonomicheskikh i kulturnykh svyazei," 153–6; Sveshnikov, "Drevnerusskii gorod," 49–52; and idem, "Raskopki v Zvenigorode pod Lvovom," 409.

97. Ratych, "Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod," 91–2.

98. Ratych, "Litopysnyi Zvenyhorod," 91–2. The seal of the unidentified prince was discovered in the commercial section of town. See Sveshnikov, "Raskopki prigoroda letopisnogo Zvenigoroda," 307.

99. For a general discussion of the birchbarks, see R. K. Kovalev, "Birch-Bark Texts," in *SMERSH* (forthcoming); and T. S. Noonan and R. K. Kovalev, "Chto govoriat berestiane gramoty ob ekonomike Kievskoi Rusi," *Russian History/Histoire russe* 25, nos. 1–2 (Spring–Summer 1998): 27–49.

100. Ibid.

Zvenyhorod are very significant, because they show that the use of birchbark for writing was not limited to northern Rus'. In fact, with these finds, there is no reason to doubt that people used birchbark for writing throughout Rus' wherever birch trees were found. The excavated styluses and graffiti inscribed on stone edifices (churches and the Golden Gate in Kyiv) and various artifacts of daily use (amphorae, jewellery moulds, slate spindle whorls, and so on) in Kyiv, Pereiaslav, Halych, and Volodymyr principalities indicate that literacy was relatively widespread in southern Rus'.¹⁰¹ Bronze styluses and graffiti inscribed on household items (an amphora, a bucket, and a wooden cross) were also unearthed in Zvenyhorod.¹⁰² Hence it appears that the main reason why archaeologists have not found more birchbark texts in the former lands of southern Rus' is that the climate, soil, and other physical factors there have not been conducive to their preservation.

Typically, the birchbark texts are short, and most of them have not survived intact. This is the case with one of the pieces (from ca. 1110–37) found in Zvenyhorod, and it is therefore impossible to determine the main thrust of its message, which reads "...[грив?]ѣнѣ а мѣне не [н]адобе сем[о] ч ...". Svieshnikov suggests that the fragment "ѣнѣ" can be reconstructed as "гривѣнѣ", or *hryvnia*, the standard monetary unit in Rus', and that the text therefore reads "*hryvnia*, and here I don't need."¹⁰³ In his recent analysis of this document, however, Andrei A. Zalizniak does not see enough evidence in the text to be able to interpret the fragment as the word *hryvnia*.¹⁰⁴ Be that as it may, the find of this text is significant, because it indicates that there was literacy in Zvenyhorod.

101. See B. A. Rybakov, *Russkie datirovannye nadpisi XI–XIV vv.: Svod arkheologicheskikh istochnikov* (Moscow: Nauka, 1964); S. A. Vysotsky, *Drevnerusskie nadpisi Sofii Kievskoi: XI–XIV vv.*, vol. 1 (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1966); idem, *Srednevekovye nadpisi Sofii Kievskoi (Po materialam graffiti XI–XIV vv.)*, vol. 2 (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1976); idem, *Kievskie graffiti: XI–XVII vv.* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1985); A. A. Medyntseva, "O liteinykh formochkakh s nadpisiami Maksima," in *Drevniaia Rus' i slaviane*, ed. T. V. Nikolaeva (Moscow: Nauka, 1978), 378–82; and T. V. Rozhdestvenskaia, *Drevnerusskie nadpisi na stenakh khramov (Novye istochniki XI–XV vv.)* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1992).

102. Ratych, "Nadpis na amfore iz Zvenigoroda na Belke," 295; Ratich and Shelomentsev-Tersky, "Osobyie pechi," 388; Svieshnikov, "Zvenyhorodski hramoty," 131; and idem, "Drevnerusskii gorod," 45–6.

103. Svieshnikov, "Zvenyhorodski hramoty," 128.

104. A. A. Zalizniak, *Drevnenovgorodskii dialekt* (Moscow: Shkola, "Iazyk russkoi kul'tury", 1995), 291.




FIGURE 8

Source: Sveshnikov, "Issledovanie prigoroda drevnerusskogo Zvenigoroda," 146.

Fortunately, another birchbark text (also from ca. 1110–37) found in Zvenyhorod (Fig. 8) was much better preserved and is therefore more informative. It states: “от говѣновое ко нѣжыньцю дае 6 / деся[т](о) коуно лодиеноую повѣдало / говѣно ида на соудо а попъ шлѣ а дае / лоуцѣ оли нѣ водаси то я оу конязя / поема отроко прижѣ приедю а во боле / ти вонидѣ.”¹⁰⁵ That is, the widow of a man called Hoven is notifying a man called Nizhnych that he should settle his debt of sixty *kuny* (Rus' monetary units) that Hoven had lent him to buy a boat or for boat transportation, or which Nizhnych owed Hoven for providing such transportation. Hoven had died before receiving this payment, but he had a priest document the debt. Hoven's widow appears to have taken charge of her late husband's affairs and has sent Nizhnych a written demand to repay his loan. Although it is not clear who Luka is, it is likely that he was the man entrusted to deliver the birchbark message to Nizhnych, to get the money that Nizhnych owed, and to deliver it to Hoven's widow. The text also provides the interesting detail that, as in Novgorod and Smolensk principalities, Zvenyhorod had an official (*otrok*) appointed by the prince whose duty it was to resolve debt-related disputes.

A Workshop of an Artist

Archaeologists also discovered another piece of birchbark in Zvenyhorod dating from ca. 1100–37 in building no. 23A. It does not contain a text, but the letter “A” and a drawing, which Sviesnikov has suggested is a sketch of a portrait in profile.¹⁰⁶ Other artifacts were unearthed near the piece of birchbark: organic mineral paints (blue, red, yellow, and green);¹⁰⁷ small clay mixing bowls with paint remains;¹⁰⁸ the back of a painted armchair; and part of a bucket inscribed with the name “ІΩΑΝΗΣ” (Ioan).¹⁰⁹ Sviesnikov has convincingly argued that an artist resided in building no. 23A. Because the name “ІΩΑΝΗΣ” contains the Greek letters “Ω” and “Ι,” Sviesnikov further argued that whoever made the inscription was a cleric.¹¹⁰ It is very likely that the resident was not only a priest and an artist but also an icon painter, who would

105. “From Hoven's [widow] to Nizhnych. Give sixty *kuny* for the boat [transportation?]. [Thus], said Hoven before he died, and the priest wrote it down. Give [them] to Luka. If you do not give [them to Luka], then I will get an *otrok* [court official] from the prince and will come [myself to get them]—[and] you will have more to lose” (Ibid., 291–2).

106. Sviesnikov, “Zvenyhorodski hramoty,” 130–1.

107. Sviesnikov, “Issledovaniia prigoroda,” 146.

108. Sviesnikov, “Zvenyhorodski hramoty,” 131.

109. Ibid., 130–1.

110. Ibid., 131.

have had some knowledge of Greek since it was essential in icon painting and sometimes used in the liturgy.

Ca. 1137 a two-storey building replaced the house where the piece of birchbark and other materials associated with painting were found (Fig. 2: building no. 23).¹¹¹ Because of several details in the way the new structure was constructed, Svieshnikov has argued that both buildings belonged to the same individuals. The fact that the new house had two floors indicates that it was a dwelling (not a barn, a workshop, or a stall) and that the owners were well-to-do. Similar two-story boyar houses were unearthed in Novgorod. There one such residence (Troitskii Dig, "A") of the second half of the twelfth century was occupied by a priest and icon painter named Olisei Grechin.¹¹² At this residence archaeologists discovered mineral paints very similar to those unearthed at dwelling no. 23A in Zvenyhorod, mixing bowls, and an array of other materials used in the creation of icons.¹¹³ Grechin's residence was located near those of his patrons, the powerful Novgorodian Nesdich-Miroshchinich boyar clan. In exchange for painting icons, performing church services at a nearby church, and other duties, Olisei's patrons provided him with accommodations, food, and other items, such as wine and olive oil.¹¹⁴ While we do not yet have a detailed study of the household that belonged to the Zvenyhorod artist, it is probable that he was, like Grechin, a priest and icon painter whose patrons were local boyars.

* * *

The archaeological study of Zvenyhorod has provided considerable information about this important town in southwestern Rus' and one of the largest economic, political, and cultural centres in medieval Galicia. All of the data gathered shows that Zvenyhorod was a growing, vibrant urban centre during the twelfth to mid-thirteenth centuries. Because of the moist conditions of the soil in some sections of the town, rare artifacts not found elsewhere in southern Rus' had been preserved and have been excavated there. They clearly show that many aspects of the material culture of Zvenyhorod (from shoes, games, musical instruments, and birchbark for writing to drainage systems, pavements, and non-monumental architecture) were very similar to their counterparts in other Rus' towns. These discoveries show that economic, artistic, and cultural life in southern Rus' was on the same high level of development as in northern Rus'.

111. Ibid., 127–31.

112. Kolchin, Khoroshev, and Ianin, *Usadba novgorodskogo khudozhnika*.

113. Ibid., 114–29; and R. K. Kovalev, "Grechin, Olisei," in *SMERSH* (forthcoming).

114. Kolchin, Khoroshev, and Ianin, *Usadba novgorodskogo khudozhnika*, 114–29; and Kovalev, "Grechin, Olisei."

Stone and wood construction, crafts and agriculture, commerce, art and literacy flourished in the town before the Mongol conquest. Zvenyhorod was clearly a fine representative of the state of Rus' culture, which spanned the territory from Beloozero in the north to Berestia in the northwest and Riazan in the east. At the same time, Zvenyhorod's proximity to Poland and the Catholic world brought certain unique elements to its culture. This is best illustrated by its Romanesque architecture, which prevailed in southwestern Rus' in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. We can only hope that in the future archaeologists will continue to examine the town and publish essential materials about the findings of past explorations. No doubt, further study of Zvenyhorod will shed more light on this important and interesting medieval town.

Ukrainians in Seventeenth-Century Political Trials

*Angela Rustemeyer**

On 8 September 1911 (O.S), a monument to Vasyl Kochubei and Ivan Iskra was unveiled in Borshchakivka, Skvyra county. In accordance with public tastes of the time, it was erected "on the blood" of those "martyrs," that is, on the spot where they had been executed for denouncing Hetman Ivan Mazepa 203 years earlier.¹ Ever since the publication of Pushkin's poem "Poltava," Kochubei and Iskra had been the most famous denouncers in the Russian Empire. The aim of this grandiose posthumous tribute to them under the guise of Great Russia-led unity must have been to diminish the Ukrainians' reputation as "traitors"—an accusation that had been malevolently disseminated in the empire in the wake of the Polish Insurrection of 1863.

Denunciation by Ukrainians was not a new thing. Works on Ukrainian folklore of the first half of the nineteenth century contain songs and legends praising honest Cossacks who denounced their leaders' treacherous intentions.² Mykola Kostomarov, however, found the inclination toward denunciation ("*donosnichestvo*") that Ukrainians had seemingly "always" exhibited, especially in the period after Mazepa's defeat, a doubtful virtue.³

Historians have recently tried to decipher the semantics of denunciations, to define their role in political systems, and to reconstruct their social context. This

* I would like to thank Professors Andreas Kappeler and Frank Sysyn for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. I am also very grateful to Elke Beyer and Roman Senkus for revising the English text.

1. *Rech, skazannaia sviashchennikom N. A. Sharaevskim pri otkrytii pamiatnika Kochubeiu i Iskre v m. Borshchakovke, Skvirsk. u., 8 sentiabria 1911 g.* (Š. l., 1911).

2. Izmail I. Sreznevsky, *Zaporozhskaia starina*, pt. 2, issue 3 (Kharkiv: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1838), 110–13, 120–1; Panteleimon A. Kulish, *Zapiski o Iuzhnoi Rusi* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia A. Iakobsona, 1856), 115–23.

3. Nikolai I. Kostomarov, *Ruina. Mazepa. Mazepintsy* (Moscow: Charli, 1995), 770.

article will examine denunciations and trials in the seventeenth-century Cossack Hetmanate from this point of view. It will also trace the early history of the stereotype of "Little Russian treachery."

Ethnicity in Muscovite Political Trials

In Muscovy, each and every subject was obliged to denounce political offenses. Indeed, people from both the upper and lower classes participated in the many seventeenth-century trials about which we have information. Denouncers passed on their knowledge about an utterance or act of concern to the sovereign ("*slovo*" or "*delo gosudarevo*") to the *voevody* (military governors), and the latter were obliged to communicate this information to the capital. Such denunciations were, of course, frequently used to protect one's personal or social interests.

"*Slovo*" and "*delo gosudarevo*" were not only formulas for political inquisition, but also ways by which the centre obtained important information. In 1632 the tsar and Patriarch Filaret instructed the *voevoda* of Viazma that if a Polish "noble of good name" appeared on Muscovite territory "and said that he knew many tidings or announced [something that would be of] great concern to us [*nashe velikoe delo*]," he should not be sent back the way "simple nobles and their retinue" would.⁴ In 1640 the "Lithuanian" Maciej Sosnowski tried to make use of Moscow's interest in information about developments in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. For reasons unknown to us, Sosnowski had been exiled to Tomsk. When he was accused of breaking into the office of the *voevody* (*s"ezzhaia izba*), he confessed that he had done so and also stolen the cash box. He then confronted the *voevody* with a letter to the tsar written in Russian but in Latin characters that contained a detailed report on a *samožvanets* with whom Sosnowski claimed to have attended the Jesuit college in Berestia. In the letter Sosnowski unsuccessfully tried to make his report credible by referring to his descent from the Commonwealth's educated nobility.⁵

4. Nikolai Ia. Novombergssky, *Slovo i delo gosudarevy (Protssessy do izdaniia Ulozheniia Alekseia Mikhailovicha)*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Pechatnia A. I. Snegirevoi, 1911), 323. The document refers to "*polskie liudi*" and not to "*litva*." This might mean that Ruthenians willing to cross the border into Muscovy were to be accepted in any case. Ethnic identification of inhabitants of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth is rare in the sources; see below and n. 7.

5. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov (hereafter RGADA), f. 6, no. 1. Although he failed to avoid punishment, Sosnowski managed to escape from his calamity some years later. In 1642 he was a prisoner in Ketskoe in the Tomsk region. Later he was sent to the Lena for military service. In 1649 he denounced some merchants and their confidants who had forged tax lists to the Iakutsk *voevoda*. Sosnowski then became a kind of spy for the *voevoda*, and eventually an emissary between Iakutsk and Moscow. See Antoni Kuczyński, "Polacy w dziele cywilizacyjnym na Syberii w początkach kolonizacji

Sosnowski's report was about a somewhat abstract person in the past. But a "Lithuanian" monk, Malakhii, engaged in what can indeed be called denunciation. In 1637 he accused his fellow "Lithuanian" monks in the Tobolsk Znamenskii Monastery of refusing to pray for the tsar's conquest of Smolensk and wishing instead for a Russian defeat. Malakhii claimed that the other monks had insulted him because he had informed against them, and that they had committed a verbal injury not only to his person, but also to Muscovy's political and religious order by stating that "You, Malakhii, have forgotten your faith, and you have adopted the Russian doggish spirit."⁶

The indiscriminate use of the term "*litva*" for all subjects of the Polish-Lithuanian state indicates that Moscow's bureaucracy and its local representatives did not distinguish fully between ethnicity and political allegiance.⁷ Malakhii charged that his fellow monks were untrustworthy because they were "Lithuanian." This was a facile argument. Although similar suspicions were not ubiquitous in trials involving non-Russians, a scribe's error resulted in a conflict in Tula in 1637 that linked "foreigners" and "traitors." There Ivan Chernavitsky, a foreigner (*kormovoi inozemets*) in the service of the tsar, informed the *voevoda* about a "word of concern to the sovereign." Chernavitsky claimed that he had heard a Don (or perhaps Yaik) Cossack at a local tavern call all *cherkasy* (i.e., Ukrainians) and Zaporozhian Cossacks "traitors."⁸ When the accused was

rosyjskiej," *Przegląd Historyczny* 73 (1982): 47–68, here 57.

6. P. N. Butsinsky, *Sibirskie arkhiepiskopy Makarii, Nektarii, Gerasim (1625–1650 g.)* (Kharkiv: Tipografiia gubernskago pravleniia, 1891), 40–3.

7. The term "*litva*" is frequently used in Muscovite sources of the period; see D. J. Rezun and I. P. Kamieniecki, "Polacy na Syberii w XVII wieku: Ludzie służni w Kuznieckim ostrogu," *Przegląd Historyczny* 78 (1987): 395–409, here 396. About the term as an indicator of Muscovites' indifference towards the Orthodox Slavs in the Commonwealth and as evidence of the lack even of an imagined East Slavic unity, see Edward L. Keenan, "Muscovite Perceptions of Other East Slavs before 1654—An Agenda for Historians, in *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj et al. (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992), 20–38, here 22 and 31.

8. Both before and after 1654, the Muscovite administration used the term "*cherkasy*" when referring to the large group of Orthodox inhabitants of (or Orthodox immigrants from) the Commonwealth. Andreas Kappeler hints at the negative connotation of the term as "unreliable Cossacks"; see his article "Mazepintsy, malorossy, khokhly: Ukraintsy v etnicheskoi ierarchii Rossiiskoi imperii," in *Rossiiia – Ukraina: istoriia vzaimootnoshenii*, ed. Aleksei I. Miller, Vladimir F. Reprintsev, and Boris N. Floria (Moscow: Institut slavianovedenia i balkanistiki RAN and Institut "Otkrytoe obshchestvo," 1997), 125–44, here 126. The differentiation between "*cherkasy*" and "Dnieper Cossacks" in the source quoted above shows that in the first half of the century "*cherkasy*" was neither a term for all Ukrainian Cossacks nor a clear ethnonym for all Ukrainians. Yet it soon was to

brought before the *voevoda*, he denied the charge, claiming that he had simply told Chernavitsky about a funny mistake that a scribe had made some years earlier when writing a petition to the tsar on behalf of *cherkasy* and Zaporozhian Cossacks. Instead of “Long-resident foreigners bow their heads to the ground before you [*biut chelom tebe starago vyezdu (...) inozemtsy*],” the scribe had written “Long-resident traitors [*izmenniki*].”⁹

Nonetheless, treason was not generally regarded in Muscovy as inherent in individuals of foreign descent. This is evident in the case of the widow Khovronitsa after the Pskov uprising in 1650. Efim Fetulov, a translator of German, informed the authorities about the “crone’s gossip” that he had heard about at the German commercial court (*nemetskii dvor*). There a “Lithuanian,” Grigorii Ostafev, had repeated Khovronitsa’s nasty words about the tsar’s sympathy for foreigners. During his later interrogation, Ostafev said that he had met Khovronitsa at the home of his brother-in-law, whom she used to ask for alms. There she insulted Ostafev, calling him “Khovansky’s man” and a “traitor to the people of Pskov.” When Ostafev replied that he did not serve Khovansky but the sovereign, the widow stated that the tsar was too young and obedient to the boyars. She went on to say that the tsar was on the side of the “Germans” instead of the “Orthodox Christians” and that he had wanted to give “the grain to the Germans,” whereas the people of Pskov had been standing up for “justice.”¹⁰ Her remarks echo an eyewitness’s observation about the 1648 uprising in Moscow, according to which people were inclined to regard the tsar himself as a traitor.¹¹ Khovronitsa is scandalized by the tsar’s close relations with the “Germans.” However, she attacks the “Lithuanian” Ostafev only for his behaviour, not for his foreign origin.

Denunciations were as varied as the daily encounters between people from different ethnic groups in taverns, courtyards, markets, and jails. The most frequent reproach—misuse of the tsar’s title—was not used solely by Russians. In 1622 a Zaporozhian Cossack in Tula informed against a peasant who allegedly

become one. A source from the end of the seventeenth century uses the adjective “*cherkaskie*” for priests, that is, for people who were definitely not Cossacks; see RGADA, f. 210, Belgorodskii stol, st. 1515, l. 152–3. Significantly, the shift from “*cherkaskie goroda*” (1656, 1658) to “*malorossiiskie goroda*” (1664, 1669) took place long before “*malorossy*” became a common term for the Ukrainians. See Nikolai Ia. Novombergsky, *Ocherki vnutrenniago pravleniia v Moskovskoi Rusi XVII stoletii: Prodovolstvennoe stroenie. Materialy*, vol. 1 (Tomsk, 1914; reprint, Munich: Otto Sagner, 1972), 73, 87, 136, 239.

9. Novombergsky, *Slovo i delo*, 1: 247–50.

10. RGADA, f. 141, no. 98, l. 100–4.

11. See Valerie A. Kivelson, “The Devil Stole His Mind: The Tsar and the 1648 Uprising,” *The American Historical Review* 98 (1993): 733–56, here 746.

said that his master was “tsar to them.”¹² Nevertheless, some trials exhibit the political dimension of ethnic allegiance. As transmitters of information, “*slovo*” and “*delo gosudarevo*” bound Muscovy’s frontier regions to the centre. The trials that originated in those regions—whether they were initiated by a denunciation or not—took the problems of the western and southwestern frontier to Moscow. A major problem in those regions was the flight of tsar’s subjects from Muscovy. Such flight was considered treason,¹³ and the Muscovite authorities distinguished the “Russian traitors” who had fled to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from the other “Lithuanian people” there. Accordingly, those who were tried for suspicious contacts with “Lithuania” had to specify their origin. At one trial, the wife of a bailiff at the saltpetre works near Putyvl who was suspected of smuggling declared that she did not know whether her husband was a “Lithuanian” or a Russian. Her sister-in-law, however, stated that she and her brother, the bailiff, were of “Lithuanian” descent and originally from Kyiv, but that her husband was a Russian who had been a captive in Kyiv and had returned to Muscovite territory together with her.¹⁴

Various Muscovite authorities transformed their victims’ biographies into traitors’ careers. But so did informers, such as Matvei Eustratev, a slave whose denunciation started a trial in 1638. Eustratev juxtaposed his autobiography and a “traitor’s” who had deliberately changed sides. Eustratev claimed that he had been taken captive as a child and thus spent twenty years abroad before returning to Muscovy and serving there as a Cossack. When he and other Cossacks were refused payment for their services, he entered the service of the son of a certain Vasilii Tolbuzin. One of Tolbuzin’s other men, Vasilii Ivanov, had betrayed the sovereign by going to “Lithuania” and staying there for two years. Eustratev denounced Ivanov for fleeing and his master for not informing the authorities about Ivanov’s flight.

Ivanov, the accused, countered the accusation by presenting his biography in a positive light. He talked about the period of the *smuta* and told the *voevoda* that he had been kidnapped as a child in 1610 by the Zaporozhian Cossacks. As an adult he again involuntarily found himself on “Lithuanian” territory because the estate of his master remained there after the peace of 1619. He went there to fetch his belongings and stayed for four years, returning to Muscovy to escape his master’s punishment.

12. Novombergsky, *Slovo i delo*, 1: 290.

13. Christoph Schmidt, *Sozialkontrolle in Moskau: Justiz, Kriminalität und Leibeigenschaft, 1649–1785*, Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des östlichen Europa, 44 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1996), 72.

14. *Akty Moskovskago gosudarstva*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: Imperatorskaia Akademiia nauk, 1890), 320.

On the one hand, Ivanov claimed to be a victim of Muscovy's changing fortunes in wartime. On the other, he did not leave any doubt about his preference for crossing the border instead of permanent dependence on his master. The way he defined the relationship between individual and collective identity is remarkable: twice he deliberately returned to Muscovy because of his "Orthodox Christian faith" (that is, not necessarily because of loyalty to the tsar).¹⁵

The 1648 Cossack-peasant uprising led by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky encouraged reflections about ethnicity and its political meaning. Now Muscovy bordered on a territory inhabited and ruled by Orthodox Christians, but one that was politically organized quite differently. Father Fedor, a priest from Oleshnia (south of Sumy), who was denounced in 1650 for boasting that he was a relative of the tsar and that he had close ties to the patriarch, describes his predicament as the result of a Ukrainian confronting Muscovy's unfamiliar political order: He and two "*cherkasy*," shareholders in his mill, crossed the border into "Lithuania" to buy a millstone. There they planned to spend the night at a priest's home. They were stopped on their way by a "*cherkashenin*" (i.e., a Ukrainian), who asked them if they were Poles. Fedor replied that he was not a Pole but "a man who prayed for the [Muscovite] sovereign [*gosudarev bogomolets*]." The Ukrainian then inquired on whom they relied while travelling so late at night. "On God and the sovereign," Fedor replied, whereupon the Ukrainian asked: "If I killed you and robbed you now, how would the sovereign ever come to know?" Fedor replied that he had a brother in Moscow who would "beat his front" and that the sovereign would hear him.¹⁶ The priest's story presents two different political mentalities and proves that crossing the border was an everyday occurrence. Thus the discontented could change their allegiance easily. But they ran the risk of severe punishment if the Muscovite authorities caught them. When the Ukrainian Cossacks had again turned away from Muscovy after 1654, the authorities regarded people leaving for the Cossacks' territory as double traitors.¹⁷

15. Novombergsky, *Slovo i delo*, 1: 458–64.

16. *Ibid.*, 244–7.

17. This is evident in the two biographies laconically summarized in a 1666 case file. In one of them, Pankratii Kiselev, a dragoon from Komaritskaia *volost*, which consisted of Sevsk district and parts of Dmitrovsk and Trubchevsk districts, "left for the *cherkas* towns" and returned "with the Tatars and the treacherous *cherkasy*." In modern terms he would be called a deserter. In the other biography, Gerasim Baev, a bondsman, fled ca. 1661 to Putyvl and thence to Hlukhiv in the Hetmanate, where he lived in the town's trading quarter. He fought against Muscovite troops and was captured. "And we, your servants, have ordered that these [two] traitors be hanged in Sevsk," the *voevody* wrote in a dispatch to Moscow (RGADA, f. 210, Prikaznyi stol, st. 384, l. 3–11).

Two trials that took place in the second half of the seventeenth century hint at the demarcation of Ukrainian and Russian identities. In both cases Russians denounced Ukrainians who had expressed disloyal intentions and had called them “*moskali*.” In 1676 Ivan Semenov, a Don Cossack (“*donskoï kormovoi kazak*”), denounced the *cherkashenin* Dmitrii (Dmytro) Tokmysh from a village near Nedryhailiv (a company centre in Sumy regiment) who allegedly had said “they’d show Moscow.” Taken to the capital, Tokmysh defended himself there by stating that Semenov had assaulted him on his way to the village and had forced him to buy beer for him and his companions. The Cossacks were dissatisfied with Nedryhailiv’s inhabitants because the latter had complained about their constant attacks. Tokmysh himself had told Semenov that he would inform the authorities about this new incident, and he claimed that he had called Semenov a “*moskal*” because “all *cherkasy* call all Muscovite people *moskali*.”¹⁸

In 1689 Aleksei Privalov, a Russian from Kharkiv, informed on the Cossack aide-de-camp (*osaul*) Ivan Shpak of Zmiiv. Privalov stated that he was sitting inside a house in Kharkiv owned by a Ukrainian called Volovyk when he heard Shpak, who was passing by the house, say: “You *moskali* shall go to hell! The *voevody* do not let us live. I will now leave for Kyiv with my wife and children, and more than one hundred *cherkasy* will leave with me. We have opened the doors to the Tatars.” Shpak denied that he had spoken about escaping to Kyiv and about the Tatars, but he admitted that he had complained about the *voevody*, who were forcing the Ukrainians out of the towns. In the Muscovite capital, interest in the misbehaviour of the *voevody* seems to have prevailed: Shpak was released from prison after guaranteeing that he would stay in Kharkiv.¹⁹ Thus the trial came to a relatively harmless end. Yet it shows that not later than the beginning of the Petrine period people in Muscovy’s southwestern frontier had become conscious of a certain distribution of roles. The potentially oppressive “*moskali*” faced the unreliable “*cherkasy*,” who regarded the Hetmanate as their refuge.

Denunciations and Trials in the Cossack Hetmanate

In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the state from which the Hetmanate seceded, political crimes had been legally defined much earlier than in Muscovy. In Poland the term and concept of “*lese-majesty*” had been adopted from Roman law by the end of the thirteenth century.²⁰ Subjects were obligated to engage

18. RGADA, f. 210, Prikaznyi stol, st. 1026, l. 3–11.

19. RGADA, f. 210, Belgorodskii stol, st. 1273, l. 8–32.

20. Juliusz Bardach, *Historia państwa i prawa Polski*, vol. 1, *Do połowy XV wieku* (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1964), 326. In Casimir the Great’s statutes

in denunciation insofar as the deliberate concealment of lese-majesty was punishable.²¹ The real dimension of the prosecution of political crimes in the Commonwealth has not yet been explored. Janusz Tazbir has estimated that the number of trials for treason there remained low in the seventeenth century, while the number of witch trials rose considerably. While political and witch trials often overlapped in Muscovy, they were strictly separated in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This was a peculiarity of the republic of nobles, which protected its *szlachta* from accusations of witchcraft.²² The Commonwealth's nobles could also not easily be accused of lese-majesty. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the crown had tried to level this charge against its noble opponents. In 1588, however, a law forbidding the king to use lese-majesty as an instrument to impede nobles in their legal political activities was introduced.²³ The Third Lithuanian Statute, which remained in force in Ukraine even after the country came under Polish rule, also limited the king's possibilities to prosecute lese-majesty.²⁴

The political trials that took place in the Commonwealth and Muscovy indicate that the two states developed different public spheres (*Öffentlichkeiten*). In Muscovy punishment was a public affair in many cases, as was sometimes the first step towards a trial—declaring that one had something about which to inform the authorities. The announcement of a “*slovo*” or “*delo gosudarevo*” was a token of the tsar's presence insofar as it was part of the ruler's public representation, in which the subjects participated.²⁵ Political trials in the

of the following century, however, the crimes of lese-majesty and treason, which might have resulted in arbitrary persecution of the king's political opponents, were absent; see *ibid.*, 251.

21. For such cases, see Adam Lityński, *Przestępstwa polityczne w polskim prawie karnym XVI–XVIII wieku*, Prace naukowe Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 119 (Katowice, 1976), 26.

22. Janusz Tazbir, “Hexenprozesse in Polen,” *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte* 71 (1980): 280–307, here 291–3.

23. Stanisław Salmonowicz, “La noblesse polonaise contre l'arbitraire du pouvoir royal: Les privilèges judiciaires de la noblesse,” *Revue historique du droit français et étranger* 72 (1994): 21–9, here 27.

24. *Statut Wialikaha kniastva litouskaha 1588: Teksty. Davednik. Kamentaryi* (Minsk: Belarusaika savetskaia entsyklopedyia, 1989), 48 and 351.

25. Participation of the people is an aspect that Jürgen Habermas neglects in his characterization of *Öffentlichkeit* as the public representation of medieval and early-modern European monarchies in his *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*, 15th ed. (Darmstadt: Luchterhand, 1982), 17–25. Recently attempts have been made to fill this gap; see, for instance, Andreas Gestrich, *Absolutismus und Öffentlichkeit: Politische Kommunikation in Deutschland zu Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts*, Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissen-

Commonwealth were different, at least when nobles were involved. Here the debating *Öffentlichkeit* of the nobles' republic was a factor to be mobilized.²⁶

Thus political trials in the Commonwealth were at least occasionally a topic of debate within the noble estate, and that is how members of the *szlachta*, including Ukrainian nobles, came to know about them. The elite of the Cossack Hetmanate was recruited from among the Ukrainian nobility. These nobles and the registered Cossacks were familiar with the disciplinary practices applied in the regular army. Polish military law severely punished treason, i.e., contacts with the enemy.²⁷ Moreover, officers in the seventeenth-century Commonwealth were duty-bound to denounce any violation of military law that they knew about.²⁸ After 1654, the Cossack elite's mutual denunciations and their most frequent accusation, that of treason, must be seen against the background of the Commonwealth's rules and practices. They must have been familiar to the Cossack leaders, but the "free" Cossacks were not bound by them. The Zaporozhians had their own unwritten law. For them treason was not a punishable act defined in the statutes, but a political accusation, a vehicle of Cossack democracy. "(S')il commet quelque lascheté ils le tuent comme traistre," writes Beauplan about the Zaporozhian hetman's precarious position.²⁹

The Cossacks' right to remove a hetman identified as a "traitor" seems to have been so fundamental that the Hlukhiv articles conceded their right to do so without the tsar's prior agreement.³⁰ In a society without written law and with a political organization based on plebiscite, fluctuations in "public opinion" could

schaft 103 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1994).

26. The Zborowski family tried to do exactly that during the trial against Krzysztof and Andrzej Zborowski for lese-majesty in 1583. To draw attention to the injuries already done to the family, the coffin of the executed brother Samuel was exposed at a Cracow cemetery while his widow and crying children stood by. See Stanisław Salmonowicz, Janusz Szwaja, and Stanisław Waltoś, *Pitaval Krakowski* (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1973), 95.

27. "Króla Władysława IV artykuły wojsku cudzoziemskiemu opisane," in *Polskie ustawy i artykuły wojskowe od XV do XVIII wieku*, ed. Stanisław Kutrzeba, Archiwum Komisji Historii Wojskowej 3 (Cracow: Polska Akademia Umiejętności, 1937), 217.

28. Jan Kamiński, *Historja sądownictwa wojskowego w dawnej Polsce* (Warsaw: Towarzystwo wiedzy wojskowej, 1928), 32.

29. Guillaume le Vasseur, sieur de Beauplan, *La description d'Ukraine*, ed. Dennis F. Essar and Andrew B. Pernal (Ottawa: Les Presses de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1989), 74. See also Carsten Kumke, *Führer und Geführte bei den Zaporoger Kosaken: Struktur und Geschichte kosakischer Verbände im polnisch-litauischen Grenzland (1550–1648)*, *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 49 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1993), 195.

30. Georgii G. Telberg, *Ocherki politicheskago suda i politicheskikh prestuplenii v Moskovskom Gosudarstve XVII veka*, *Uchenye zapiski Moskovskago universiteta, Otdel iuridicheskii*, 39 (Moscow: Tipografiia Moskovskago universiteta, 1912), 40.

easily result in such an accusation of treason. Consequently the 1648 Khmelnytsky uprising gave power to a Cossack elite that must have been highly sensitive to what the Muscovite bureaucracy called indecent words (*“nepristoinyia slova”*). They knew about the duty to denounce as a means of military discipline. They might have been familiar with political trials that, in the frame of estate jurisdiction and noble *“Öffentlichkeit,”* were no real danger to the stability of the group.

Clerical and Secular Denouncers

In 1654 the first of Moscow’s *voevody* came to Kyiv, and along with them came *“slovo”* and *“delo gosudarevo.”* Ukrainians did not often use the formal Muscovite system of denunciation. Members of the Cossack elite and high clergy could easily communicate their information directly to Moscow. Nevertheless, as early as May 1654—two months after the Pereiaslav agreement—Rafail, the vicar (*namisnyk*) of St. Michael’s Monastery, appeared before the *voevody* to announce that he knew about a “great matter of concern to the sovereign” (*“velikoe gosudarevo delo”*) in which the metropolitan of Kyiv, the archimandrite of the Kyivan Cave Monastery, and his own archimandrite were involved. Making use of the knowledge that he had acquired as a father confessor, he provided much information about the three men’s anti-Muscovite intentions. In return he asked to be sent to Moscow immediately for his own safety. The *voevody* fulfilled his request. When Hetman Khmelnytsky later complained about the monk’s “indecent words,” they told him that the vicar had gone on a pilgrimage to visit “miracle workers.” They also tried to hide the real reasons for his departure from the superiors of his own monastery.³¹

In July 1654 Kyiv’s monastic clergy obtained the tsar’s guarantee of their judicial immunity. This had some effect in the case of the monk Krynytsky and his companion, who, according to the vicar Rafail, had served the metropolitan as emissaries to Poland. The *voevody* had arrested them, but had to release them upon the metropolitan’s demand that they do so.³² Because the Church’s jurisdiction over its subjects was also respected in political trials in Muscovy, the concession was not exceptional. But neither was it long-lasting, as can be seen in another case of political denunciation in Kyiv. This time—in January 1656—the *voevody* enforced their control. A “boy of about fifteen” had come to them and told them that “his uncle, Pimin Ulevsky, a monk of the Cave Monastery,

31. RGADA, f. 210, Sevskii stol, st. 153, l. 110–23, published in Vasiliï M. Bazilevich, *Izvet startsa Rafaila: Iz kievskikh nastroyenii vremeni Bogdana Khmelnytskogo* (Kyiv: Tipografiia Kievskoi shkoly pechatnago dela, 1919).

32. Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 9, bk. 1 (New York: Knyho-spilka, 1957), 864–5.

had sent him.... Pimin had come from Volhynia three days ago ... and he knew many tidings [*vesti*] ... and at the monastery they keep him in chains so that nobody would get to know about him." The *voevody* sent a musketeer captain to the monastery and then a secretary (*diak*), who threatened to make the archimandrite's "disobedience" known to Moscow and to the hetman unless Pimin was released. Two monks accompanied Pimin to the *voevody* to assist in his interrogation by the latter, as the archimandrite had ordered. The *voevody* told the two monks that "in the sovereign's matters" no witnesses were admitted. Pimin gave a detailed report about the links between Kyiv and Poland and stated that "the clergymen ... are not well-disposed toward His Highness the Tsar, [but that] they support the Polish king in every respect."³³

Thus the authors of the first clearly political denunciations that came from the Hetmanate to Moscow were not Cossacks, but clergymen denouncing fellow clergymen. This suggests that opinions for or against the Muscovite protectorate were more clearly defined among the clergy than they were among the Cossacks.³⁴ According to Kostomarov, the higher clergy was against the Pereiaslav agreement.³⁵ Vicar Rafail's and Pimin's cases indicate that opinions among the second-rank monastic clergy differed, to say the least. They also show that the Muscovite system of denunciation could be imported.

Mutual denunciation by the Hetmanate's inhabitants was at first a practice limited to the upper classes, where it was used by clergymen and Cossack leaders against their equals. Yet clergymen and members of the Cossack elite also informed against each other. Thus, in 1664 Hetman Ivan Briukhovetsky denounced Bishop Metodii, who administered the vacant see of the metropolitan of Kyiv, and other clerics to the *voevoda* of Hadiach: "(The) Polish king goes to Kyiv on the invitation [*po prisylke*] of the inhabitants of Kyiv, and all this evil calamity comes from the nun [*staritsa*] Angilina, who ... is teaching the bishop's daughter to read and write [*gramote*], and this nun Angilina has heard news from the bishop's daughter and has communicated them to Poland [i.e., Right-Bank Ukraine], to [Hetman Pavlo] Teteria." Briukhovetsky claimed that the bishop had even offered him his daughter's hand in marriage to entice him to change sides, but he stated that he would have maintained his "loyalty and steadfastness"

33. RGADA, f. 210, Sevskii stol., st. 179, l. 396.

34. Those against whom the denunciations were addressed claimed, of course, that the denouncers' motives were other than political. In Rafail's case, Khmelnytsky wrote to the *voevody* that "certain rogues [*vory*], the monks Rafail and Saffonii, having stolen in the monastery, express indecent words about various persons" (ibid., l. 123). The archimandrite of the Cave Monastery told the *voevody* that the monk Pimin had been fettered because he had "caused great losses on the monastery's estates" (ibid., l. 386).

35. Nikolai I. Kostomarov, *Getmanstvo Vygovskago* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia P. A. Kulisha, 1862), 6.

towards the tsar even if the bishop had given him "a mountain of gold." He proposed harsh measures to rid Kyiv of the peril: occupation of the Cave Monastery by the tsar's troops and removal of all the monks therein.³⁶

For his part, Bishop Metodii was not less of a denouncer, however. In 1663 he had supported Briukhovetsky's denunciation of the latter's rival for hetman, Iakym Somko, to Moscow for treason.³⁷ Then in 1666, dissatisfied with the Moscow treaty's provision for sending a metropolitan to Kyiv from Moscow, he agitated against Briukhovetsky in Ukraine, accusing the hetman of handing over his opponents to Moscow in order to have them banished to Siberia.³⁸ Later still he himself denounced Briukhovetsky to the Muscovite authorities.³⁹

These mutual denunciations hint at a balance of power, which both the bishop and the hetman tried to change in favour of themselves. Yet Metodii probably did not regard his own "reports" as denunciations. Their renowned ecclesiastical authority may have suggested to the high Ukrainian clergy the exercise of control by clerical advisors over the secular rulers in Moscow and in Kyiv. For them a completely new situation had occurred after 1648: they found themselves linked with Orthodox secular rulers in a relationship marked by both symbiosis and rivalry. Metodii's denunciations of the hetman were the same kind of tactical manoeuvre as the metropolitan's and large monasteries' appeals to the tsar to guarantee their landownings in the Hetmanate and even help to enlarge them.⁴⁰ They were not gestures of submission and were fully compatible with at least partial resistance to Moscow's religious policies in Ukraine.⁴¹

36. RGADA, f. 210, Belgorodskii stol, st. 539, ll. 176–8.

37. Dmitrii N. Bantysh-Kamensky, *Istoriia Maloi Rossii*, pt. 2 (Moscow: the author, 1822), 4. The Cossack chronicles tell the same story. See *Letopis Samovidtsa po neotkrytym spiskam, s prilozheniem trekh malorossiiskikh khronik* (Kyiv: Kievskaiia vremennaia kommissiia dlia razbora drevnikh aktov, 1878), 77; "Kratkoe opisanie Malorossii," in *ibid.*, 258; and *Deistviia prezelnoi i ot nachala poliakov krvavshei nebyvaloi brani Bogdana Khmelnitskago, getmana zaporozhskago, s poliakami ... z roznykh letopistsov i iz diariusha, na toi voine napisannago, v grade Gadiachu, trudom Grigoriia Griabianki ... roku 1710* (Kyiv: Vremennaia kommissiia dlia razbora drevnikh aktov, 1854), 175.

38. Bantysh-Kamensky, *Istoriia Maloi Rossii*, 43.

39. *Ibid.*, 54.

40. About these appeals, see Venedikt A. Miakotin, *Ocherki sotsialnoi istorii Ukrainy v XVII–XVIII vv.*, vol. 1 (Prague: "Vataga i plamia," 1924), 75–6. Mutual complaints and denunciations to Moscow also marked the relationship between the rebellious colonel Petro Roslavets and Bishop Lazar Baranovych of Chernihiv; see Georg Michels, "The First Old Believers in Ukraine: Observations about Their Social Profile and Behavior," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 16 (1992), no. 3/4: 289–313, here 295.

41. In 1668 Metodii turned against Muscovy together with Briukhovetsky. He was convicted of treason against the tsar in 1669 and spent the rest of his life at a monastery in Moscow. Ivan Vlasovsky condemns him as Moscow's "bribed servant" who changed

The church itself was also a recipient of denunciations of secular dignitaries. During the period in question, two hetmans were excommunicated by ecumenical patriarchs.⁴² For the hetman denunciations to the tsar were also a counterweight to this ecclesiastical sanction. In the long run the practice of mutual denunciation gravely impaired the consolidation of a political elite in the Hetmanate.

Rhetoric and the Struggle for Power

How did denouncers and the authorities define subversion? When it came to Ukrainian clergymen, the convenient accusation was "Latinism." Indeed, according to Hetman Briukhovetsky Metodii was a "Latinist."⁴³ Vicar Rafail denounced the metropolitan, the archimandrite of the Cave Monastery, his own archimandrite and hegumen, and the vicars of two other monasteries as "Latinists" because they had conversed in Latin.⁴⁴ Another reproach implied here is that of pride. To make the Kyiv "Latinists" look even worse, Rafail praised the loyal bishop of Chernihiv as the opposite of a proud person—"a meek man [*chelovek smirnoi*]."⁴⁵ "It does not behoove you, a monk, to be proud and not to obey the sovereign's ukase," the secretary sent by the *voevody* warned the archimandrite of the Cave Monastery, who refused to deliver Pimin.⁴⁶ This

his mind only because his wish to become metropolitan of Kyiv with Moscow's support was not fulfilled; see Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii Ukrainiskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy*, vol. 2, *XVII stolittia* (New York and Bound Brook: Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the U.S.A., 1956), 322. I think Metodii belongs to those people "crossing the borders" whom David Frick considers as typical of early-modern Ukraine and who might deserve a more differentiated approach; see David A. Frick, "Misinterpretations, Misunderstandings, and Silences: Problems of Seventeenth-Century Ruthenian and Muscovite Cultural History," in *Religion and Culture in Early Modern Russia and Ukraine*, ed. Samuel H. Baron and Nancy Shields Kollmann (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1997), 149–68, here 155–6.

42. In 1666 Briukhovetsky sent Col. Kostiantyn Myhaievsky to Moscow so that the latter's power would be neutralized. Instead, Myhaievsky succeeded in getting the hetman excommunicated by two patriarchs who had come there because of the Nikon affair. See Bantysh-Kamensky, *Istoriia Maloi Rossii*, 53; and Osip Bodiansky, ed., *Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii*, pt. 1 (Moscow: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1858), 178–80. According to the hetman's letter to the tsar, the Patriarch of Constantinople banned Hetman Mnohohrishny "because of the Bratslav archpriest Roman's calumnies" (RGADA, f. 210, Prikaznyi stol, st. 424, l. 320). Mnohohrishny asked for the tsar's help to get the excommunication annulled.

43. RGADA, f. 210, Belgorodskii stol, st. 539, l. 179.

44. RGADA, f. 210, Sevskii stol, st. 153, l. 117.

45. Ibid.

46. RGADA, f. 210, Sevskii stol, st. 179, l. 385. A reference to haughty Ukrainian clergy also occurred during a conflict between Ukrainian and Russian clerics in Sudzha in 1688. During a meeting at the *voevoda*'s residence, a Ukrainian priest, Lavrentii,

appeal to the second-highest clergyman in the Hetmanate to engage in good conduct reflects Muscovite ideology, and not reality. The Muscovite higher clergy itself was not inclined to be “meek,” even when a “sovereign’s word” or “matter” of concern demanded respect.⁴⁷

During trials, rhetoric, ideology, and traces of power struggles overlapped. The trials of Ukrainian secular dignitaries there reveal a strikingly large number of religious references, because the politically active higher clergy participated in one way or another in those cases. Thus, in 1672 the Nizhen archpriest Symeon Adamovych supported the Cossack *starshyna*’s accusations against Hetman Demian Mnohohrishny in a letter to Artamon Matveev, calling the hetman’s treason against “the Lord’s anointed one” the result of devilish seduction.⁴⁸ The letter that the tsar wrote to the *starshyna* four days later repeats this idea.⁴⁹ The judgment against Mnohohrishny underlines the religious guarantee of the oath of loyalty the hetman had broken.⁵⁰ The frequent references to religion can also be ascribed to the circumstance that religion was the only obvious element of political mentality that the elites in Muscovy and the Hetmanate shared.⁵¹

The members of the *starshyna* who denounced Hetman Ivan Samoilovych in a detailed petition to the tsar in 1687 called him a traitor because he had incited the khan of the Crimean Tatars to “do harm to the Christian people” in Polish-ruled Ukraine in order to weaken the Polish state.⁵² However, after the Peace of Andrusovo the religious definition of treason also implied a serious danger to the tsar’s image. During one of his interrogations, Hetman Mnohohrishny was accused of having said that “the great sovereign [the tsar] did not

allegedly claimed that the new Moscow *shestidnevnye* prescribed that priests enter a church without taking off their hats. A Russian archpriest, Vasilii, countered by saying that this was Lavrentii’s own invention. In an allusion to the great church schism in seventeenth-century Muscovy, the latter reproached Vasilii for slandering the “great sovereigns.” The Russian, for his part, denounced Lavrentii for uttering “indecent words” and, during the subsequent interrogation, stated that he had told Lavrentii that Ukrainian priests entered churches with their hats on “because of their pride,” while at the patriarch’s see in Moscow, at the metropolitan’s see in Belgorod, and everywhere else in Muscovy priests removed their hats. See RGADA, f. 210, Belgorodskii stol, st. 1515, l. 141–61.

47. See, for instance, RGADA, f. 210, Belgorodskii st., st. 961, l. 96–106.

48. *Akty, otnosiashchiisia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii* (hereafter *AluZR*), vol. 9 (St. Petersburg: Arkheograficheskaiia komissiia, 1877), 698.

49. *Ibid.*, 715.

50. *Ibid.*, 80.

51. See Orest Subtelny, “Mazepa, Peter I, and the Question of Treason,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 2 (1978): 158–83, here 174–5.

52. Bodiansky, *Istochniki*, pt. 1, 298.

take the city of Kyiv and the other Little Russian cities by sabre [i.e., by force], [but] they voluntarily came under his high hand [authority] for the sake of the one Christian faith ... [and] when the great sovereign does not need Kyiv and the other Little Russian cities and himself, Demko [Mnohohrishny], and the entire Zaporozhian Host any more, he hands them over to his royal highness [the Polish king].”⁵³ The idea, not that remote among subjects in the centre of Muscovy, that the tsar himself might be a traitor has some importance here.

Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether religious considerations were decisive to the trials’ initiators. Hetman Mnohohrishny called the accusations of treason an old tactic: “They, the *starshyna*, always do so: if they want to do harm to the hetman they immediately utter such reproaches [*totchas k tomu ego privedut*].”⁵⁴ One indeed gets the impression that accusations of treason were primarily used to protect particular interests and temporary coalitions, but not to preserve Ukrainian autonomy. To be sure, in 1664 Pavlo Teteria, the hetman of Right-Bank Ukraine, settled scores with his rival Ivan Vyhovsky by making use of a Cossack tradition: Vyhovsky, the military governor of Kyiv and a senator, was denounced as a traitor to a Cossack council in Korsun, judged according to the “laws of the Host,” and executed.⁵⁵ “For the sake of appearance a council was convoked, seemingly in the name of the king, [and] the military tribunal abruptly brought up the accusation of treason,” the chronicler Jan Józefowicz writes.⁵⁶ In the same year, Teteria denounced the elected metropolitan of Kyiv and the former hetman, Iurii Khmelnytsky, directly to the king, and this denunciation cost them two years’ incarceration in the Marienburg fortress.⁵⁷

Meanwhile, on the Left Bank of the Dnieper the *starshyna* arrested Hetman Mnohohrishny in 1672 and delivered him for trial on charges of treason to the Muscovite Ambassadorial Office (*Posolskii prikaz*). Moreover, they explicitly demanded his execution in Moscow.⁵⁸ The *starshyna* put forward the same demand in the case of the “traitor” Samoilovych. They used the Cossack democracy as a threat should their demand not be fulfilled: “We ask that he, the hetman, be replaced, for if this should not be the will of Your Illustrious Imperial

53. *AIuZR*, 9: 766.

54. *Ibid.*, 777.

55. Borys Hrinchenko, *Ivan Vyhovsky: Ioho zhyttia i dila* (Kyiv: Vik, 1909), 108–10. Hrinchenko cites the Cossack chronicles.

56. “(Sub) specie consilli (sic!) Chwastowia Corsuniam quasi regiis litteris evocatum, militare iudicium ex abrupto perfidiae perstringit” (“Letopis sobytii v Iuzhnoi Rusi Ilovskago kanonika Iana Iuzefovicha (1624–1700),” in *Sbornik letopisei, otnosia-shchikhsia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rusi* (Kyiv: Komissiia dlia razbora drevnikh aktov, sostoiashchaia pri Kievskom, Podolskom i Volynskom general-gubernatore, 1888), 194.

57. *Deistviia prezelnoi*, 186; *Letopis Samovidtsa*, 84.

58. Bodiansky, *Istochniki*, pt. 1: 233.

[*tsarskoe*] Highness, the Zaporozhian Host, from its lowest ranks up, will not tolerate him ... [and] will soon be obliged to deal with him according to the laws and customs of the Host.”⁵⁹ Prince Vasilii Golitsyn—himself perhaps not uninterested in using Samoilovych as a scapegoat for the failure in the Crimean campaign—reported what members of the *starshyna* had told him more than once: “that the Cossacks and the common people [*pospolstvo*] were unanimous in trying to kill him, the hetman ... and that they [the *starshyna*] had to make great efforts to prevent them from doing so.”⁶⁰

Samoilovych’s accusers reproached him for wanting to transform the Hetmanate into a monarchy. In the conspicuous trial against Archpriest Adamovych and his confidants—Petro Roslavets, two other colonels, and a scribe of the Zaporozhian Host—there are no indications that Samoilovych had such intentions. The trial, which took place during the early part of Samoilovych’s hetmancy, was a show trial marked by elements of Cossack democracy and interventions from Moscow. The jurisdiction of the clerical estate was left intact: Adamovych, who was accused of having treacherous relations with Hetman Petro Doroshenko and intentions to murder Samoilovych, was first judged by Ukrainian clergymen. According to church law, they deprived him of his clerical rank and delivered him to the secular judges to be sentenced “to death or to imprisonment until the end of his life.”⁶¹ The secular judges applied Cossack law, although the hetman had told “the clergymen and the General *Starshyna* to judge the archpriest and Roslavets according to Brandenburg [Magdeburg] law.” The trial obviously took place at a Cossack assembly: when the judges sentenced the accused to death, the captains and rank-and-file Cossacks demanded that the execution be carried out immediately. But the hetman ordered that the execution of the death sentence be postponed for one day and showed the *starshyna* letters from the tsar that, according to the Muscovite practice of “pardoning” political criminals, forbade the execution. The clergymen and the General *Starshyna* recognized the tsar’s pardon and sentenced the archpriest to “have his hair cut,” that is, to banishment to a monastery. Roslavets, Adamovych’s main confidant, was to be kept under arrest, and for this purpose he was “put under Muscovite military guard [*otdan za moskovskii karaul*].”⁶² A Muscovite musketeer commander was sitting with the judges, yet Ivan Mazepa (the later hetman) does not mention him in his report on the passing of the sentence.⁶³

59. Ibid., 1: 303–4.

60. Ibid., 1: 321.

61. *AluZR*, 12 (1882): 859.

62. *AluZR*, 13 (1884): 23.

63. *AluZR*, 12: 868.

What has been said so far seems to confirm Hans-Joachim Torke's observation that the hetman's power was progressively reduced in favour of the *starshyna* and of a growing Muscovite influence.⁶⁴ But other political trials hint that the hetman maintained a position of strength in his relations with the *starshyna*. In 1666 Hetman Briukhovetsky had "five witches and a sixth, the wife of the colonel of Hadiach," burned at the stake "because he believed that they had bewitched him and his wife and brought consumption upon them."⁶⁵ The witch trial that preceded their deaths was directed against a member of the Cossack elite and was probably politically motivated. Let us compare: in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth burning a noblewoman under the pretext that she had bewitched the king would have been hard to imagine. Thus far under the Romanov autocracy, however, there had also been no equivalent cases that had ended with an execution. From the end of the 1680s Moscow delivered to the hetman persons who had uttered "indecent words" about him.⁶⁶ This was probably not much more than a gesture intended to flatter a Cossack leader who had already ceased to be independent. Yet, among those delivered to the hetman there were members of the Cossack elite whose denunciations against Hetman Mazepa had not been trusted. In 1703 Mazepa received an instruction from Moscow to send persons who had expressed "words and matters concerning the sovereign" to the capital without interrogating them first.⁶⁷ The prosecution of political crimes played a pioneering role in the juridical integration of the Hetmanate into the Russian state. But it remained without immediate political consequences as long as the hetman himself was above any doubt.

The political trials indicate that the Cossack elite did not regard itself as a corporate entity.⁶⁸ In comparison, the *szlachta* in the Commonwealth did have

64. Hans-Joachim Torke, "The Unloved Alliance: Political Relations between Muscovy and Ukraine in the Seventeenth Century," in Potichnyj, *Ukraine and Russia*, 39–66, here 51–2.

65. In Hadiach rumours spread that these women had "stolen a child from the hetman's wife's womb and that another witch had stolen her ear too" (Nikolai Ia. Novombergsky, *Koldovstvo v Moskovskoi Rusi XVII st.: Materialy po istorii meditsyny*, vol. 3, pt. 1 (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Altshulera, 1906), 94).

66. Vadym A. Diadychenko, *Narysy suspilno-politychnoho ustroiu Livoberezhnoi Ukrainy kintsia XVII–pochatku XVIII st.* (Kyiv: Akademiia nauk Ukrainiskoi RSR, 1959), 327.

67. Ibid.

68. Cf. Frank E. Sysyn, who has written that the Cossacks became "the most numerous corporate order" after 1648 ("Ukrainian Social Tensions before the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising," in Baron and Kollmann, *Religion and Culture*, 52–70, here 52). Orest Subtelny depicts the Cossack elite as a "leading estate" confronted with the pretensions of the tsars, to whom the idea of a contractual relation between a sovereign and his vassals was alien. Indeed, "[a]lmost every one of Mazepa's predecessors had been called a traitor by his

a corporate identity, and it managed to attain the legal restriction of the king's right to dispense political justice against its members. For their part, the Cossack officers provoked political trials by inviting Moscow's interference. This was done, of course, not only for opportunistic reasons. Rather it can be ascribed to a combination of viewing political trials in the Commonwealth as relatively harmless experiences and of Cossack traditions. The latter made the settling of scores with "traitors" from within seem as if old rights were being preserved.

"Indecent Words" by the Lower Classes

"Indecent words" were a grave crime, and yet one that was easy to impute. It is not surprising that such accusations were used in the hetman's conflicts with members of the *starshyna*. In 1667 Briukhovetsky reported to the *voevody* of Kyiv that "certain persons" were sowing discord between the tsar's troops and "our entire people [*pospolitym nashim narodom*]." The capital confirmed the hetman's jurisdiction over the guilty if they were "inhabitants of Little Russia." One of the guilty ones happened to be a Cossack colonel, Vasyl Dvoretzky of Kyiv, who, unlike Briukhovetsky, supported the clergy's resistance to the appointment of a Muscovite as metropolitan. The hetman had Dvoretzky judged by a Cossack tribunal.⁶⁹

By the early 1670s the trials for "indecent words" had become more socially inclusive. They included culprits from the lower classes, who had received increasingly more attention since the Razin uprising. The bureaucracy in Moscow, its representatives, the hetman, and the *starshyna* co-operated in their prosecution. On 14 December 1672 the "Little Russian" Cossack Tymofii But and his "companion" Hryhoriev, who at that time were in Okhtyrka in Slobidska Ukraine, were denounced to the *voevoda* by a local inhabitant. The two Ukrainians had been drinking at an open-air tavern, where But had also asked for food. When the innkeeper refused him, "he insulted her and said: 'As the Polish king bowed before the Turkish tsar, so the [Muscovite] tsar will bow before that Turkish tsar.'" Moscow sent instructions that the matter was to be decided by Hetman Samoilovych, and the latter ordered the execution of But and his companion. The general judge of the Hetmanate and the colonel of Hadiach spared Hryhoriev, whom no one had denounced. But, however, was beheaded.⁷⁰

Muscovite sovereign" ("Mazepa, Peter I," 177). But in the trials in question the accusations of treason came from members of the Cossack elite themselves.

69. RGADA, f. 210, Belgorodskii stol, st. 704, ll. 586–90, 676–80, 801. About Dvoretzky's opinion on church questions as a source of tensions between him and the hetman, see Dmytro I. Iavornytsky, *Istoriia zaporizkykh kozakiv*, vol. 2 (Lviv: Svit, 1991), 284.

70. *AluZR*, 10 (1878): 107–10, 261–3.

In Muscovy, political trials that ended in executions were rare. Therefore the extremely severe punishment for “indecent words” that the Cossack elite inflicted upon But, a rank-and-file Cossack, is striking. In 1675 Samoilovych once more imposed a death penalty “in accordance with his Host’s law,” this time upon an inhabitant of the village of Talalaivka who “had surfaced as an evil rumour-monger in Little Russian towns [*v ... malorossiiskikh gorodakh obiavilsia plevoseiatelem*]” and was delivered to the hetman for judgement in accordance with an instruction from the tsar. Already in 1673 the tsar, reacting to an oral petition from the colonel of Chernihiv, had ordered the prosecution of persons who “would spread words sowing discord” about the hetman, the General *Starshyna*, “and the entire [Zaporozhian] Host.” They were to be handed over to the hetman. An ukase handed down in 1675 added that the hetman should threaten with the death penalty even those who *believed* in any such “deceitful speeches.”⁷¹

The reason that people from the population at large were implicated in such trials, however, was not only the fear of seditious words. It would be wrong to call the trials merely a tool of class warfare,⁷² but there is no doubt that they could serve as an instrument for disciplining subordinates in the Hetmanate. In 1682 Col. Mykhailo Vasyliv of Hadiach used this instrument to put matters in his village of Mykhailivka in Slobidska Ukraine in order. Vasyliv denounced the village priest for allegedly wanting to set out for territory “under the Muslim yoke” and convincing two of Vasyliv’s men to help him. With the support of Hetman Samoilovych, the colonel succeeded in persuading the metropolitan of Belgorod to defrock the priest and the authorities in Moscow to sentence him to death. Because six weeks had not passed since Tsar Fedor’s death, the sentence was commuted to banishment to a monastery. Thus, by claiming that the priest was a rebel and a danger to peace in Ukraine, Vasyliv succeeded in getting him exiled.⁷³

Do the case files allow any conclusions regarding political opinions within the Ukrainian lower classes? In 1675 a conflict between Osip Sobolkov, a cadet (*praporshchik*) of a Muscovite regiment, and Fedir Iuryh, the elder (*viit*) of a village belonging to a monastery in the Hetmanate, resulted in a trial. The cadet was among the soldiers guarding a group of dragoons who had deserted but had been caught. He denounced Iuryh for refusing to help him, for resisting the tsar’s ukase, and for desecrating the tsar’s seal on a letter of safe conduct. According

71. *AluZR*, 12: 66–8. Members of the tsar’s troops who were accused of such speeches became the responsibility of the *voevody*.

72. For an account based entirely on the concept of class struggle, see Nina B. Golikova, *Politicheskie protsessy pri Petre I* (Moscow: Moskovskii universitet, 1957).

73. RGADA, f. 210, Prikaznyi st., st. 492, l. 335–40.

to Sobolkov, Iuryn had expressed his refusal in rather “indecent words”: “I do not trust your tsar [*tsariu vashemu ne veruiu*].” He only believed “in the saviour and the monks.” A perhaps unintentional linguistic misunderstanding made the statement even worse: “And he called the monks [*cherntsy*] ‘monarchs’ [*monarkhy*],” Sobolkov claimed. “I have not sworn an oath to your tsar, and I will not do so,” Iuryn supposedly said. Referring to his blindness, he had added: “If I had eyes, I would dominate your tsar by my wit and I would walk above the trees [*razumom by svoim tsarem vashim vladel i poverkh khodil derevia*].”

With the support of his monastery’s vicar, Iuryn presented a petition in which he accused the cadet of having “tormented him and taken money from him.” Iuryn claimed that he had simply said that he had not sworn an oath to the tsar because people had not been convoked for the oath (“*privodu ne bylo*”), and that he did not want to swear one now because the oath was “something great, and he, Fedka, was unworthy and old and without eyes and had not known about any of this for fifty years [*ne vestvuet tomu piatdesiat let*].”⁷⁴

Interpreting “indecent words” and gestures as evidence of political opinion is not easy, especially if there are two opposing testimonies. Whom should one believe: the cadet, who claimed Iuryn had bitten off the tsar’s seal on a letter of safe conduct, or Iuryn, who replied that he had simply kissed it?⁷⁵ Iuryn’s laboured self-vindication suggests, however, that he really was not enthusiastic about Muscovy’s political order and its claim to the Ukrainians in the Hetmanate as its subjects. This challenges the widespread view that the “apolitical” lower classes in the Hetmanate favoured submission to the tsar.⁷⁶

74. RGADA, f. 210, Belgorodskii stol, st. 596, ll. 359–92.

75. Ibid., l. 390.

76. About the “very weak national and political sympathies and antipathies” of the “Ukrainian people,” see Orest Levitsky [Levytsky], *Ocherk vnutrennei istorii Malorossii vo vtoroi polovine XVII v.*, vol. 1 (Kyiv: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1875), 45. According to Levitsky (p. 47), the people saw no reason for opposing the Muscovite authorities’ limitation of Cossack autonomy because they did not profit from that autonomy. Kostomarov claims that in Hetman Vyhovsky’s time the people “blindly clung to the tsar” because of the disadvantages of reintegration into Poland (*Getmanstvo Vygovskago*, 8). And Torke guardedly refers to the peasants masses’ “preference for Muscovy,” which they considered “a haven from oppression by the Polish nobility,” in the 1650s (“The Unloved Alliance,” 48). Recently Vladimir A. Artamonov stated that the Ukrainians never ceased believing in the Orthodox tsar and the holy nature of his rule (“Pozitsii getmanskoï vlasti i Rossii na Ukraine v kontse XVII–nachale XVIII veka,” in *Rossiiia – Ukraina*, ed. Miller et al, 89–99, here 93–4). Some years ago, Volodymyr I. Borysenko expressed the official Soviet view that the Cossacks, peasants, and burghers swore an oath to the tsar “with great joy” (*Sotsialno-ekonomichnyi rozvytok Livoberezhnoi Ukrainy v druhii polovyni XVII st.* [Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1986], 13). Frick has doubts about this. The findings presented here suggest that he is right both in stating that “the willingness of Rus’

A similar conclusion about Slobidska Ukraine could be drawn from a 1689 case, which Hetman Mazepa had passed on Prince Golitsyn, regarding the uttering of “fabricated and criminal [*vorovskikh*] words to instigate and confuse the Little Russian people.” A burgher and “notable [*znatnyi*] merchant” from Zinkiv in the Hetmanate had related during an interrogation in Hadiach what he had heard from the Krasnopillia burgher Vasyl Chepiha. Apparently Golitsyn had ordered an investigation, which revealed that at the Sumy fair in Slobidska Ukraine Chepiha had told an acquaintance from the Hetmanate that “Moscow does not think well about them, the *cherkasy*; they [the Muscovites] want to make them [the Ukrainians] subjects forever, and once they have taken hold of them the harness [*shleika*] will be ready for them, the Slobidska [Ukrainian] Cossacks.”⁷⁷ When Chepiha was asked who had told him this, he said it was a Cossack of the Sumy regiment, who, in turn, had heard it from an inhabitant of the village Mykhailivka. According to this version, Mykhailo Vasylyv, the afore-mentioned colonel of Hadiach and owner of that village, had been called to appear before the tsar and asked what should be done to make the inhabitants of the “Little Russian towns” “subjects forever.” In response, Vasylyv proposed taking advantage of the Crimean campaign to deport “the colonels and captains and otamans and best people among the burghers” to Moscow and to appoint simple commoners (“*iz prostykh pospolytykh liudei*”, that is, non-Cossacks) as replacements for the colonels and *starshyna*. Yet Petro Doroshenko, whom the tsar also consulted, stated that there was no need for that because the *cherkasy* were forever subjects of the tsars anyway, and that if the Crimea was defeated, all *cherkasy* would submit to the “great sovereigns.” Doroshenko’s opinion was accepted.⁷⁸

This file on the above case, though incomplete like many others, shows that the Cossack elite in the Hetmanate and the Muscovite authorities also co-operated in controlling the population of Slobidska Ukraine. It is not clear whether the burgher from the Hetmanate had informed against Chepiha voluntarily. But the case indicates that the Slobidska Ukrainians identified with Cossack autonomy in the Hetmanate while being somewhat skeptical about individual Cossack leaders. It is significant that not only Cossacks were regarded as important for preserving that autonomy, but also the “best people among the burghers.” This indicates that there existed the notion of a political nation of “*cherkasy*” and that it transcended mere sympathy for the Cossacks.

to be under Muscovite control” was from the beginning “an object of competition for public control,” and in presuming that a number of ordinary people in Ukraine “hoped to find some third way” between Muscovy and Poland (“Misunderstandings,” 164).

77. RGADA, f. 210, Belgorodskii stol, st. 1273, ll. 158–9.

78. Ibid., ll. 149–65.

Representatives of the Zaporozhian Sich, the refuge for the discontented of the Hetmanate, also addressed petitions and accusations to the tsars.⁷⁹ But this fact should not be overestimated as an indicator of the lower classes' attitude. While the Hetmanate's elite readily sent denunciations to Moscow, there is no evidence of lower-class people doing so.

There is no doubt that denunciations and trials helped to spread treason as a formula for differentiating one's own people ("svoi") from others. Yet, from the authorities' point of view this kind of ethnic demarcation was not unproblematic. In 1675 the tsar forbade inhabitants of Muscovy's southwestern frontier to call the "Little Russians" traitors and threatened them with unmerciful punishment if they did.⁸⁰ State coercion encourages national prejudices, which this coercion must in turn prevent from spreading. This pattern is visible in early-modern Muscovy.

79. See Kateryna I. Stetsiuk, *Narodni rukhy na Livoberezhnii i Slobidskii Ukraini v 50–70-kh rokakh XVII st.* (Kyiv: Akademiia nauk Ukrainskoi RSR, 1960), 145 and 149.

80. The ban, "Tsarskaia gramota putivlskomu voevode kniaziiu Volkonskomu o neobzyvanii malorossiian izmennikami," was also sent to the *voevody* of Sevs, Kursk, Trubchevsk, and Briansk; see *AluZR*, 12: 88–9. In 1710 Peter I once more forbade calling the Ukrainians traitors; see Bodiansky, *Istochniki*, pt. 2 (1859), 262–3.

Mykhailo Drahomanov's Writings on the Pan-Slavic Mission: A Russian or Ukrainian Discourse?

Anatolii Kruglashov

The Slavic idea played an important role in the intellectual formation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the nineteenth century. It left a significant mark on the political views of several generations of scholars, writers, and public activists in Ukraine, beginning with the Freemasons, Decembrists, and members of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood and ending with the Ukrainian students belonging to the "academic societies" in Vienna, Lviv, and Chernivtsi and their Pan-Slavic activities at the turn of the twentieth century. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine the Ukrainian renaissance and its ideological genesis without the intelligentsia's attempts at articulating the ideals of Slavic affinity.

The nineteenth-century Slavic national awakening generated powerful emotions and intellectual ferment in Ukraine: the successes that Ukraine's West Slavic and South Slavic neighbours achieved in building national institutions and in scholarship and education gave rise to expectations of a better future for the Ukrainians as well. Taking their example from Czech, Slovak, Serbian, and Bulgarian activists, Ukrainians tried at the very least not to lag behind them, and they often claimed a far greater role than that of being their pupils. Slavophilism was an important, necessary, and fruitful stage in the formation of a Ukrainian national ideology. It was marked by the appearance of new ideas and the widening of the Ukrainians' intellectual, cultural, and political horizons.

Mykhailo Drahomanov played an important role in formulating and modernizing the idea of Pan-Slavic affinity and in trying to adapt it to the new conditions of Ukraine's national development in the last third of the nineteenth century. He was a significant Ukrainian thinker who formulated an original political version of that idea.

Drahomanov's enthusiasm for Slavic history, culture, and ethnography became apparent in his early articles in the Russian press, to which he actively

contributed. In the second half of the 1860s he began devoting increasingly more attention to contemporary Slavic cultural, social, and political concerns, presenting them from an original viewpoint based on his extensive factual knowledge. Consequently *Sankt-Peterburgskiiia vedomosti*, one of the most prominent Russian newspapers of the time, invited him to become a contributor. "Starting in 1867," Drahomanov explained, "the editors invited me to write on the Slavic question and 'to engage in polemics with the Moscow newspapers.' At that time I wrote numerous feuilletons and editorials in which I strove to examine Russian-Polish and generally Slavic relations from a democratic-federalist point of view. It goes without saying that I often touched on the Ukrainian question, especially because I had become closer to Kyiv's Ukrainophile circle, which had considerably diminished since 1863, and had again confronted the question of education in Ukrainian."¹

By that time Drahomanov had become a recognized authority on Slavic problems. The broad range of his Slavic interests were determined primarily by the complicated and strained relations among the Russians, Poles, and Ukrainians in the past and present and by the prospects for their future co-operation. At that time Drahomanov usually displayed the "engagement" of political journalists and analysts in the Russian Empire familiar with Slavic issues. Because of the way he saw the tasks confronting Russian imperial society as a whole, he tried to present Ukrainian interests to that society within the framework of a regional, "ethnographic" patriotism based on the Russian liberals' conception of the Slavic idea. He did not go beyond *Sankt-Peterburgskiiia vedomosti*'s and *Vestnik Evropy*'s general editorial policy of promoting the liberalizing, reformist course of the Russian government and therefore examining Russian foreign policy from the perspective of European priorities.

Although Drahomanov's theoretical reflections were part of the all-Russian discourse, even his earliest writings exhibited a Ukrainian perspective on things. They revealed ever more clearly his concern that any discussions of the Slavic theme, the Slavic renaissance, or possible Slavic unity and fraternity should reflect Ukrainian national-cultural and educational interests as he and his adherents saw them.

The movement for the national liberation of the Southern Slavs had a particular impact on the politicization of Drahomanov's understanding and explication of the processes that were occurring in the Slavic world. It was becoming clear that a new political crisis was brewing in the Ottoman Empire and that it could have important geopolitical consequences, changing the balance of power in Europe. Liberal expectations awakened by the reforms of the 1860s found their expression in propaganda about the need for imperial Russia to aid

1. Mykhailo Drahomanov, *Avtobiohrafiiia* (Kyiv: Krynytsia, 1917), 59.

its Slavic brothers and in calls to bring them national freedom and a free system of government. Because the tsarist government did not forbid propaganda in favour of Russia's mission of liberation to be published in the press, and to some extent even encouraged it, the liberal-democratic intelligentsia could not avoid taking part in the discussions about how to resolve "the Slavic question."² The crisis in the Balkans made it possible to express a broad range of hopes in the Russian Empire, from a crusade on Constantinople and the conquest of the "Second Rome" to, as a minimum, a revision of the political and diplomatic consequences of the "catastrophe" of the Crimean War. The Russian Pan-Slavists' language and aggressive rhetoric became important components of the semi-official "proper attitude" and gave rise in sympathetic imperial circles to hopes for uniting the people around the throne. Thus the social crisis created by the disparity between the calls for modernizing the Russian Empire and the political system's predominantly conservative reactions to these calls could be happily resolved by consolidating imperial society at the cost of shifting attention away from domestic to foreign political problems. The most suitable solution to such a difficult situation, it seemed to many, was a strong imperial Russia in the noble role of liberator of the oppressed Slavs.

This was the background to the ideological and organizational rise in Pan-Slavist activities in imperial Russia. The Slavic theme also became popular in the west European press, inasmuch as the "Eastern question," that is, the fate of Ottoman Turkey and its future, were of considerable interest to all the major European powers. Drahomanov could not but be affected by these developments, and he published numerous articles in Kyiv, Saint Petersburg, and Lviv periodicals criticizing the "Slavic committees" in imperial Russia and analyzing the Slavic policies of Saint Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, and London. In these works he stressed what the Balkan Slavs were fighting for and what help they needed from their foreign supporters;³ and he polemicized with the Russian Slavophiles, accusing them of failing to understand the substance and aims of the Slavs' struggle against their oppressors and hinting at the hypocrisy of the tsarist regime and its apologists on the "Eastern question." Finally, he tried to rouse the Ukrainian and Russian "free-thinking" public to fight for the "true liberation" of the Balkan Slavs.

2. Typically, by "Inciting the government to defend the 'Slavic brothers,' Russian liberals hoped that, whatever the consequences of such a war [might be], the tsar would be forced to grant a constitution" (L. G. Deich, "Voina s Turtsiei i russkie revoliutsionery 70-kh gg. [Iz vospominanii]" Manuscript Department, Plekhanov House, Russian National Library, f. 1097, no. 31, p. 8 [12 l]).

3. See, e.g., M. Dragomanov, "Galitskiiia otnosheniia kievskago otdela Slavianskago blagotvoritel'nago komiteta," *Kievskii telegraf*, 1875, no. 62: 1-7.

Russian pro-government spokesmen stressed the messianic role of imperial Russia as the only possible liberator of their Slavic brothers, arguing that the Balkan peoples were waiting for Russian soldiers to appear in their lands. Drahomanov countered by emphasizing the key role that internal processes played in the formation of mass national-liberation movements, and showed that foreign-policy considerations were secondary for the supporters of the Slavic renaissance. Protesting against the notions that the Russian press was disseminating about the Slavs' sympathies for and expectations of Russia, he tried to show that the priority of the national-liberation movements was to defend their nations' values. Drahomanov's views and his analysis of the stormy development of the Slavic renaissance influenced the change in his thinking concerning the nationality policies of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires and the situation and future prospects of the Ukrainian national awakening. While urging the Russian Pan-Slavists to "Let the Slovak, Croat, or Bulgarian [first] become aware that he is a Slovak, Croat, or Bulgarian, and then he will become aware that he is a Slav,"⁴ he also stopped to consider the Ukrainians' national-cultural development.

Drahomanov turned to the Slavic theme at this time primarily because he hoped to use the growing interest in that problem to arouse Russian public opinion. He viewed the experience of the Slavic lands outside the Russian Empire as an example worth emulating and as a warning against the basic trends in the empire's domestic and foreign policies. When he began his journalistic and political activities, this experience determined his view of the relevance of the Slavic theme and his interpretation of it. In his description of the aim of his writings on this subject he wrote:

The method that *Russkii vestnik* used in the old days—to voice opinions on foreign affairs that can be applied to domestic affairs—will still be good for a long time. Contemporary events provide rich material for using this method.... I believe that the Slavic question is also worth exploiting, [by] devoting a series of articles to the significance of associations and clubs while simultaneously examining our laws about them, publishing, our conditions for colonization, the reasons why Germans are dominant among us, and so forth. By thus raising this question you will greatly attract attention to domestic questions and deflect the public's attention away from idle talk about foreign affairs and fruitless (at least in the form that they exist now) discussions of Slavic unity and our power.⁵

The Slavic idea appears here as a functional tool, as an instrument for influencing public opinion and thus political events in the Russian Empire.

4. *Sankt-Peterburgskiiia vedomosti*, 1868, no. 105: 2.

5. Pisma Dragomanova M. iz Kieva Korshu V. F. v Peterburg, 29 June 1867, Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Russkoi Federatsii (GARF), f. 109 s/a, op. 2, d. 718, 2 ob.-3.

Until the early 1870s Drahomanov considered the desired changes in Russian imperial society in their entirety, not only within its political borders but also in the context of his conception of the inviolable unity of the Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians, if not of all the empire's Slavs. Granted, he preferred to speak of such unity only if would be truly equal and equally valuable for all of its participants, but he believed that such a state of relations among the Eastern Slavs would be possible in the future. When he polemicized with the Galician populists in particular, he declared:

I am not writing a political program in any detail, for such programs change with the times. It is only necessary to point out what cannot fail to be permanent because it is natural. What is natural is the unity of the interests of the Rus' people in [Austrian-ruled] Galicia, Little Russia [Russian-ruled Ukraine], and [ethnic] Great Russia, [that is,] the unitary aims of the progressive Galician, Ukrainian, Great Russian, and Russo-European intelligentsia. It is enough for them to recognize this unity, and then they will be able to find forms for it, to turn any political, historically determined form around for the benefit of the Rus' people.⁶

At this time Drahomanov believed that it was possible to create a new basis for the future free unification of the Eastern Slavs by exploiting the popularity of the Slavic idea and declaring the equality and fraternity of all linguistically and culturally related peoples. Both directly and indirectly these hopes testified to his largely negative attitude towards the past and present state of East Slavic relations, especially between the Ukrainians and Russians. Nevertheless it is striking that even as Drahomanov was trying to prove the viability of his own conception of democratic "pan-Russianness," he was basing his theoretical constructs on the principle of the national independence, originality, and uniqueness of the Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples. This ran counter to prevailing attitudes in Russian imperial society, not to mention official scholarship and propaganda. Drahomanov tried to reconcile these levels of identity (the Ukrainian, all-Russian, and Slavic), which existed at the time as phenomena of social consciousness, in a well-defined hierarchical system, declaring that he was thus expressing and defending a new version of Ukrainophilism. While addressing the Galician Ukrainians from this original position, he presented them with a solution to their problem of national choice (i.e., were they Ruthenians, Russians, or Ukrainians) and affirmed that the theory at the root of his Ukrainophilism

offers a firm national and social basis for the rebirth, the uplifting, of the Rus' nationality and people there. While it also constitutes the theory of pan-Little Russianness, that is, the unification of all the Little Russians partitioned among Russia, the Kingdom of Poland, Galicia, Bukovyna, and Hungary, Ukrainophilism

6. Mykhailo Drahomanov, "Literatura rosiiska, velykoruska, ukrainska i halytska," in his *Literaturno-publitsystychni pratsi*, vol. 1 (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1970), 218–19.

is the leading element both in organic pan-Russianness, inasmuch as our Little Russia-Ukraine is organically connected with Great Russia, and in Pan-Slavism, which can only enjoy the sympathy of the conscious representatives of the Western Slavs, [that is,] a federal Pan-Slavism that does not exclude a necessary and proper intermediary.⁷

Having concluded that the project for creating an independent Ukrainian state in the future was unrealistic, Drahomanov saw an opportunity to formulate Ukraine's primary needs as part of the mainstream of a democratic, federal all-Slavic ideology and program. In the first half of the 1870s, he declared this program to be a rationally based alternative to the separatist scenario. "This is a different matter," he emphasized,

from national, political, and literary separatism. This is a movement for the self-rule of the Ukrainian lands (and not of all centralized [sic] Ukraine) in agreement with a similar movement in the Great Russian lands, a movement for popular rule and for raising up into the culture those elements from the people that can enrich it without spoiling and breaking up that richness and strength that has been experienced jointly by the Great Russians and Little Russians. To arise in [imperial] Russia as an autonomous and democratic element, as a tribe that is close in geography, history, and social goals to the Western Slavs, [and] to become an intermediary between the Eastern and Western Slavs, [that is,] between smaller peoples that do not have their own state and a great people that has founded a national state, is [entirely] a different matter.⁸

Consequently Drahomanov believed that Ukraine's Slavic neighbours, and primarily the Russians, should compensate the Ukrainians for not having the possibility to achieve independence (and for refusing even to try to achieve it?) by recognizing Ukraine's unique geopolitical role and affirming its significance as a necessary link, a civilizing bridge, between the Western and Southern Slavs. He called for balancing Ukraine's unreadiness to establish itself as a unitary, centralized, independent state with the absence of favourable conditions for a political struggle towards such a goal by assigning a particular role to the Ukrainians in the family of Slavic peoples. In this role he saw another opportunity to draw all of the Ukrainian lands closer together. He expressed the conviction that the Ukrainians under Russian rule and in Austrian-ruled Galicia could have a great future, and that the Galicians could particularly benefit from becoming intermediaries between imperial Russia and the Western Slavs, particularly those in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, without losing those original features that were useful for their own people. He continued this thought by asserting that it would be mere rhetoric to say that the Ukrainians and Galicians

7. Drahomanov, "Po voprosu o maloruskoi literature," in his *Literaturno-publitsystichni pratsi*, 1: 392.

8. Drahomanov, "Literatura rosiiska," 213.

would do better to concern themselves with issues in their own lands and develop their own originality. The Ukrainians had, after all, few chances of separating from Russia not only politically, but also culturally.⁹

Drahomanov judged the mission of the intermediary between the only Slavic nation that had its own state and all the other, stateless Slavs not from the perspective of what was good for the interests of the Russian Empire, including its unity and political evolution, but from the point of view of "the Ukrainian idea." He stressed in particular that carrying out this role required that educated Ukrainians know what Ukraine is and that the Russians know what Ukraine is in the empire and in the entire Slavic world—that is, that they understand Ukraine's role in the world.¹⁰ While assuming no less than a "world role" for his own nation and country, Drahomanov posited as axioms the intrinsic value and importance of a nationally based education and culture for the Ukrainian people. He tried to show, especially to Russian society, that helping the Ukrainian people was in Russia's political interest. Such views completely fitted Drahomanov's pragmatic scheme of the "Slavic theme." He had begun writing about them in the 1860s, but now their contents had changed.

Already in the first half of the 1870s, Drahomanov started believing that it was possible to shift the emphasis in his ideas. At first, to put it broadly, he used a deductive method of reasoning: to wit, because the Slavs were awakening and demanding their cultural and political rights and the Ukrainians are also Slavs, the Ukrainians merited respect and the right to defend their national rights. Later Drahomanov increasingly turned to an inductive method of reasoning: because the Ukrainians were awakening, all the Slavs were demanding their rights, and the Ukrainians were no worse than other Slavs and had a unique role to play in the Slavic world in general and in the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires in particular, their rights must be unconditionally guaranteed and protected. Thus, even before he became an émigré, the "Slavic theme" made it possible for Drahomanov to formulate the Ukrainians' aspirations, to show their valid, dignified place in the Slavic world, and to prove that they had a special role in the Slavs' historical struggles against invaders. At the same time, he tried to arouse the Ukrainians' national feelings and pride in their people and history, and thus to rekindle their hopes for a better future. He saw this future in the context of a democratic restructuring of the Russian imperial state as a federal union, first and foremost of the Slavic Ukrainians, Belarusians, Russians, and Poles.

The events in the Balkans in the second half of the 1870s were a turning point in Drahomanov's thinking. It had become clear that the Balkan Slavs were in a resolute struggle for liberation from the Turks, and politicians, scholars, and

9. *Ibid.*, 212.

10. *Ibid.*, 181.

journalists in the Russian Empire and western Europe needed to consider the possible outcome of this struggle, particularly the realignment of borders and spheres of influence. Events in the Balkans received a particularly impassioned response in the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires, including from Ukraine's intelligentsia, townsfolk, and even "common people." The "Slavic question," which had been a fashionable but secondary subject for journalists and ethnographers, became a matter of wide concern in those empires and stimulated an enthusiasm for going to the aid of the Southern "fraternal Slavs." Drahomanov saw this moment as a unique, long-awaited opportunity for the Ukrainian intelligentsia to achieve its desired cultural, educational, and even political goals, and he set about writing many journalistic and scholarly works in support of those public figures who were trying to use the geopolitical situation in the Balkans to further the goals of the democratic and national movements in the Russian Empire. He later explained his actions, particularly why he had delayed emigrating to publish his study *Pro ukrainskykh kozakiv, tatar ta turkiv* (Kyiv: Tipografii V. Davidenka, 1876). It was, he wrote, "a popular brochure on the insurrection in Herzegovina that was intended to link agitation on the Eastern question with national traditions. At the time Ukrainians in Kyiv and Odesa were very interested in the Serbian insurrection, both because of their [Pan-]Slavic sympathies and because they expected that the insurrection would have the same significance as the Greek insurrection of the 1820s, that is, that it would break up the *Dreikaiserbund*."¹¹

These events evoked a widespread response in Ukraine, raising Ukrainians' hopes for changes in the Russian Empire and for a new geopolitical situation in Europe that would help to resolve the "Ukrainian question," or at least satisfy the essential needs of the Ukrainian national revival. Thus Drahomanov's journalistic, theoretical, and organizational initiatives were determined not only by external political factors or his position on the "Balkan crisis." They were also a reaction to hopes raised in Russian and Ukrainian society, a theoretical and programmatic reply to the expectations of the Kyiv Hromada's members. Conceptually the writings of Drahomanov's "Balkan cycle" were distinguished by their greater consistency and argumentation. But they were not exceptional in the context of the views being expressed by other democratic and liberal journalists in Galicia, Russian-ruled Ukraine, or ethnic Russia.¹²

11. Drahomanov, *Avtobiohrafiia*, 36.

12. See, for example, Drahomanov's "Chistoe delo trebuet chistykh sredstv," in *Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii M. P. Dragomanova*, vol. 2 (Paris: Osvobozhdenie, 1906), 20–45; "Turki vnutrennie i vneshnie: Pismo k izdateliu 'Novogo vremeni,'" in *ibid.*, 46–77; "Vnutrennee rabstvo i voina za osvobozhdenie," in *ibid.*, 77–121; and *Vyigrashi poslednei voiny* (Saint Petersburg, 1878), a reprint from the Geneva publication *Do chogo dovoevalis?*

In addition to the geopolitical and foreign-policy concerns and expected consequences of the Balkan crisis, as an experienced politician Drahomanov also dealt with more mundane questions. For example, he tried to exploit general interest in the "Slavic theme" to draw Russian society's attention to the Ukrainians' needs, especially in Galicia, Bukovyna, and Transcarpathia. While promoting the need to assist the Slavs of these regions, he emphasized that they were not ethnic Russians but part of the Ukrainian people. He also urged the numerous Slavic societies set up by Russian citizens' groups (or pro-government structures) to help the Ukrainian societies to solve their organizational problems and to support their educational, scholarly, and cultural activities.¹³

When, after long delays, the Russo-Turkish War finally began, Drahomanov saw it as the "appropriate time" to achieve the goals of the Ukrainian national cause and the autonomist-federalist plans that he had been actively promoting. "The Serbo-Bulgarian movement and then the war with Turkey," he wrote in his autobiography, "naturally gave me a convenient opportunity to propagate liberal federalist ideas in the Russian language."¹⁴ Drahomanov thought that radical changes would soon occur in the Balkans and in the Russian Empire itself and that democratic forces would vanquish not only the Southern Slavs' enemies, the "Constantinople Turks," but also the "Petersburg Turks"—the oppressors of the Russian Empire's Slavic subjects. He urged the Ukrainians not to miss this rare historical opportunity and to exploit the Russian public's widespread Slavophile sentiments in such a way that they, the Ukrainians, would be able to play a suitable role in this great struggle.

Even today, at least from the point of view of historiography, if not *Historiophilie*, Drahomanov's reflections on the origins and course of the "Balkan crisis" and his attempts to anticipate its resolution and find ways of exploiting it for the Ukrainians' benefit remain of interest. The total liberation of all the Slavic and non-Slavic peoples from the Ottoman yoke was, however, a dream that he sincerely held, and a hope that reflected widespread sentiments in Ukrainian society. Believing that the liberation of the Southern Slavs was a historical necessity, Drahomanov was interested in knowing how it would occur, who would be the liberator, what would be the strategic consequences of Russian intervention in the Balkans, and what the peoples of the Russian Empire, especially the Ukrainians, could expect as a result.

13. Drahomanov repeatedly reminded influential public figures that "it is now, when the Slavic rage has seized everyone, that perhaps the most successful idea of any would be the one that I proposed to [Volodymyr] Lesevych: collecting books and money for Galicia, Bukovyna, and Hungarian Rus'" (Drahomanov to M. K. Mikhailovsky, 9 October 1876, Institute of Russian Literature [Saint Petersburg], f. 191, op. 1, od. zb. 222, p. 1 zv).

14. Drahomanov, *Avtobiohrafia*, 11.

Once he had emigrated to Geneva, Drahomanov was able to express himself freely for the first time and not have to worry about Russian or Austrian censorship. Under these conditions, a new stage in the Ukrainian movement began with *Hromada*, the journal that he published in Geneva. *Hromada* served as Drahomanov's forum for presenting his political and cultural program not only to his compatriots, but also to other European nations. In it the already familiar motifs of his earlier contributions to the Galician, Kyiv, and Saint Petersburg press were presented in a different tone and with even an entirely different meaning. Drahomanov was now able to express his opinions without having to resort to the Aesopian language used widely by Russian journalists and scholars, and he could openly express his views on the Balkan war. In contrast to the official views that most journalists in the Russian Empire espoused, he made it clear that the Slavic peoples had awakened and were forging their own national lives not as a result of having waited passively for imperial Russia to free them from the Turks by force, but owing to the tremendous intellectual, cultural, and organizational efforts of the Slavic enlighteners. This idea was important, because it convincingly posited the democratic ideal of the nation as the creator of its own history as an alternative to the nature of contemporary Russian society. The latter was almost "ideal" from the imperialist point of view: passive, obedient, and infantile, awaiting possible changes not simply from God's mercy, but of necessity by the intervention of its "anointed" sovereigns. For Drahomanov it was important to elucidate the difference between the aims of the peoples enslaved by Turkey and the true, imperialist interests of Saint Petersburg's officialdom.

In his polemics with the official position that regarded the Russian mission as exceptionally noble, altruistic, and pro-liberation, Drahomanov never resorted to expressing anti-Russian feelings and never denied that the Balkan peoples hoped that they would receive aid from Russia. He even wanted these hopes to come true as quickly as possible and with the fewest human losses. At the same time, however, he cautioned the Slavs against cultivating illusions about the nature of imperial Russia and emphasized the duplicity of Saint Petersburg's propaganda: "It is not for Imperial Majesties and Highnesses to talk about freedom. This is none of their business, and it does not pertain to them when it is written about. The only one who has the right to speak about freedom is he who has not oppressed anyone, who has not robbed, and who is ready to sacrifice his head for freedom."¹⁵ Naturally, Drahomanov singled out the Slavic peoples subjugated by Russia—especially the Ukrainians—among those who had "the right to speak." It was on their behalf that he addressed the Slavs.

15. Drahomanov, "Viina," *Hromada* (Geneva), no. 2 (1878): 350.

After exposing the hypocrisy of the tsarist regime's Balkan policy, Drahomanov went on to reveal the blatant discrepancy between Russia's "freedom-loving" declarations and the real state of its "free" subjects:

Indeed, why would the Russian government care so much about the freedom of the Turkish[-ruled] Slavs when we see that in its own empire the Russian government not only does not care about any freedom for its own people, for its own Russian[-ruled] Slavs, but, on the contrary, is concerned only with how to crush every thought of freedom, how to oppress the people even more terribly, [and] to extract as much money as possible from it for its own use and for the rich. We ourselves would be overjoyed if only the Russian government really set about liberating the Slavs and giving them freedom. But to achieve this the Russian tsar would have to liberate people from Turkish, and Austrian, and his own rule, and it is already a well-known matter that before anything else he would have to begin from himself, from his own Russian tsardom.¹⁶

For Drahomanov the introduction of radical changes in the empire would have been the most desirable conclusion that Russian "society" could have drawn from the Balkan crisis, the best possible consequence of that massive drive to help the Balkan Slavs and of the no less massive disillusionment with the behaviour of the tsarist regime. It is obvious that as he scourged Russian foreign and domestic policy for its falseness and duplicity, Drahomanov also aimed to show its ruinous consequences to his own Ukrainian readers, at whom he primarily directed the writings that the *Hromada* imprimery and other uncensored publications were publishing.

Drahomanov's brave and uncompromising stance was facilitated not only by being freed from the restrictions of censored journalism. Now, as events intensified and swords were crossed instead of just pens, he declared, with evident pride, that many of the conclusions and prognoses he had made before the war were coming true. He cited his own assessments of the tsarist regime's policies, the behaviour of the Russian military, and the strategic effectiveness and diplomatic consequences of Russia's intervention. Consequently he saw himself as the victor in the ideological struggle with Russian officialdom, and this lent his Geneva publications a certain colour and passion.

As he reflected upon the Russo-Turkish War as it unfolded and upon its possible consequences, Drahomanov began making ever more pessimistic conclusions. While the Balkan Slavs expected a positive outcome, he became increasingly inclined toward the opposite point of view. To dispel the enthusiasm of unwavering optimists, he reminded them about the fate of Ukraine, Poland, and Belarus as the recipients of Russia's real, instead of declared, "love" for the Slavs. To those who knew little about the Russian Empire he offered extended excursions into Russia's political history and highlighted the drama of Ukrainian-

16. Ibid., 347.

Russian relations. Using the experience of several hundred years as a basis, he cautioned:

Every Slav will find it useful to examine the fate of our Ukraine at a time when, following in the footsteps of old Poland, Turkey is collapsing and Austria-Hungary's turn is coming. Already much of the same has been done to the Serbs that was done to us. Now the turn of the Bulgarians has come. They will also get to the Croats, Slovenes, and Czechs, who may not even realize that they are being handed over to the "Branderburgian" as long as, through the efforts of all the Slavic peoples, starting with the Russians themselves, at least the beginnings of freedom are not established in [imperial] Russia and all the Slavs fail to understand that only a free brother can help others to achieve true freedom.¹⁷

Until such a "free brother" appeared, and this did not mean Russia as the "older brother," Drahomanov proposed that conclusions be drawn from the past to see "what was 'gained through struggle by Ukraine,' which rose up alone for its freedom and then surrendered [it] to [zlozhylas na] a neighbouring empire. May this be known not only by our countrymen, but also by our other Slavic brothers, who are now placing so many hopes on official Russia [kazennu Rosiiu]."¹⁸ In his writings of the second half of the 1870s, citing numerous examples of Ukraine's "achievements" after it was absorbed by Russia, he sketched a convincing picture of the kind of future the other Slavs could expect if Saint Petersburg's strategists achieved their expansionist goals.

The far-reaching hopes that Drahomanov had during the Russo-Turkish War did not materialize. Nevertheless this conflict left a distinct mark on his worldview and influenced him to change his theoretical priorities. It was at this time that the period of co-existence, of a certain parallelism between the "all-Russian" and Ukrainian discourses, came to an end in the scheme of Drahomanov's views on the Slavic renaissance, the Balkan national movements, and the place of the Ukrainian people in these processes. His "Ukrainocentric" perception of the outcome of the Balkan crisis was reflected in his assessments of the Peace Treaty of San Stefano and the Congress of Berlin, in which, with genuine indignation and pain, he drew a direct analogy between the situations of the Bulgarians after 1878 and of the Ukrainians after the 1667 Peace Treaty of Andrusovo and the resulting tragic division of Ukraine along the Dnieper between Poland and Muscovy.¹⁹

17. Drahomanov, "Ot vporiadchyka," in *ibid.*, xii.

18. *Ibid.*

19. Drahomanov, "Vnutrennee rabstvo,"¹⁰ He repeated these thoughts even years later in "Russkii kulak i bolgarskaia svoboda." See *idem*, *Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii*, 2: 519.

Drahomanov's reflections on the domestic consequences of Russia's intervention in the Balkans were also filled with disillusionment. He bitterly admitted the futility of his expectations:

So far the Slavic movement has not had any influence on the course of internal affairs, which, whether [this is] good or not, had nevertheless been proceeding along an established path: the process of Russification [*obrusinnia*] and even Great Russification [*obvelykorusinnia*] not only of the [empire's] "peripheries," but also of the ancient Rus' yet not [ethnic] Great Russian lands, is continuing, resulting not only in the elimination of [the use of] Polish from the new court in Poland, but even in the halting of printing anything in the Little Russian language within [imperial] Russia and the importation of Little Russian books from Austria.²⁰

Despite the diplomatic humiliations that it had suffered at the Congress of Berlin, the tsarist regime emerged from the war not weakened or more liberal. On the contrary, it now had the self-assurance of a victor and became even more convinced that history itself had confirmed the correctness of its policies and the direction of the state and that any doubts about this could originate only from Russia's enemies or from the "devil." In these conditions, the wave of tsarist reaction could only be strengthened, and the constitutional transformation of the autocratic regime, which had long been the dream of liberal and democratic circles and, for quite some time, Drahomanov could only be postponed indefinitely.

The change in theoretical goals and ideological values left its mark not only on Drahomanov's position on Russia's "Slavic policy," but also on his analysis of the forces that claimed to be Slavophiles and the defenders of Slavic unity and fraternity. In his numerous open debates with Russian Pan-Slavist spokesmen he voiced the conviction that the term "lovers of the Slavs" (*slavianoliubtsi*) did not reflect the true nature of this social phenomenon. "We do not have a serious and progressive national and Slavic party because we do not have serious knowledge of nationality questions in general or of the Slavic peoples in particular," Drahomanov noted. "Specialists usually know more about Slavic antiquities than about new developments [*novyny*]; Slavophiles know what they are told by supplicants from [their] brother Slavs; [and] in ordinary times liberal journalists even wonder how it is possible to be interested in anything Slavic!"²¹ It is important to see behind Drahomanov's attitude towards the Russian love for the Slavs his view of the stereotypes that prevailed in Russian imperial society,

20. Pisma Dragomanova k A. N. Pypinu: Kopii neustanovlennoi rukoi, podgotovlennyye D. I. Abramovichem k publikatsii (1924–1925). Manuscript Department, Plekhanov House, Russian National Library, f. 4, no. 40 (5), pp. 42–3. The letter was written for a polemic with *Golos*, no. 229, and probably addressed to its editor.

21. Drahomanov, "K voprosu ob 'oskudenii' literatury i o stolichnoi pechati i provintsii," in his *Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii*, 2: 5.

particularly among the intelligentsia. In speaking out against Russian officialdom, he did not limit himself to criticism of its policies. He went further and showed that the Russian public at large, which was convinced that it sincerely loved the Slavs, was also considerably infected by imperialist sentiments and undeniably constituted an obstacle to Russia's fulfillment of its "mission of liberation." In characterizing the ideology of the Russian Slavophiles, he wrote:

There have never been any real lovers of the Slavs, especially ones still free in their thinking, [or] any real Pan-Slavists [*vsesloviantsi*] in Russia, because the former Russian Slavophiles, for all their occasionally free-thinking prattle, in practice could never imagine that they could do anything if the tsarist authorities did not permit it, even if they [the authorities] were stupid thirty times over and, according to the Slavophiles [*po sloviaofilskomu*], German besides. The old Slavophiles never escaped very far from the official trinity [of] Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality.²²

Remaining ever faithful to his belief in the power of the word, Drahomanov hoped especially that if literary and scholarly polemics could not, life itself would teach thinking Russians that they have to renounce their Pan-Slavist ideas, reconsider what Russia's role in the Slavic world really is, and facilitate the rise of new, progressive social forces. Consequently, even after he had reached his negative conclusions about the Russian love for the Slavs, Drahomanov still had some hope for the new Pan-Slavism [*vseslovianstvo*] in the Russian Empire. Believing that his expectations had a factual basis, he examined both the positive and negative "kernels" in this new wave of social activism. He did not fail to notice that the renewed Pan-Slavism was still "supporting the power of the state's drawing together [*stiahuvannia*] of lands and people (centralization) as well as military-bureaucratic power, [and] awakening thoughts about the 'Russification' [*obruseniie*] of all the Slavs."²³ Yet Drahomanov wanted to see something "radiant" and positive behind these negative features of modernized Russian Pan-Slavism, and that is how he saw the way that it "forces one to think about the free governing [*vilnii vpravi*] of all lands, which cannot be Russified even by stronger forces than those that the Russian capital [*stolychna Moskovshchyna*] has."²⁴

Taking his cue from older generations of Ukrainian activists, Drahomanov tried to counterpose a Ukrainian national version of Slavophilism to the Russian version, which he saw as an ideological cover for the great-state, expansionist policy of the Russian Empire. Rejecting widespread expectations (which he had earlier himself accepted partly on faith) of what would result from the integration

22. Drahomanov, *Hromada*, no. 2: 213.

23. *Ibid.*, 220.

24. *Ibid.*, 221.

of the Slavic peoples, their cultures, and their languages on the basis of the Russian language and culture as the language and culture of the largest Slavic people and greatest Slavic power, he concluded that all hopes, even among the Orthodox Slavs, for a literary Pan-Slavism, be it Russian or otherwise, were based on a misconception. But he stressed that real Pan-Slavism does not stand to lose anything from the process by which each Slavic "tribe" acquires a separate literary identity.²⁵ Therefore, without fully abandoning his conviction as to the importance of the Slavic idea and the need to unite the Slavic peoples, Drahomanov began his own theoretical struggle for a true ("*spravzhnie*") love for the Slavs. As a rule, a struggle for a "true" idea is a sign that an idea (or ideology) has peaked, that its adherents have exhausted its potential for further development, and that therefore it is in crisis as a system of beliefs. Without giving much thought to this, Drahomanov assessed the circumstances of Ukrainian participation in Pan-Slavic theoretical discussions in the Russian Empire. How well he understood the recent stage in Russian and Ukrainian thought is reflected in his evaluation of events in the Ukrainian movement in the late 1850s as a time "when Ukrainophilism [*ukrainoliubstvo*], which had been struck down in 1847, had barely begun spreading its wings and was sheltering under the protection of Russian Slavophilism [*moskovskoho slovianoliubstva*]."²⁶ Yet, as time went on the Ukrainian Pan-Slavists needed increasingly less shelter under the wing of their Russian counterparts and tried to change from a "Little Russian branch" of the Russian imperial intelligentsia into a Ukrainian national intelligentsia. The ideological dimensions of this transformation had a decisive, pioneering significance for the creation of the organizations and institutions of the Ukrainian national movement.

The Ukrainian version of the Slavic idea played an important role in this process. For the new generation of Ukraine's civic leaders, the Slavic world, first and foremost that of the Western Slavs, was supposed to become not only an antithesis to their own backwardness and inclusion as the "younger brothers" in the political, social, and cultural life of the Russian Empire, but also a unique "window onto Europe," a way to gain access to the ideals and bright prospects of European civilization. Understanding this, Drahomanov repeatedly tried to convince his compatriots that they needed to revise and revamp their thinking radically. They needed to purge themselves of the stereotypes that had taken root because of the long-standing inertia of their politically dependent and frequently culturally secondary development and their roles as lackeys ("*prykhvosni*") of the more developed Russian (or even Austrian) civilization, particularly of the state. This is precisely what he kept in mind when addressing his writings to the

25. Drahomanov, "Chistoe delo trebuet chistykh sredstv," 35.

26. Drahomanov, "Shevchenko, ukrainofily i sotsiializm," *Hromada*, no. 4 (1879): 102.

Ukrainian intelligentsia, which at that time was almost entirely imbued with the ideas of Pan-Slavic brotherhood. Proceeding from these or similar principles to explicate the various aspects of the "Slavic idea," he used arguments and symbols that were widespread in Ukrainian circles at that time. But his conclusions reflected his formulation of the substance and value of the "Slavic idea" in affirming the Ukrainians' national interests and aspirations.

By comparing Ukraine's development with the achievements of neighbouring peoples, Drahomanov thought that he could eliminate confusion as to the aims and methods of national activities, formulate objective criteria for evaluating the path that Ukrainian activists had chosen, and overcome the syndrome of provinciality, that long-standing illness of the Ukrainian intellectual and political elite. It is from this perspective that the appropriateness and timeliness of the following remarks by Drahomanov should be evaluated:

This means that we can expect that at least those Ukrainophiles and Ukrainian Hromada members for whom the Ukrainian cause [*ukrainstvo*] and Hromada movement [*hromadivstvo*] are truly a matter of life [and death], and not [simply] of conversation and momentary dreaming, do reflect on the shift [*perestankovka*] in thinking and community work from [its] old and narrow Ukrainian-Russian base [*grunt*] to the full and broad European-Slavic [base] about which we had just spoken.. In any case, [he generalized,] without a European-Slavic foundation the Ukrainian Hromada movement will be even less able to set itself right [*nalahodytys*], will wander about [*blukatyne*] even more as it seeks the true path, and will gain strength even later than the Russian [movement], as well as fall more often than might be the case into the pits that the old and new Ukrainian and all-Russian life have dug and will continue to dig for it.²⁷

In other words, the Slavic idea and relations with the Western and Southern Slavs were to serve as a laboratory for Ukrainian educational, cultural, and political work, a stimulus to set broad goals, and a unique "window onto Europe" through which Ukrainian activists could assimilate the experience of those peoples whose ethnocultural traits, historical memory, and sociopolitical situation were most like theirs.

There is no doubt that by the late 1870s and early 1880s Drahomanov fully understood how the Slavic and Ukrainian ideas corresponded and that he tried to convince his compatriots of this. Consideration of the real priorities in his interpretation of these ideas facilitates an understanding of his following thoughts. Even at the height of his compatriots' sentiments for all the Slavs—an enthusiasm that Drahomanov regarded with great interest and optimism—he made clear that "in Ukraine Slavic issues cannot be placed ahead of our own or even on an equal footing with them"²⁸ because Ukrainians had been dispersed

27. Ibid., 102–3.

28. Drahomanov, "Tsentr i okrainy," *Hromada*, no. 2: 545.

willingly or unwillingly throughout the world and Ukraine had not had justice for so long that "now more than anything else Ukrainians need to gather together in their own land, around their own people and their own domestic issues." In order to do so, it was important for Ukrainians not to forget that "even a domestic issue should be approached with broader, universal thoughts, remembering first of all [about our] closest neighbours, who are primarily Slavs."²⁹ Thus, even when he was most concerned with Slavic affinity, Drahomanov declared his views as a Ukrainian, as a spokesman for the Ukrainian national cause, and not as a Russian subject or a member of the all-Russian liberal or democratic camp. He viewed the potential of the Slavic idea and his compatriots' sympathy for it as a viable mobilizing force for satisfying the Ukrainians' national needs and solving their own problems, the first and foremost being attaining political liberty and changing the conditions under which the Ukrainian nation had been developing under both Russian and Austro-Hungarian rule.

It was not the Slavs' ethnic or even historical and cultural similarities that determined Drahomanov's response to the "Slavic question." Rather, it was his awareness of the obvious fact that the majority of Ukraine's neighbours were Slavs and that the victory or defeat of the struggle for the Ukrainian cause depended on whether these neighbours were positively or negatively inclined toward it. Such geopolitical and historical realities left him with no choice but to search for an understanding and ongoing dialogue with these neighbours. For him the idea of Slavic affinity was not the worst possible means of achieving this goal. Naturally, he thought that history had called the Ukrainians to the fore and that they would be able to carry out the mission that they had been assigned in the Slavic world. Thus rational considerations and theoretical calculations did not prevent him from becoming sincerely committed to the ideals of Slavic fraternity, and these ideals prompted the words that he solemnly addressed to his compatriots: "Ukrainians must take part with their words and efforts [*pratseiu*] in the Slavic world [*Slavianshchyni*] in any matter that the Slavs need, from the academy and the office to the trades and the field, to [engaging in a] bloody war and insurrection for freedom and the land of the Slavs."³⁰

For Drahomanov all the necessary factors—primarily geographic, historical, and political, but also linguistic and cultural ones—facilitating such an onerous task existed. In his view, Ukraine's historic destiny and its position almost at the centre of the lands populated by the Slavs impelled the Ukrainians to pay particular attention to the Slavic world and to define their role in it. Anyone who glanced at a map of the Slavic lands and peoples, he pointed out, would say that because Ukraine was adjacent to the Poles and, via Galicia and Hungarian-ruled

29. Drahomanov, "Ukraina i tsentry," *Hromada*, no. 2: 559.

30. *Ibid.*, 558.

Ruthenia, to the Slovaks and was separated only by a narrow band of land from the Serbs and Bulgarians, and the more so because longtime Polish and Bulgarian and more recently founded Czech settlements existed in Ukraine, "this is where all-Slavic fraternity should have taken root most easily and where at least learning about the Slavic world [*slovianstvo*] should have arisen."³¹

An extensive network of Ukrainian-Slavic ties could not but take shape on such a basis. Looking at them in broad retrospective, Drahomanov concluded that "Ukrainian affairs are so closely intertwined with the affairs of neighbouring peoples all around it, both in Russia and in Austria-Hungary—the Russian, Belarusian, Polish, Slovak, Serbian, and various other Slavic and non-Slavic [peoples] (for example, with the Rumanian [people] through Bukovyna and Bessarabia, not to mention Transylvania)—that a Ukrainian civic person [*hromadskomu cholovikovi*], particularly from the moment when he becomes a Ukrainian, cannot fail to become a person with very broad federal and even international ideas. Naturally, the closest thing of all for a Ukrainian citizen will be the affairs of neighbours whose lineage is most like his [*nairidnishoi porody*] and whose fate is most similar, that is, the [other] Slavs."³²

Drahomanov designated for the Ukrainians an important, if not exclusive, role in the future process of Slavic unification. Consequently he argued that the political platform of the Ukrainian national movement had to include as a goal the closest possible union of all Slavs. Asserting that the Ukrainians' national liberation and the Slavs' common struggle against enslavement were indivisible, he proclaimed on behalf of his fellow Ukrainians that "We will come to them [the other Slavs] truly as brothers and not as 'uncles,' as equal brothers and not as older ones, not as 'benefactors' [*blahotvortsiamy*] but as colleagues [*spilnymy robitnykamy*], in order to struggle together with them equally against injustice, no matter where it comes from, be it a stranger or a relative, [and] in order to shatter the fetters forged by Turkish, Hungarian, and Slavic blacksmiths."³³ For Drahomanov neither Russian officialdom nor the Russian Pan-Slavists (whom he considered an invariable of Great Russian nationalism) would be the ones who would join with other participants of the Slavic rebirth in a common struggle against all oppressors, including Slavic ones, but a new generation of Ukrainians at the head of a democratic liberation movement that they had initiated. It is not difficult to recognize in these thoughts the same motifs found in the writings of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood or in the then much more widely known poetry of Taras Shevchenko.

31. M. P. Drahomanov, "Perednie slovo [do 'Hromady' 1878 r.]," in his *Vybrane: Mii zadum zlozhyty ocherk istorii tsyvilizatsii na Ukraini* (Kyiv: Lybid, 1991), 326.

32. Ibid.

33. Drahomanov, "Ukraina i tsentry," 559.

Of course, it was not this almost all-encompassing and therefore barely attainable “external” mission of the Ukrainians as liberators of the Slavs that dictated Drahomanov’s passionate words. The Ukrainians had more modest but also more urgent domestic needs: abandoning hope in receiving any consideration from their “older brother” and overcoming their national inferiority complex by proving that they, oppressed and persecuted though they were, were worthy of becoming true “toilers” on the field of liberty and that a great future awaited them. Drahomanov’s aspirations to fill his compatriots’ hearts with lofty and action-inspiring ideals enlivened his political journalism. Because the fundamental, popular theme of the 1870s—and, what was more important, one that united public opinion—was the Slavic idea, Drahomanov could not but depict his views using images and colours from the Slavophiles’ by then ready, familiar, and publicly acceptable “palette.” In trying to prove the historical and political foundations and justifiable preponderance of the “Ukrainian mission” over its Russian counterpart in the Slavic world, he was not so much suggesting to the Western and Southern Slavs that they rely on the Ukrainians rather than the Russians as he was affirming the necessity of conviction and self-reliance in the Ukrainian consciousness. Only then, he believed, should the Ukrainians expect to receive support from those peoples with whom they had nothing to share along the winding paths of East European history except adversity.

The path that Drahomanov travelled from the time he first became captivated by the idea of Slavic unity to when he realized that the further elaboration of this idea had to be abandoned in the context of shaping the Ukrainian national movement’s political platform serves as a useful reminder to Ukrainian society even today—a time of breakneck political changes, new geopolitical tensions, and competition among revived versions of outdated ideologies. How Ukraine’s thinkers and politicians will use this accumulated intellectual capital and theoretical experience remains to be seen. How they do use it will not depend solely or even largely on that nation’s historians and students of Ukrainian and East European social and political thought.

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Mykhailo Hrushevsky in Moscow and His Death (1931–34): New Revelations

Iurii Shapoval

*Whether Hrushevsky's death was natural
or whether it happened on secret orders
from the Soviet authorities is difficult
to say. In any case, this death was quite
opportune for the authorities ...*

Oleksander Ohloblyn

In March 1924 Mykhailo Hrushevsky returned to Ukraine to play a leading role in the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (VUAN) in Kyiv. From that moment on he remained under the close scrutiny and surveillance of the Soviet secret police, which proceeded to build a case against him as the leader of a clandestine, anti-Soviet "Ukrainian National Centre" (UNC).¹ As early as the Soviet "thaw" of the 1950s and 1960s, certain facts indicating that the case of the "UNC" had been fabricated had become known. For example, Mykola Shrah, a former member of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (UPSR) who was repressed as a member of the "UNC" but managed to survive the Great Terror, testified on 11 March 1965:

1. Details about Hrushevsky's life and major contributions to Ukrainian scholarship and politics can be found in the only English-language monograph about him, Thomas M. Prymak's *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of national Culture* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987). New information about Hrushevsky's decade under Soviet rule is available in Volodymyr Prystaiko and Iurii Shapoval's *Mykhailo Hrushevsky i GPU-NKVD: Trahichne desiatylittia: 1924–1934* (Kyiv: Ukraina, 1996).

During [my] investigation in 1931, banned methods of investigation were applied to me. Frequent interrogations at night, [forced] standing on my feet during the interrogations, [and] the screaming and insults [I was subjected to] by the investigators [Sergei] Pustovoitov and, occasionally, Kogan [Moisei Kagan] physically and mentally exhausted me and demoralized me. In addition, while I was under arrest my daughter died, which caused me great trauma.... I knew nothing about any organization, [and I] had not been involved in [any] sabotage or preparations for an insurrection. In response to the investigator's demand, I named as participants in [this] counter-revolutionary organization former UPSR members, [that is,] my acquaintances.... The visits by and gatherings at home on the occasion of various family celebrations with my friends ... I presented as conferences by participants in a counter-revolutionary organization. In other words, I wrote everything that was demanded of me as long as I would not be called out at night and screamed at.²

Another survivor of the Great Terror, Mykola Vasylykivsky, a lecturer at the Industrial Academy of the Ukrainian SSR, wrote in official grievances that he submitted in 1954 and 1957: "The depositions that I made in 1931 were false. They were extracted by the investigators [by using] methods of physical and mental coercion.... There were no face-to-face encounters with witnesses, [and] no concrete accusations against anyone were made in written form. Under such conditions of jurisprudence in 1931 the contradictions will become apparent, and hence it will be easy to see the contrived nature of the entire indictment."³

Despite such testimony, for many years the Soviet authorities officially declared that the "UNC" had in fact existed and that Hrushevsky had been its leader. What is particularly striking is that this official account was used not only for mass propaganda purposes, but also in Soviet police training. For example, the official textbook on the history of Soviet state security prepared at the KGB school attached to the USSR Council of Ministers states:

In [the years] 1929–32 the GPU agencies of Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and other Soviet republics devoted a great deal of attention to the struggle against the subversive activities of anti-Soviet nationalist organizations that maintained ties with the nationalist emigration[s] and reactionary forces in a number of capitalist states. In Ukraine the agencies of state security uncovered the bourgeois-nationalist "Ukrainian Nationalist [sic] Centre" headed by the nationalist Hrushevsky, as well as the "Ukrainian Military Organization" and other [such organizations].⁴

2. Iurii I. Shapoval, *Ukraina 20–50-kh rokiv: Storinky nenapysanoi istorii* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1993), 83–4. Like Hrushevsky, Shrah (1894–1970) had fled the Soviet occupation of Ukraine and was active in émigré political life in Vienna before returning to Ukraine in 1924.

3. Ibid.

4. V. M. Chebrikov et al, eds., *Istoriia sovetskikh organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti: Uchebnik* (Moscow: Vysshshaia shkola KGB SSSR, 1977), 259.

Now we have proof that the fifty people convicted in the case against the “UNC” and sentenced to terms of imprisonment of three to six years had been falsely accused.⁵ During the years 1934–41, thirty-three of these individuals were found guilty once again of “anti-Soviet activities” and “espionage.” Twenty-one of them were executed, and the remaining twelve received new terms of imprisonment. Most of the latter died in Soviet concentration camps.

Mykhailo Hrushevsky suffered a different fate. Very recently new documents were found that shed light on the last years of his life and make it possible to reconstruct the details of his arrest, why he gave in to his interrogators and made his forced “confession,” the circumstances in which he was released, his contacts with other people, and how his life ended.

All of this became possible with the discovery of a previously unknown volume from his case file that is preserved in the State Archives of the Security Service of Ukraine (Derzhavnyi arkhiv Sluzhby bezpeky Ukrainy, or DA SBU) in Kyiv. The volume contains documents from Hrushevsky’s final years, in Moscow and in Kislovodsk, where he died while in November 1934. Marked “*khranit postianno*” (permanently classified), it was transferred on 10 February 1965 from the Central KGB Archives at the USSR Council of Ministers to the First Department of the KGB at the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers as “materials of archival case no. 262 against M. Hrushevsky.”⁶ It had not been available to researchers for over sixty-five years. When Gen. Volodymyr Prystaiko, the deputy director of the Security Service of Ukraine, and I were writing our book *Mykhailo Hrushevsky i GPU-NKVD* in 1995 and 1996, we were not aware that these documents had been in Kyiv for over thirty years. We had searched for them in Moscow, where the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation responded negatively to our enquiries.

The newly discovered volume contains a number of extraordinarily interesting and valuable materials, among them a typescript of the speech that Hrushevsky gave at celebration of his jubilee in October 1926 with his own handwritten corrections⁷; a letter that he wrote as organizer of the Ukrainian Sociological Institute in Vienna to the Soviet embassy in Poland with a request to facilitate Oleksander Zhukovsky and Mykola Chechel’s trip to Soviet Ukraine to take part in a scientific congress there in June 1922⁸; and other rare documents.

5. See Volodymyr Prystaiko and Iurii Shapoval, “Za dveriu bez zamka,” *Rabochaia gazeta*, 9 April 1989; idem, “Ukrainskii natsionalnyi tsentr: Mif, obernuvshiisia tragediei,” *Soiuz*, 1990, no. 2; and idem, “Reabilitovana pravda,” *Radianska Ukraina*, 12 September 1990.

6. These materials are now preserved in DA SBU, spr. [case no.] 11130, fol. 368.

7. DA SBU, spr. 11130, fols. 4–9.

8. Ibid., fol. 3.

In order to evaluate these materials properly, we should first examine the circumstances of Hrushevsky's arrest in Moscow on 23 March 1931. Earlier we had no knowledge whatsoever of an incident that occurred four days earlier. As it turns out, on 19 March 1931 Hrushevsky went to see Oleksander Shumsky, the former Soviet Ukrainian commissar of education and at that time the head of the Central Committee of Educational Workers of the USSR, to ask him to intercede on his behalf because he and his family were being evicted from their apartment in Kyiv, and to help him to find employment in Moscow "until everything is cleared up." Shumsky, who had long known Hrushevsky, promised to do what he could.

Not only Hrushevsky's request must have alarmed Shumsky. I believe that the very fact that the academician had come to see him had frightened him, and that is why Shumsky decided to inform none other than Stalin himself about his discussion with Hrushevsky. The draft of the letter that Shumsky wrote to Stalin that very day has been preserved. It states:

In reply to my question as to what exactly would be cleared up and what are the reasons for his decision, he [Hrushevsky] said that there are very many rumours that war is nigh and a very alarming atmosphere in Kyiv, and that is why he wants to move to Moscow. It is difficult to say whether this motive is the real reason for his flight from Kyiv, inasmuch as he lamented a great deal about [his] impossible working conditions. The only thing that is certain, however, is that the old man's behaviour reflects the panic-stricken mood of part of the Ukrainian intelligentsia.

As for the substance of his request, I replied to him that since he does not know what kind of work he would like to do and where, it will be difficult for me to refer him anywhere, and I advised him to think [some more] about this matter.⁹

Shumsky's postscript is particularly telling: "Damn it, even here I'm being forced to deal with Hrushevsky."¹⁰

Hrushevsky did not have to think long about where to find work: his arrest put an end to all his plans. He was transported to Kharkiv, and during his interrogation there on 28 March he was forced to admit that he had belonged to a "counter-revolutionary organization." On 31 March he made a further deposition, and on 3 April he was questioned by none other than Vsevolod Balytsky, the head of the GPU and people's commissar of internal affairs in Soviet Ukraine. Hrushevsky's session with Balytsky was much like the one that Academician Serhii Iefremov had with the GPU chief before he was tried for heading a clandestine "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine" (SVU) in 1929. It had a ritual purpose: Balytsky no doubt wanted to assure himself that Hrushevsky would continue to say what was expected of him. A four-page Russian-

9. Ibid., fol. 2.

10. "Chort zabyrail, i tut mene nelehka zishtovkhuie z Hrushevskym" (Ibid).

language typescript of the record has been preserved. It contains Hrushevsky's signature on each page and his handwritten confirmation that the corrections made to the record are reliable.

On 4 April 1931 Balytsky reported on Hrushevsky's confession at a session of the Ukrainian Politburo, and a decision was taken to distribute the text of the confession to the leaders of Soviet Ukraine. Immediately after his interrogation by Balytsky on 3 April, Hrushevsky was transported to Moscow, where Genrikh Iagoda, the deputy chief of the OGPU for the entire USSR, instructed Iakov Agranov, the head of the OGPU's Secret Political Department, to meet with Hrushevsky. It should be noted that many of the uncovered classified documents, especially the reports about Hrushevsky's transfer from one prison to another, contain notes stating that copies had been "Sent to Comrade Stalin."¹¹ This clearly shows that Stalin was closely following Hrushevsky's case.

At first Hrushevsky obediently repeated everything that he had been coached to say by Illarion Iuzhny-Vetlitsyn of the Ukrainian GPU's Secret Department as part of the GPU's grandiose conspiracy scheme about the "UNC"'s activities and multifarious links, including ones abroad. Many of the documents reveal Iuzhny-Vetlitsyn's operating methods. On 4 March 1931, for example, when he interrogated Mykola Chechel (1891–1937), the former secretary of the Ukrainian Central Rada and Hrushevsky's long-time associate who had also returned to Ukraine, he blackmailed Chechel into talking by showing him Hrushevsky's "confessions," even though Hrushevsky had not been arrested yet. Chechel responded: "When I am shown testimony by Hrushevsky, [Ivan] Lyzanivsky, and [Vsevolod] Holubovych written in their own hand, in which there is reference to my membership in the organization [the "UNC"], then I will sign [it]. I am ready to vouch with my life that neither [Mykola] Shrah nor [Pavlo] Khrystiuk, who have the same political views as I [*moi politychni odnodumtsi*], have done anything hostile against the Soviet government since 1920. And if they did, then I did too." Yet, after he was worked over the next day, Chechel admitted that he had belonged to "a counter-revolutionary organization that set itself the goal of overthrowing the Soviet government and whose members included Khrystiuk, Holubovych, Ievhen Fylypovych, Lyzanivsky, [and] Hrushevsky."¹²

11. See, for example, *ibid.*, fols. 11 and 29.

12. DA SBU, spr. 59881 FP, vol. 3, fols. 7–9. Like Hrushevsky and Shrah, Ivan Lyzanivsky (1892–1937), Vsevolod Holubovych (1885–1939), and Pavlo Khrystiuk (1890–1941) were also former prominent members of the UPSR and leading figures in the Ukrainian Central Rada and governments of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR). Khrystiuk also fled the Soviet occupation and was active in émigré political and scholarly life in Vienna before returning to Ukraine in 1923, a year before Hrushevsky; see my article "Heneralnyi pysar," in my book *Liudyna i systema (Shtrykhy do portretu totalitarnoi doby v Ukraini)* (Kyiv: Instytut natsionalnykh vidnosyn i politolohii

It is also noteworthy that Agranov spoke not only to Hrushevsky, but also interrogated many other people accused of belonging to the "UNC." This indicates that Moscow was closely following the case and considered it particularly important. Hrushevsky's experiences confirm this. After he talked to Agranov on 4 April, Hrushevsky was forced to meet with another OGPU agent, Stanislav Messing. He was then released, but not before he signed a promise to write a letter to various Ukrainian political figures exhorting them to cease the struggle against the Bolshevik regime.

Hrushevsky realized that the authorities wanted to exploit his name and authority for their own purposes and thus would toy with him without resorting to the blatant pressure that he had received in Kharkiv from the Ukrainian GPU. He also realized that another show trial was in the making, that it would be no less grand than the 1930 show trial of the SVU, and that he would be forced to play a leading role in it much like the one that Serhii Iefremov had played a year earlier. Hrushevsky remembered how Iefremov had obediently confirmed even the most absurd accusations levelled against him and how the SVU trial had ended for him. He also knew what sham ideal conditions had been created for those prisoners who had been selected by their interrogators to play leading roles in the SVU trial. He thought about these matters for quite some time and was in no hurry to meet with Agranov.

In the end Agranov had to call Hrushevsky in for a meeting on 15 April 1931. It was here that Hrushevsky took the daring step to upset the GPU's plans for a new show trial by refuting his earlier testimony about the existence of the "UNC" and his leading role in it. Agranov responded by pointing out that a number of Hrushevsky's followers had mentioned his name in their depositions. Hrushevsky replied that they were probably motivated by the same thing that he was: the belief that by giving the investigator the testimony that he required would result in kinder fates for the other accused.

The OGPU's leaders thus realized that they would probably not be able to make Hrushevsky into the leading character in yet another show trial and, after consulting with the Bolshevik Central Committee in Moscow (documents concerning this are no doubt preserved in Moscow), released him. On 16 April 1931 Iagoda wrote to Stalin:

In sending you the transcript of Comrade Agranov's conversation with Academician M. S. Hrushevsky, I should point out that when Hrushevsky was leaving Kharkiv for Moscow he knew that he would be released in Moscow. Agranov's conversation with Hrushevsky on 4 April of this year, the day of the latter's arrival

Natsionalnoi akademii nauk Ukrainy, 1994), 108–28. Ievhen Fylypovych (1889–?) was an émigré co-operative figure who returned to Ukraine in the 1920s and worked at the State Agricultural Publishing House in Kharkiv. All of the above were repressed and died in the Stalin terror.

in Moscow and of his release, did not have the features of an interrogation. Nonetheless, during this conversation Hrushevsky confirmed all the depositions that he had given at the GPU of Ukraine. Hrushevsky also confirmed these depositions to Comrade Messing before he was released.¹³

One indication of Moscow's dissatisfaction with the Kharkiv GPU agents' failure to make Hrushevsky into the leader of the "UNC" is found in a brief but clear note that Efim G. Evdokimov, the head of the OGPU's Secret Operations Administration, wrote to Balytsky on 19 April 1931: "For Comrade Balytsky personally. I am submitting two documents: a report dated 4 April 1931 and a transcript of Comrade Agranov's conversation with Professor Hrushevsky on 15 April 1931. For your information and appropriate conclusions. Evdokimov."¹⁴

Balytsky did draw conclusions: fifty persons accused of belonging to the "UNC" (many of whom had been Hrushevsky's close comrades in the UPSR) were convicted in camera in February 1932, and Hrushevsky remained under relentless secret-police surveillance until the very last minutes of his life. Nevertheless, the GPU returned to the matter of Hrushevsky's appeal to Ukrainian political activists to stop fighting against the Bolshevik regime. This, too, has never been mentioned before. In a report to Iagoda on 21 April 1931, Agranov wrote: "Academician M. S. Hrushevsky gave me two drafts of his letters abroad and the addresses to which he intends to send these letters. Naturally the letters have been written in Ukrainian. Hrushevsky also intends to send similar letters to some French scholars. He is ready to make those changes that will be suggested to him in these letters. Please [send me] your instructions."¹⁵

A sheet of paper with the names and addresses of the people to whom Hrushevsky's letters were to be sent has been preserved. The addresses are divided into those in Polish-ruled Galicia and those in Czechoslovakia. The recipients included Academician Kost Studynsky, the biobibliographer and literary scholar Volodymyr Doroshenko, the historian Myron Korduba (Hrushevsky's former pupil), the writer, literary scholar, and university lecturer Denys Lukiiianovych, Prof. Jaroslav Bidlo of Charles University, Prof. Stepan Smal-Stotsky of the Ukrainian Free University in Prague, Prof. Vasyl Simovych of the Ukrainian Higher Pedagogical Institute on Prague, and Prof. Oleksander Mytsiuk of the Ukrainian Husbandry Academy in Poděbrady.

Two Russian versions of this letter handwritten by Hrushevsky, as well two typed versions, have also been preserved. The letters contain a positive

13. Ibid., fol. 56.

14. Document published in Prystaiko and Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky i GPU-NKVD*, 267.

15. DA SBU, spr. 11130, fol. 38.

evaluation of Soviet policies, including collectivization and the trial of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine. One draft ends with the words:

The Ukrainian intelligentsia has become convinced that the Soviet government has taken firm control of the situation and will carry out its program of socio-economic and national-cultural development firmly and steadfastly.

I thought it necessary to inform you about this state of affairs because of the reports that are surfacing in the foreign press about the difficulties that Soviet [state] building is experiencing, [and] about the attempts to fight against it and sabotage of it, and so on. No significance should be attributed to these reports.¹⁶

One can only imagine what a moral defeat the writing of these letters must have been for Hrushevsky. When his wife Mariia arrived in Moscow, she did not recognize him because he had changed so much. He did not say much and "only related that in Kharkiv the investigator Iuzhny-Vetlitsyn had interrogated him at length, [and] had kept threatening [him] the entire time, saying among other things that he would deport [their] daughter to the Solovets Islands for ten years. 'If something like this [were to happen] once again, I would not survive,' Mykhailo Serhiiovych let out ... and he said nothing more."¹⁷

We can seemingly hear Hrushevsky's own voice for the first time in a letter that he wrote to Stalin in September 1931. In it he tried to explain why he had first made a confession and then retracted it, and he described Iuzhny's operating methods:

The investigator [Iuzhny] rejected my testimony. He would not allow me to write it down [but] kept grabbing the paper from my hand [and] tearing it up if I was not writing what he wanted. Using coarse words, threats, and other means of psychological coercion, he demanded that I confess to everything that the testimonies of other implicated [people] supposedly revealed about me. There was a whole bunch [of them], and they had unanimously pointed at me as [their] leader. [Iuzhny said that] if I confirm their testimony and express [my] sincere repentance, that would ease the fate of all the accused and mine [as well]. On the other hand, [if I did not] everyone close to me would be arrested, dozens of debilitating searches would be carried out, dozens of apartments would be wrecked, floors and walls would be torn up, and people close to me would be sent to concentration camps, where they would be executed.¹⁸

In his letter to Stalin, Hrushevsky also described how he stood his ground and assured his inquisitor that false testimony would not benefit anyone, and how Iuzhny responded with ridicule, scorn, shouting, and threats. It is interesting to note that at first Iuzhny suggested to Hrushevsky that he corroborate the

16. Ibid., fol. 44.

17. Oksana Stepanyshyn, quoted in Liubomyr Vynar, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: Istoryk i budivnychy natsii. Statti i materialy* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo im. Oleny Telihi, 1995), 244.

18. DA SVU, spr. 11130, fols. 102–3.

testimony given by Lyzanivsky, Chechel, and Hryhorii Kossak (1882–39), a former colonel in the Ukrainian Galician Army and a friend of Hrushevsky. But later Iuzhny began demanding that Hrushevsky provide evidence of his own misdeeds. The interrogation lasted from 7:00 p.m. until 4:00 a.m., and in the end Hrushevsky, who was quite ill with pneumonia, gave in and signed the document that had been proffered to him as a “sample”:

I insisted for a long time that I could not expound on what had not happened, but the investigator got what he wanted. I felt completely powerless when faced with the prospects that he painted for me in case I remained recalcitrant. I had become so weak that my hands refused to function, and in the end I signed this statement and was allowed to return to [my] cell.¹⁹

Hrushevsky’s ordeal had not come to an end, however. After a brief respite, his inquisitor began demanding that Hrushevsky describe the organization’s plans and actions in detail and name all of the other members. Hrushevsky asked to see the depositions of the other people who had been arrested, but his request was denied. Whatever he wrote down did not satisfy Iuzhny and was rejected. Iuzhny also tore up a letter that Hrushevsky had written to Vlas Chubar, the head of the Ukrainian Council of People’s Commissars, and he continued threatening that he would send Hrushevsky directly to prison. Hrushevsky had had enough, however, and he begged Iuzhny to do so.

At first Hrushevsky was left for the night in an interrogation cell and instructed to write down his testimony in the presence of a guard. Then he was sent to another cell and given a cellmate who urged him to confess everything and even suggested what he should write. The cellmate’s “stories,” Hrushevsky observed, “confirmed the impressions that I had drawn even before I was arrested: if certain testimony is required, there is no point in refusing to give it, [for] this will only make the situation worse.”²⁰ In the end, Hrushevsky wrote what the investigator had demanded and exactly as it was dictated to him. He did so because

Comparing everything that had happened to me in the last while with what I had heard previously, during the trial of the SVU—that I could expect the same fate as Iefremov if I did not submit completely (“making Hrushevsky get down on his knees” was how it was put then)—I thought that this was what was required—that I admit [my] transgression of counter-revolutionary activity: this was why evidence was being gathered against me, and once I had made a confession this would no longer be needed and the [others who had been] implicated would be released.²¹

19. *Ibid.*, fol. 105.

20. *Ibid.*, fol. 106.

21. *Ibid.*, fol. 107.

Only when he was talking to Agranov in Moscow did Hrushevsky dare to tell the truth about his "confession," sensing that Agranov was not putting pressure on him and was taking the deposition that he had made in Kharkiv seriously. Hrushevsky also expressed the desire to meet with Viacheslav Menzhinsky, the chief of the OGPU in the USSR, but this did not happen. On 1 September 1931, however, Hrushevsky did meet with the OGPU's first deputy chief, Ivan Akulov, in the presence of Agranov and told him about the circumstances in which he had "confessed." Because no written record of this conversation was made, Hrushevsky decided to write his detailed letter to Stalin. In conclusion he wrote therein: "As an addendum to and confirmation of what I stated verbally then and have presented above, I declare in all sincerity: I have not taken part in any counter-revolutionary organizations, especially not since my return to Ukraine (in 1924), and I do not think that among the people who were close to me any counter-revolutionary organization existed."²² We do not know whether Stalin actually read Hrushevsky's letter. But my guess is that he did inasmuch as the dictator had expressed a personal interest in Hrushevsky's case.

We do know that someone high up in the OGPU examined Hrushevsky's letter closely for contradictions and ambiguities. A typed, three-page analysis of the letter by this person has been preserved. The document contains ten points of comments and demands, including forcing Hrushevsky to explain what he meant when he wrote about the various circumstances of his arrest. Point 8, regarding Hrushevsky's remarks about the SVU trial, states: "Demand a deciphering of these declarations inasmuch as Hrushevsky is questioning the entire activity of the GPU organs and in particular views the SVU trial as a provocation."²³

Several years ago Ruslan Pyrih remarked that the last few years of Hrushevsky's life after he was arrested and then released and allowed to live in Moscow have been one of the least-known pages in his biography.²⁴ This is no longer the case, for now newly discovered documents make it possible to describe and discuss years in Moscow in much greater detail. When he lived there, Hrushevsky tried, as he had in Ukraine, to work as a scholar as intensively as possible. He would often be seen in various Muscovite archives and libraries. Even though his health was poor and his eyesight had deteriorated, he did not abandon his work on his multi-volume *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. His wife Maria and daughter Kateryna lived with him, while his brother Oleksander and sister-in-law had stayed behind in Kyiv.²⁵

22. Ibid., fol. 108.

23. Ibid., fol. 114.

24. Ruslan Ia. Pyrih, *Zhyttia Mykhaila Hrushevskoho: Ostannie desiatylittia (1924–1934)* (Kyiv: Instytut ukrainskoi arkhoeohrafii Akademii nauk Ukrainy, 1993), 124.

25. DA SVU, spr. 11130, fol. 59. Kateryna had been under surveillance since

In Moscow the Hrushevskys lived in apartment 102 at 3/2 Pogodin Street. As before, the secret police opened and inspected all of their correspondence, although some letters from Kyiv slipped by because they were posted at railway stations. It was for this reason that in September 1933 the Kyiv oblast division of the GPU requested that the USSR OGPU open and inspect all of the letters that Hrushevsky was receiving from Kyiv and to forward copies of them to Kyiv.

As in the past, Hrushevsky remained under total surveillance, first by the OGPU and then by the NKVD. On 23 December 1933 a new, second case file against him was opened, and once again he came under particular scrutiny as a "Ukrainian counter-revolutionary."²⁶ Secret agents and informers were actively used in an effort to obtain information about him. One of the most valuable informers was Kostiantyn Shtepa, a former professor at the Nizhyn Pedagogical Institute, who had been recruited in 1928.²⁷ He moved to Kyiv in 1930, and there, under the code name Medvedev, he was used by the GPU's Secret Political Department as an agent "for probing [*dlia rozrobky*] M. Hrushevsky's group."²⁸ The GPU also decided to use him to investigate Hrushevsky's ties in Moscow. "Medvedev" arrived there on 7 September 1932 but did not manage to see Hrushevsky because he had left with his family for the health resort in Kislovodsk. Shtepa did, however, talk with Academician Mikhail Speransky, who described Hrushevsky's state and mood to him and said that Hrushevsky "will not go to Ukraine even if they start to insist on this in Moscow, because he feels calmer here."²⁹

In August 1934 a secret agent code-named Chimera, who had been "a close acquaintance of Hrushevsky in the past," was summoned to Moscow.³⁰ The NKVD staged a "chance" meeting between Chimera and Hrushevsky, Hrushev-

October 1932.

26. Ibid., fol. 1.

27. Shtepa (aka Konstantin Shtepa, 1896–58) was an ancient and medieval historian who also taught at the Nizhyn Institute of People's Education (1922–30) and Kyiv University (1930–8) and was the chairman of the Byzantological Commission of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. During the wartime German occupation he served briefly as the rector of Kyiv University and then as the editor of the Russian-language newspaper *Novoe russkoe slovo*. A postwar refugee in Germany, he emigrated to the United States in 1952 and worked in New York for the American Committee for Liberation. He is the author of books in Ukrainian on ancient and Christian demonology (1926, 1927); *Russian Purge and the Extraction of Confession* (New York: Viking Press, 1951), under the pseud. W. Godin, with F. Beck; and *Russian Historians and the Soviet State* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1962).

28. DA SVU, spr. 11130, fol. 60.

29. Ibid., fol. 63.

30. Ibid., fol. 257.

sky invited Chimera to his home, and their acquaintanceship was renewed. It subsequently became clear to the NKVD that Hrushevsky was well informed about the whereabouts of the Ukrainians who had been sentenced as nationalists or members of the UNC.

The newly found volume of OGPU/NKVD archival documents about Hrushevsky contains daily reports on his surveillance, which describe in detail his circle of acquaintances and contacts in Moscow. Hrushevsky often met with Academician Speransky (whose library he used), Professors Nikolai Durnovo, Grigorii Ilinsky, and Viacheslav Rzhiga, and other scholars. It was these people, as well as Hrushevsky, whom the OGPU/NKVD began construing as members of a counter-revolutionary "Russian National Party" (RNP). The existence of such a fabricated case and its history were previously unknown. The newly uncovered records contain an extensive report on Hrushevsky signed by Genrikh Liushkov, the deputy director of the Secret Political Department of the OGPU, and Moisei Kagan, the director of the department's Second Division, dated March 1934. It states that

In 1924, after [his] return to the Soviet Union, [Hrushevsky] continued [his] active counter-revolutionary work [and] organized and headed a bloc of Ukrainian counter-revolutionary parties.

He was the ideologue and leader of the c[ounter]-r[evolutionary] insurgent Ukrainian National Centre that was liquidated in 1931.³¹ He had close ties with the liquidated "Ukrainian Military Organization."

Despite his declaration about ceasing [his] struggle against the Soviet regime, [Hrushevsky] became part of the core of a counter-revolutionary bloc of Russian and Ukrainian nationalists that has called itself the "Russian National Party," has oriented itself on German fascism, and has set itself the goal of overthrowing the Soviet regime.

[Hrushevsky] worked actively in the organization [and] was connected with foreign counter-revolutionary circles, particularly the French professor and Slavist [André] Mazon.³²

In addition to the scholars already mentioned above, the OGPU also considered Academician Volodymyr Peretts, who stayed at Speransky's apartment when he visited Moscow, a member of the RNP. Many of these people were arrested in late 1933. The preserved transcripts of their interrogations mention Hrushevsky. For example, Borys Kryzhanivsky, the director of the Ukrainian department at the Russian Museum in Leningrad, testified on 25 December 1933 that "Besides these individuals, Academician Hrushevsky, the

31. This is stated here even though Hrushevsky's testimony and the accusations that he was the leader of the UNC had been recognized as false and he had been officially released.

32. DA SBU, spr. 11130, fol. 323.

former head of the Ukrainian Central Rada who has extensive ties in the Ukrainian nationalist milieu, especially among Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries, played a leading role in the organization. Hrushevsky was connected through the organization with Peretts, and jointly with him and [N. S.] Derzhavin [he] maintained contact regarding organizational matters with [supporters] abroad, where both Peretts and Derzhavin travelled to [take part in] a [scholarly] congress.³³

On 1 November 1933 the prominent art historian Fedir Ernst was forced to give testimony in which he also mentioned Hrushevsky:

In late 1930 and in 1931 the centre, which Hrushevsky headed, collapsed, [and] as a result of [this] collapse the centre was smashed and Hrushevsky moved to Moscow. In 1930 and 1931 the basic direction was already coming from Moscow, where counter-revolutionary work was being conducted by Hrushevsky, who was [still] in contact with [Oleksander] Shumsky and [other former] Borotbists—members of a counter-revolutionary organization that carried out counter-revolutionary work while hiding behind their [Bolshevik] party membership cards.

The counter-revolutionary work continued uninterrupted even in 1933 after the arrests of the [émigré] Galicians, Shumsky, and others. In contact [*po linii*] with the Ukrainian c[ounter]-r[evolutionary] organization were: in Moscow, Hrushevsky, who relied on a counter-revolutionary organization that recruited its members from the milieu of counter-revolutionary and nationalist elements in the Ukrainian colony in Moscow.³⁴

Thus, the documents show that the OGPU not only positioned Hrushevsky as the leader of “Ukrainian counter-revolution” in Moscow, but also, for some reason, added him to the membership roll of the so-called RNP. At this time yet another attack on Hrushevsky was staged in Ukraine. In May 1934 Volodymyr Zatonsky, the Soviet Ukrainian minister of education, officially reminded Stanislav Kosior and Pavel Postyshev, the secretaries of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks’ Central Committee, that the question of Hrushevsky in Moscow had to be resolved somehow. A session of the VUAN was approaching, and if the Bolshevik leadership in Moscow gave its approval, the session could vote to expel Hrushevsky from the VUAN. Zatonsky wrote:

We need to decide what position we are taking on Hrushevsky. Today he is considered to be on [research] leave [in Moscow], is receiving his salary, conducting a correspondence with the VUAN about his department’s “work plan,” [and] demanding that various certificates and references be issued [to him]. All of this is being done on a completely legal basis.

33. Ibid., fol. 203–4. Peretts and Derzhavin were, respectively, the deputy director and director of the Institute of Slavic Studies in Leningrad.

34. Ibid., fol. 225. For details on the repression of Galician political émigrés during the Stalin terror, see Oleksandr S. Rublov and Iurii A. Cherchenko, *Stalinshchyna i dolia zakhidnoukrainskoi intelihtentsii (20–50-ti roky XX st.)* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1994).

The comrades who are working in the Presidium of the VUAN have wound up in a completely stupid situation, [and] it has become impossible simply to remain silent. We cannot demand, for example, that the VUAN president [Oleksander] Bohomolets assume the responsibility and decide what to reply to Hrushevsky when Party members cannot say anything certain.

The simplest [solution] of all would be to draw organizational conclusions from what is known and has already been published about Hrushevsky's counter-revolutionary activity. If this proves for a variety of reasons to be untimely, then we need to reply clearly that Hrushevsky is considered to be an academician (even if on travel leave) and to draw the proper conclusions: the legalization of official correspondence with him, the issuance of appropriate references, and so forth. A decision about Hrushevsky is also necessary because otherwise it will be difficult to do anything about various Voblys, Krymskys, and company.³⁵

However, the Ukrainian leaders did not receive permission to expel Hrushevsky from the VUAN. It is difficult now to say why. Hrushevsky was also not bothered in Moscow, even though the GPU was building a compromising case against him almost by the hour. For example, in May 1934 Boris Kozelsky, the acting director of the Ukrainian GPU's Secret Political Department, reported to Georgii Molchanov, his counterpart at the USSR OGPU, that a secret informer had learned in a conversation with Viktor Petrovsky, an editor at the army publishing house *Na varti*, that Hrushevsky intended to escape to Finland while on leave in Leningrad.³⁶ Moscow took this report seriously, and on 19 May 1934 Molchanov requested Kozelsky to send him all the papers concerning Hrushevsky's possible flight abroad.³⁷ That same day Molchanov also sent Aron Gorin, the permanent OGPU representative in the Leningrad military district, a memorandum in which he wrote:

According to available information, Academician Hrushevsky, Mykhailo Serhiiovych, who is living in Moscow, is preparing to escape abroad in the near future. In Leningrad the technique of crossing over into Finland illegally has been set up. Take measures to establish Hrushevsky's connections in detail. If he arrives in Leningrad, place him under external observation and scrutiny. Hrushevsky is to be arrested only within the border region when he tries to cross the border. In the course of your investigation report to high-frequency link no. 9272.³⁸

Two secret informers, "Zero" and "Andreev," sent reports to Moscow in which they described their meetings and conversations with Petrovsky and Olha

35. Pyrih, *Zhyttia Mykhaila Hrushevskoho*, 138–9. Kostiantyn Vobly (1876–1947) and Ahatanhel Krymsky (1871–1942) were also prominent members of the VUAN. Krymsky was arrested by the NKVD in 1941 and died in a prison hospital in Kazakhstan.

36. DA SBU, spr. 11130, fol. 240.

37. *Ibid.*, fol. 243.

38. *Ibid.*, fol. 244.

Kovalevska, a former Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary who was working at Partvydav, the Party's publishing house, and living in the famous Slovo apartment building for writers and their families in Kharkiv. "Andreev" reported:

Kovalevska asked me what I had heard about Mykhailo Serhiiiovych Hrushevsky. I told her that I had not heard anything in particular and asked what this was about. Kovalevska replied that something was being prepared for Mykhailo Serhiiiovych and that he should soon be abroad. Kovalevska avoided replying directly to my detailed questions, saying that she would be visiting a home today where she would find out more about this.³⁹

Of course, both Petrovsky and Kovalevska were subjected to close scrutiny, but this yielded nothing. In June the secret police became interested in whether Hrushevsky's daughter Kateryna had gone to Leningrad, but they were unable to find her. The only "Hrushevskia" they located was a Ekaterina Matveevna Grushevskaiia, who worked as a statistician for Leningrad public transit.⁴⁰

In the meantime, the people with whom Hrushevsky was in touch were kept under close surveillance. Newly found documents contain the name of Dmitrii Ievseevich Kravtsov, a planner at a liquid-fuel institute in Leningrad. In 1927 and 1928 he had been a graduate student at the VUAN Research Department of Ukrainian History in Kyiv that Hrushevsky had headed.⁴¹ It was at Kravtsov's apartment in Moscow that Hrushevsky had been arrested in March 1931. It is interesting to note that Kravtsov stated that he had taken part in the efforts to get Hrushevsky released from prison. Naturally, instructions were issued to keep Kravtsov under surveillance.⁴²

Other persons were also kept under surveillance, but still no attempt was made to detain Hrushevsky. In fact, he was even given an opportunity to take a vacation at a sanatorium outside Moscow. On 6 September he left the capital, and on 9 September he arrived with his wife and daughter in Mineralnye Vody, from where he went on to Kislovodsk. From that moment on he was again under surveillance.

On 17 September Genrikh Liushkov, the deputy director of the Secret Political Department of the USSR NKVD, sent a telegram to Ivan Lavrushin, the NKVD plenipotentiary for the North Caucasus krai:

Hrushevsky has maintained his leading position among Ukrainian nationalist cadres up to this time.

39. Ibid., fol. 248.

40. Ibid., fol. 258.

41. See *Ukraina: Naukovyi dvomisiachnyk ukraïnoznavstva*, ed. Mykhailo Hrushevsky, 1928, no. 4: 155.

42. DA SBU, spr. 11130, fols. 259–60.

We are actively investigating on him as part of the Starets case, for which we have amassed agents' reports about preparations for Hrushevsky's escape abroad.

We do not rule out the possibility that Hrushevsky's trip to Kislovodsk will be used [by him] for meetings with the organizers of [his] escape and possibly even for carrying it out.

The prevention of Hrushevsky's escape has exceptional political importance. We advise:

1. Sending an experienced operative to Kislovodsk to organize the agents' investigation of Hrushevsky in Kislovodsk;
2. Ensuring that all of [Hrushevsky's] correspondence is opened and examined;
3. Ensuring that he is under constant surveillance by intelligence officers and agents. In case [he] departs, having him followed by intelligence officers;
4. Ensuring the identification and investigation of Hrushevsky's contacts in Kislovodsk and especially of persons who arrive to meet with him;
5. Keeping us informed about the course of Hrushevsky's investigation through special reports every five days.

Hrushevsky is [now] being followed by intelligence officers.⁴³

The new documents contain exceptionally interesting and important evidence about Hrushevsky's contacts during his convalescence in Kislovodsk. One of the first secret reports about his behaviour there indicates that he was keeping to himself and not seeing anyone except his wife and daughter.⁴⁴ Among the few people he did see were Professor Iosif Polak from the Moscow Institute of Geodesy; the Leningrad professor Vladimir Ravdyniks; Academician Vobly, who was also staying at the same sanatorium and whom Hrushevsky even saw off on a train to Kyiv on 30 September; Leon Landau, who was working at an electrical institute in Moscow; Mikhail Gernet, a blind employee of the Socio-Economic Institute in Moscow; Boris Gerasimovich, director of the Leningrad Observatory; Iurii Uman, a professor from Belarus; and Professor Vasilii Ustiantsev from Moscow. Hrushevsky's contacts with Ustiantsev made the NKVD uneasy because they were continuing to work up the theory that Hrushevsky intended to escape abroad and Ustiantsev had been in touch with a man living in Finland called Baranetsky who worked for Ievhen Konovalets, the leader of the underground Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.⁴⁵

While resting in Kislovodsk, Hrushevsky's health worsened. He died there at 2:00 p.m. on 24 November 1934 at the Rykov municipal hospital, where he had been staying in ward no. 2 since 13 November with a diagnosis of "malignant carbuncle on the back" and "sepsis."⁴⁶ The complete medical file, no. 1364,

43. *Ibid.*, fols. 262–3.

44. *Ibid.*, fol. 274.

45. *Ibid.*, fol. 302.

46. *Ibid.*, fol. 310.

about his illness has been preserved. It was previously thought that Hrushevsky had a minor operation to remove a boil on his neck, but the medical file indicates that his physical condition deteriorated day by day. Entries in the file indicate that Hrushevsky was in fact admitted to hospital in serious condition and underwent four operations and that his back was one large lesion from the neck to the waist.⁴⁷ We learn from the file that Hrushevsky became ill in October 1934 while still at the sanatorium. The first operation on his carbuncle was performed on 12 October. The first NKVD report after he entered the hospital stated that “the doctors’ conclusion is that Hrushevsky is dangerously ill. Monitoring of [Hrushevsky’s] family ... has not provided anything.”⁴⁸

In her book on Kateryna Hrushevsky, Iryna Matiash cites the following letter from Kateryna to her aunt Olha Hrushevsky, stating that it was written in late September 1934.

[My] Dears! Forgive us for writing so rarely, but we have been in great dismay all this time. The furuncle that I wrote to you about proved to be a carbuncle, and Daddy had to have an operation, but it wasn’t enough so then they cut [him open] again, and then several days later [once] again. They cut [into him] three times almost without anesthetic [*maizhe po zhyvomu*]. And they cut very deep. He suffered terribly these two weeks and had a high fever and great pain. Lying on his side was difficult, in addition it was very hard to turn over, and he hardly slept and really suffered terribly. Now his temperature is dropping and the wound is in better condition, but pus is still coming out and in one spot this process is continuing, and the doctor says that maybe he will have to be cut [open again]. We are hoping, however, that this will not be necessary.⁴⁹

How could Hrushevsky have written this letter in late September 1934 if, according to official data, Hrushevsky had his first operation on 12 October? Was Hrushevsky’s daughter writing about a different operation? I asked Matiash about this, and it turned out that she had made a mistake. The letter was in fact dated 28 October 1934.

After his first operation in Kislovodsk, Hrushevsky was bedridden with a high fever. His condition did not improve, and on 16 October he had a second operation. A report to the Second Section of the Secret Political Department of the Main Administration of State Security from the North Caucasus krai NKVD, which kept track of Hrushevsky while he was in Kislovodsk, states: “On 16.10.[19]34 the second operation was performed. The patient has a temperature

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid., fol. 261.

49. Cited in Iryna B. Matiash, *Kateryna Hrushevsky: Zhyttiepys, bibliohrafiia, arkhivy* (Kyiv: Ukrainskyi naukovo-doslidnyi instytut arkhivnoi spravy ta dokumentoznavstva, 1997), 105.

of 39.9. Doctors assert that Hrushevsky may be confined to bed until 1 November 1934. No new contacts in this period were noted.”⁵⁰

We should note, however, that Hrushevsky’s medical file mentions four “surgical interferences.” On 16 November he received a transfusion of blood donated by his daughter. On 19 November his condition sharply deteriorated. On 22 November he received another transfusion, also from his daughter, but this did not save him. On 24 November doctors certified that Hrushevsky had suffered “Death [brought on] by the increase in cardiac weakness.”⁵¹

Hrushevsky’s newly found medical records describe the progression of his illness as follows:

13.11.[1934.] Admitted in serious condition. During the last month, while staying at the sanatorium of the KSU [*Komissiiia sodeistviia uchenym*, or Commission of Aid to Scholars], he has been suffering from a malignant carbuncle on [his] back. He underwent four surgical interventions. [Inscription in Latin.] The patient has a regular build [and shows] satisfactory nourishment. He is a very old man [*Glubokii starik*]. Pulse 110, slightly arrhythmic. The back is a large surface lesion from the neck to the waist. On the back there are suppurating wounds from previous operations. On the neck, closer to the bottom, there is a surface lesion with a profuse quantity of pus. Higher up, just below the hairy part of the head, there is an intensely morbid carbuncle. In the region of the waist there is a second, maturing large carbuncle.

14.11. While [he was] under ether anesthetic, numerous penetrating cuts [made] in the area of the upper and lower carbuncles. Profuse secretions of pus. By evening [his] condition [was] satisfactory. No particular complaints.

15.11. Condition unchanged. Bandage profusely soaked with pus.

16.11. Citrated transfusion of 300 cm³ of blood taken from daughter. Severe shivering by the end of the transfusion. He took the transfusion well.

17.11. Normal temperature in the morning. Feels wonderful.

18.11. Temperature up again, condition unchanged. [Latin]

19.11. Condition serious, shivering. Pulse rapid and weak.

20.11. Tumour rising higher to the hairy part of the head. Abscess forming in the region of the corner of the left shoulder blade.

21.11. While [patient was] under clorethyl anesthetic, an additional incision in the neck [and] an incision in the new abscess [were made]. All tissues are filled with pus, which reaches into the deeper layers. Pulse rapid. Patient is semi-conscious.

22.11. Transfusion from the daughter of [another] 300 [cm³] of blood. Transfusion without complications and without reaction. By evening condition serious. Pulse 120 weak, arrhythmic. Condition semi-conscious, hallucination. [Latin]

23.11. Condition serious, marked weakness, loss of appetite, somnolence, hallucination. [Latin]

50. DA SBU, spr. 11130, fol. 303.

51. Ibid., fol. 311r.

24.11. Cardiac weakness increasing, temperature below normal. Pulse 120, barely palpable. Consciousness clouded. Death at 2:00 p.m. with increase in cardiac weakness.

Certified true copy [signature illegible].⁵²

The newly discovered case file contains one rather mysterious, possibly erroneous, document: "Memorandum from Piatigorsk Comrade [Vladimir] Kursky. 23.11. Reports that Hrushevsky and his family accompanied by a doctor left on 23.11 on train 31 for Moscow. Hrushevsky accompanied by intelligence [officers]. Hrushevsky's health has deteriorated. 23.11 [amended to 25.11]. Certified: [signature]."⁵³

But Kursky's next memorandum, dated 26 November, contained information about the transportation of Hrushevsky's body to Kyiv. It also mentioned that intelligence officers were accompanying Hrushevsky's wife and daughter.⁵⁴

After Hrushevsky died, the director of the Kislovodsk sanatorium where the Hrushevskys had been staying sent a telegram to his Moscow superiors: "Hrushevsky died. The family wants to bury [him] in Kyiv. Urgently send express telegram clarifying the possibility of obtaining a separate carriage. Vengerovsky."⁵⁵

Hrushevsky's daughter also sent telegrams to her father's friends in Moscow about his death. The NKVD administration in the North Caucasus krai informed Genrikh Liushkov about this: "We report that after Hrushevsky's death his daughter sent express telegrams to Moscow [informing]: (1) Ipatev, [residing] at 56 B[olshaia] Gruzinskaia St., apt. 2. (2) Bachmanov, [residing] at 2/3 Pogodinskaia St., apt. 102. (3) [Georgii] Opokov, [residing at] 20 Petrovskie linii, apt. 23. (4) [Oleksander] Bohomolets, [residing at] 4 Sivtsev vrazhek, apt. 4."⁵⁶

In a letter to Kost Studynsky, Kateryna Hrushevskia wrote:

Our terrible loss has completely stunned us, we cannot get used to it, and I do not know whether we ever will.... The only [thing] that is clear to me is that because of the exhaustion and enfeeblement that his hard-working life brought about he did not have the strength to fight his illness. He often said this himself when he was still in [good] health, [but] we never thought that this was so close, [and we] did not believe it until the last day and the last minute. I cannot accept this even now.⁵⁷

On 26 November Hrushevsky's wife and daughter accompanied his body on train no. 15 to Kyiv. The train arrived two hours late at 3:00 p.m. on 28

52. Ibid., fols. 310–11.

53. Ibid., fol. 307.

54. Ibid., fol. 308.

55. Ibid., fol. 306.

56. Ibid., fol. 309.

57. Matiash, *Kateryna Hrushevskia*, 105.

November. At the station several academicians, relatives, and members of a government commission that had been set up to arrange Hrushevsky's funeral met the train. His body was taken to the VUAN, where viewing was permitted from 6:00 to 10:00 p.m. that day and from 10:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. the following day. The day after, the funeral was held at the Baikove Cemetery.

The NKVD continued to monitor these sorrowful events and to submit reports by telegram to Balytsky, Agranov, and Karl Pauker in Moscow.⁵⁸ That this information was also sent to Pauker, who was in charge of Stalin's personal bodyguards, indicates, in our opinion, that Stalin continued to take an interest in Hrushevsky.

The NKVD also closely observed the funeral itself. One report indicates that the funeral service proceeded calmly and that four hundred of the six hundred participants also attended the burial at the cemetery.⁵⁹ "The carrying-out of the body from the [building of the] Academy, the procession to the cemetery, and the funeral took place calmly," we read in a document signed by Kozelsky, the director of the Ukrainian NKVD's Secret Political Department, and Sherstov, the acting director of the department's Second Section.⁶⁰

Summary reports about reactions to Hrushevsky's death have been preserved, and they indicate that the NKVD carefully analyzed who said what. Immediately after Hrushevsky died, people began saying that he had met a violent end. One such report stated: "Anti-Soviet nationalist circles are trying to explain Academician M. S. Hrushevsky's death as an act of violence. In talking about the first communication [about Hrushevsky's death] in the press, a small group of research associates at the VUAN's Institute of Chemical Technology indicated that Hrushevsky had in fact been poisoned."⁶¹

It is interesting to note that the documents record responses to Hrushevsky's death by future prominent Soviet writers. For example, Liubomyr Dmyterko, whom the NKVD identified as a "writer, [former] Galician," said:

We've shifted to organizing the very same stagings as those [that have occurred] in Poland. Kyiv writers are being sent one after another to forced-labour centres [DOPR], and over those who are still free the sword of Damocles is hanging. I have the impression that Hrushevsky was deliberately taken to Kislovodsk in order to die there. I can imagine the funeral ... M[ykola] I. Tereshchenko and Maksym Rylsky, both completely terrorized, will make speeches in trembling voices, or maybe [the authorities] will be afraid to let them out."⁶²

58. DA SBU, spr. 11130, fols. 313–314.

59. *Ibid.*, fol. 322.

60. *Ibid.*

61. *Ibid.*, fol. 316.

62. *Ibid.*, fol. 316.

Iurii Dold-Mykhailyk, later the author of the best-selling Soviet spy thriller *Iodyn u poli voïn* (1956), predicted a new wave of repressions: "I read about the death, and ... [so] I instructed my wife to review all [our] correspondence and books immediately [and] to destroy any suspicious facsimiles and so on. After such a funeral arrests and new waves of terror always begin."⁶³

Maksym Rylsky, whom the NKVD authors of one summary report identify as a "poet and nationalist," stated in one of his condolences that Hrushevsky "was a brilliant man [*zolota holova*]", not quite Soviet, it's true, and thus he died in honorary exile. In this there is even something sad and symbolic. He fought for Ukraine, but died abroad. It is not important that he lived out his last days at a Caucasian resort, for he was done in by Moscow."⁶⁴

Vasyl Krychevsky, the prominent architect who would design Hrushevsky's gravestone, said, "Now we're burying Mykhailo Serhiiiovych, and my heart is bursting with pain. If only I could see his wonderful face one last time, but [people] are not allowed near the coffin. I cannot go up [to him] and cry like an old man. It's difficult..."⁶⁵

Because of the oppressive atmosphere and situation at that time, many people did not go up to Hrushevsky's body while it was on view at the VUAN out of fear that they would be persecuted. Many more still did not attend the farewell ceremony. Those who did summon up the courage to come felt uneasy. One of them, the writer Marko Vorony, said, "You go to pay a person your last respects and you feel like a criminal. But tell me what's wrong with this ..."⁶⁶

The documents also record the reactions of Hrushevsky's relatives to the events around his funeral. For example, because so many full members of the VUAN did not attend the official farewell ceremony, Hrushevsky's brother Oleksander complained that "the Academy is not honouring Hrushevsky's memory."⁶⁷ Indeed, the VUAN was forced to bury Hrushevsky, but it could not show him the respect that he deserved. NKVD agents also noted that "Hrushevsky's wife and daughter are expressing [their] dissatisfaction that the government commission has not established a mausoleum [for the deceased]."⁶⁸

No mausoleum was ever erected. In 1936 the sculptors Vasyl Krychevsky and Ivan Makohon created a tombstone for Hrushevsky's grave, but it was never officially unveiled because the Communist regime's campaign against "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism," which Hrushevsky personified, was at its height.

63. Ibid., fol. 317.

64. Ibid., fol. 320.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., fol. 321.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

Interestingly enough, the NKVD's case file (no. 9770) on Hrushevsky was not closed immediately after his death, but nearly four years later, on 22 July 1938.⁶⁹

Some thirty years ago Ivan Maistrenko wrote that "with Hrushevsky began the time of the demise of people who were prominent but whom Stalin found undesirable, such as Gorky, Ordzhonikidze, Kirov, and others."⁷⁰ Maistrenko thought that the circumstances of Hrushevsky's death were mysterious. The newly found documents cited in this article shed a good deal of light on these circumstances. However, this does not mean that I am overestimating their importance. Unfortunately, they do not provide the answer to the question, "Was Hrushevsky deliberately murdered?" We now know the course of events connected with his illness. But who was responsible for the surgical operations that were carried out, and were any illegal methods used during them? Moreover, where is the original of Hrushevsky's medical case file? Answers to these and many other questions still have to be found.

69. Ibid., fol. 360.

70. Ivan Maistrenko, *Storinky z istorii Komunistychnoi partii Ukrainy*, pt. 2 (Munich: Proloh, 1969), 99.

Review Article

In Search of Early Modern Ukrainian Statehood: Post-Soviet Studies of the Cossack Hetmanate

Zenon E. Kohut

Valerii Smolii and Valerii Stepankov. *Pravoberezhna Ukraina u druhii polovyni XVII–XVIII st.: Problema derzhavotvorennia*. Kyiv: Instytut arkhieohrafi NAN Ukrainy, 1993. 71 pp.

———. *Ukrainska derzhavna ideia: Problemy formuvannia, evoliutsii, realizatsii*. Kyiv: Alternatyvy, 1997. 368 pp.

Oleksandr Hurzhii. *Ukrainska kozatska derzhava v druhii polovyni XVII–XVIII st.: Kordony, naselennia, pravo*. Kyiv: Osnovy, 1996. 222 pp.

Leonid Melnyk. *Hetmanshchyna pershoi chverti XVIII stolittia*. Kyiv: IZMN, 1997. 232 pp.

———. *Politychna istoriia Hetmanshchyny XVIII st. u dokumentakh i materialakh*. Kyiv: IZMN, 1997. 140 pp.

Myroslav Trofymuk, ed. *Konstytutsiia ukrainskoi hetmanskoi derzhavy*. Kyiv: Vipol, 1997. 160 pp.

Kyrylo Vyslobokov, ed. *Prava za iakymy sudytsia malorosiiskyi narod: 1743*. Kyiv: Instytut Kuretskoho, 1997. 547 pp.

Tetiana Iakovleva. *Hetmanshchyna v druhii polovyni 50-kh rokiv XVII stolittia: Prychyny i pochatok Ruiny*. Kyiv: Osnovy, 1998. 447 pp.

Oleksandr Hurzhii. *Hetman Ivan Skoropadsky*. Kyiv: Instytut istorii Ukrainy NAN Ukrainy, 1998. 207 pp.

Viktor Horobets. *Prysmerek Hetmanshchyny: Ukraina v roky reform Petra I*. Kyiv: Instytut istorii Ukrainy NAN Ukrainy, 1998. 323 pp.

The Hetmanate was a polity that emerged out of the 1648 Cossack revolt against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, existed for several decades as a semi-independent state, and in a truncated form became an autonomous part of Muscovy/Russia until its autonomy was abolished at the end of the eighteenth century. How historians viewed this entity depended very much on how the Hetmanate fitted in a number of narratives. Traditional Polish historiography represented the 1648 uprising as an unfortunate misunderstanding and the emergence of the Hetmanate as the first loss of the easternmost territory of historical Poland. Imperial Russian historiography came to interpret the Hetmanate's absorption by Russia as an episode in the continuing "gathering" of "Russian" lands corrupted by Polish influences. The Ukrainian narratives, both gentry and populist, celebrated the Cossack uprising as a liberation from foreign, religious, and social oppression and viewed the creation of the Hetmanate as a defining moment in the shaping of the Ukrainian people/nation.

The first historical works about the Hetmanate were written by the Cossack officers and gentry who ruled it. Their primary interest was in Cossack Ukraine under Poland, the great liberator Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and Ukrainian and Cossack rights and liberties, both under Polish kings and Russian tsars. They attempted to demonstrate that there were two Rus' entities, Russia and the Hetmanate or Little Russia (as it was called by the middle of the eighteenth century), and that Little Russia had entered into voluntary agreements first with the Polish king and then with the Muscovite tsar. In this respect, eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Ukrainian historiography had what later would be considered a statist point of view. With the abolition of the Hetmanate it became increasingly difficult to write its history and, at the same time, attribute a positive role to the Russian monarchy and the Russian state. In essence, late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century gentry historians attempted to do this by assigning the Hetmanate an honourable and important place within the history of the Russian monarchy and state.

This approach to the history of the Hetmanate was changed fundamentally with the advent of nineteenth-century Ukrainian populism. The populists believed that the Ukrainian people had been engaged in an age-old struggle for social justice and national liberation. In their focus on the "people" (defined as the lower strata of the population), the populists were little interested in and even hostile to state structures, including Ukrainian ones; they were also hostile to elites in general, including Ukrainian elites. Thus the Hetmanate's long struggle to maintain its autonomy in the wake of Russian centralization was viewed

primarily as a struggle for social privilege. The populists nevertheless collected and published the basic archival record of the Hetmanate and produced fundamental studies on the Cossacks, the enserfment of the peasantry, and other social issues. For example, Oleksander Lazarevsky wrote more than four hundred works on virtually every aspect of the Hetmanate. At the same time, the populists could not entirely avoid politics or even the issue of Ukrainian statehood, which entailed the evolution of the Hetmanate's institutions and its political history, including the course of Russian-Ukrainian relations. Mykhailo Hrushevsky's monumental *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* probably marks the crescendo of populist historiography and a bridge to the new statist orientation, for Hrushevsky not only constructed a continuous history of the Ukrainian people but also provided a solid account of Ukrainian institutional development. Unfortunately, his history covers only the very early stages of the Hetmanate's existence.

The corrective to populism was made in the early twentieth century by the state school, which emphasized territoriality and institutional structures, attempting to show instances of Ukrainian statehood. Ukrainian national historiography, which, in Hrushevsky's classic model, had traced the continuous development of the Ukrainian nation, was now embellished with statist elements (the statist could not provide a continuous history of a Ukrainian state, but they could trace the continuous history of a Ukrainian land). It was this new version of Ukrainian national historiography that dominated in Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s, in Western Ukraine under Poland until 1945, and in the emigration. Its core was in Soviet Ukraine, where the Historical Section of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, guided by Hrushevsky, published an unprecedented number of studies and documents on the Hetmanate. These were supplemented by the activities of the academy's Commission for the Study of the History of Western Ruthenian and Ukrainian Law, scholarly organizations (the Historical and Literary Society, the Historical Society of Nestor the Chronicler) and a number of scholarly research departments (Kharkiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk). The Commission for the Study of the History of Western Ruthenian and Ukrainian Law, in particular, did more to establish the Hetmanate's institutional history than all the previous populist studies. In Western Ukraine, Ivan Krypiakievych and his colleagues expanded the statist interpretation, particularly in his "Studii nad derzhavoiu Bohdana Khmelnytskoho" (vols. 138–40, 144–45, 147, and 151 of *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* [1925–31]). Two waves of émigré historians—Ilko Borshchak, Dmytro Doroshenko, Borys Krupnytsky, and Bohdan Kentrzhynsky after 1917–21 and Oleksander Ohloblyn, Lev Okinshevych, and Nataliia Polonska-Vasylenko after World War II—further refined and augmented the statist paradigm. Some of these historians were able to draw on foreign archives and sources to present new political biographies. Finally, North American historians—Orest Subtelny, Frank Sysyn, and I—contributed to determining the origins, evolution, and demise of the Hetmanate.

By the 1930s, Ukrainian populist and statist paradigms, or combinations of them, were no longer permitted in Soviet Ukraine. Instead, a new compulsory Soviet historical scheme combined Marxism with the Ukrainian populist and Imperial Russian paradigms. Thus the populists' "people" were replaced by the "toiling masses" exploited by a Ukrainian elite in the class struggle (at least in the case of the Hetmanate). At the same time, the scheme posited the joyous "reunion" of the Russian and Ukrainian people in largely a "progressive" Russian state (as compared with native institutions or any of Ukraine's non-Russian neighbours). This scheme limited Soviet historians of the Hetmanate primarily to studying peasant/Cossack revolts and the development of social structure. During the entire Soviet period no biography of a Ukrainian hetman was written except that of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, as part of the commemoration of the Pereiaslav agreement. Nevertheless, even within such a narrow straightjacket, such historians as Vadym Diadychenko and Olena Apanovych produced valuable works on the Hetmanate.

With the emergence of an independent Ukrainian state, the revival of the previously banned Ukrainian national historiography became an important element of Ukraine's state- and nation-building projects. In many instances, historians who hitherto had made careers as castigators of "bourgeois nationalism" now began writing histories from an ultra-patriotic national perspective. Probably the most burning question, debated not only by historians but also by anthropologists, linguists, and archaeologists, was that of the formation of the Ukrainian nation. A ferocious debate, employing Western paradigms, has been raging between the "primordialists," who emphasize such "perennial" features as ethnicity and language, and the "modernists," who favour the "constructed" nation interpretation.¹

The issue of early-modern Ukrainian statehood is not so controversial. Post-Soviet historians have rediscovered, recovered, and reconstructed various aspects of the Hetmanate. Valerii Smolii and Valerii Stepankov's *Ukrainska derzhavna ideia* is an attempt at a new interpretation based primarily on rediscovered and recovered scholarship. In fact, Smolii's tenure as director of the Institute of Ukraine's History of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and vice-premier for humanitarian questions in the government (1997–99), endows the work with the aura of an official programmatic pronouncement.² While Stepankov and Smolii are quite adamant about the existence and persistence of

1. This debate is analyzed by Heorhii Kasianov in his *Teorii natsii ta natsionalizmu* (Kyiv: Lybid, 1999), 258–327.

2. Smolii and Stepankov's pamphlet on Right-Bank Ukraine is incorporated completely into their larger work on the Ukrainian state idea and, therefore, will not be discussed separately.

a Ukrainian state idea, their book is a fairly measured outline of the problem of early modern Ukrainian statehood. The authors posit that Khmelnytsky basically developed two Ukrainian state programs: a maximalist one that envisioned uniting most of Ukrainian ethnic territory, in essence creating a "Ukrainian national state," and a moderate program that envisioned a Cossack Ukraine on both banks of the Dnieper River. For the most part, Khmelnytsky pursued the larger goal but, if need be, was prepared to settle for the more limited Cossack state (e.g., the Zboriv agreement). Although Stepankov and Smolii give a few examples of the "Ukrainian national state" idea, it is clear that the program pursued by subsequent hetmans was primarily that of building a Cossack state.

Most of the book relates how the state idea was either realized or frustrated as a result of geopolitics, social strife, and internal politics. The greatest difficulty for the authors is that of sustaining a clear narrative from the time of Khmelnytsky to the abolition of Ukrainian autonomy at the end of the eighteenth century. After all, there were in reality many Ukrainian states, both in chronology and geography. Thus there were Ukrainian states under Russian, Polish, Ottoman, Swedish, and Tatar protection fighting one another. For the most part, the leaders of these states had a vision of a single Hetmanate encompassing territory on both sides of the Dnieper that they sought to achieve by eliminating rival Ukrainian states. But were the Zaporozhian Cossacks part of these states? For most of the period, the Zaporozhians formed their own state. The Cossacks of Sloboda Ukraine were another separate formation under Muscovy.

Even more problematic is the authors' attribution to state formation and consciousness of statements and events that may simply indicate an attachment to tradition or efforts to improve social standing. For example, the haidamaka rebels clearly wanted a return to a Cossack way of life. But does this mean that they supported or had any concept of Cossack statehood? In fact, the authors revert to their populist, Soviet methodology by occasionally attempting to indicate attitudes of the common people, whether about statehood, a particular hetman, or a specific policy. Such attitudes are extremely difficult to reconstruct even for members of elites, who at least left some written records, and, to my mind, cannot be attempted on the basis of a few chance remarks or several lines in a folk song.

Smolii and Stepankov's programmatic framework is filled out by number of specific studies on the Hetmanate. Oleksandr Hurzhii's *Ukrainska kozatska derzhava* investigates three aspects of statehood: official borders, the population, and the legal system. One is immediately struck by the fact that there was not a single Ukrainian state, but a number of states with changing borders, populations, and even legal systems. Most of these states had a common origin in the polity established by Khmelnytsky. However, Hurzhii also includes Sloboda Ukraine in his study—a Russian-ruled territory settled primarily by Ukrainian Cossacks. Although these Cossacks brought with them customs and

social organization, Sloboda Ukraine had a legal status and traditions different from those of the Hetmanate. Hurzhii's unstated definition of the "Ukrainian Cossack state" therefore encompasses all of Cossack Ukraine. This is brought out in the chapters on population and demography, in which he traces the process of depopulation, colonization, and repopulation of not only the Hetmanate (on both banks of the Dnieper) but also Sloboda Ukraine, Tavria, and Southern Ukraine. There is an interesting short chapter on the ethnic composition of the population, which was largely Ukrainian. This chapter is Hurzhii's answer to much Soviet historiography, which emphasized the mixed population of these "borderlands," and, perhaps, also to some of the "modernists," who fail to find Ukrainians anywhere before the late nineteenth century (thereby confusing ethnicity and modern national consciousness).

The best analysis of the genesis, early development, and degradation of the state idea is the monograph by Tatiana Iakovleva, a St. Petersburg historian. Her book is based on a candidate dissertation that she defended in Kyiv and is solidly grounded in archival research in Ukraine, Russia, and Poland. It is a work not only of rediscovery and recovery but also of reconstruction. Iakovleva traces the fate of the state idea by comparing the official agreements negotiated by the new political entity: Zboriv (1649, with Poland), the March Points or Pereiaslav 1 (1654, with Russia), Hadiach (1658, with Poland), and Pereiaslav 2 (1659, with Russia). The work includes extensive tables comparing these agreements. By carefully reconstructing consecutive drafts of the Hadiach agreement as developed in the negotiations and ratification by the Sejm, Iakovleva manages to make sense of the many variant copies of the treaty that have hitherto confused historians.

Perhaps the best indicators of the Hetmanate's virtual independence are points in the agreements on the free election of a hetman and on his authority to conduct foreign affairs. Iakovleva shows how, in contrast to the views of the state school historians, the Hadiach agreement with Poland actually subverted the principles of statehood and set a precedent for the second Pereiaslav agreement with Muscovy. Thus, by examining the four agreements, Iakovleva demonstrates the rapid devolution of the Hetmanate's status from that of a semi-independent state to that of an autonomous Muscovite dependency.

Iakovleva identifies the primary "state-builders," a small circle of top leaders, many with Polish *szlachta* backgrounds. It is very clear that the same people—Bohdan Khmelnytsky (until his death in 1657), Ivan Vyhovsky, Pavlo Teteria, and Iurii Nemyrych—were responsible for the drafting of the Zboriv, Pereiaslav 1, and Hadiach agreements. Moreover, the state idea was so interwoven with questions of corporate rights and personal political and economic ambitions that, at times, it receded or even disappeared altogether. Iakovleva's book shows that all hetmans after Khmelnytsky relied on foreign support in order to take or maintain power within the Hetmanate, a formula that

invited struggles for the hetmancy and foreign intervention, setting the stage for the continuous warfare later referred to as the "Ruin."

Iakovleva advances two rather bold hypotheses. She convincingly disputes the widely held view that Hetman Vyhovsky's turn toward Poland in the Hadiach agreement was subverted by a "national uprising," particularly on the Left Bank. Iakovleva shows how Vyhovsky was able to defeat the previous uprising on the Left Bank and was removed not by an uprising but by a coup led by a small group of Right-Bank colonels dissatisfied with the terms of the Hadiach agreement. Since the coup occurred only two months after Vyhovsky decisively defeated the Russian and Ukrainian pro-Russian forces, the conspirators handed the Russians an unexpected gift. Iakovleva speculates that there was no strategic need for the Ukrainian side to accept the falsified Russian copy of Pereiaslav 1 as a basis for Pereiaslav 2. The Russians were weak and would have relented if the falsification had been challenged. However, the "state-builders" were no longer in control, and the Hetmanate's independence was compromised.

The other studies all deal with another turning point in the history of the Hetmanate—the Petrine era. Leonid Melnyk's concise textbook on the Hetmanate during the first quarter of the eighteenth century was published by the Ministry of Education. It is not based on archival studies, but incorporates much of the statist and nineteenth-century historiography previously ignored by the Soviets. Melnyk dramatizes his text by counterposing two competing hetmans of the post-Mazepa era. On the one side is the cautious Ivan Skoropadsky, who, as a close associate of the "treasonous" Ivan Mazepa, was under constant Russian scrutiny but still tried to preserve some modicum of the Hetmanate's institutions while, at the same time, attempting to appease the tsar reformer. On the other side is Pylyp Orlyk, the émigré successor to Mazepa, constantly appealing to all world powers to condemn Russia and recognize the justice of his cause, occasionally succeeding in establishing a foothold in Ukraine, and constantly plotting a return to power under Ottoman, Tatar, or Swedish protection.

Hetman Ivan Skoropadsky is the subject of the first book-length and partially revisionist biography by Oleksandr Hurzhii. Skoropadsky did not fare well in nineteenth-century (largely populist) historiography. Frequently portrayed as a frightened and weak ruler, a willing tool of the tsarist representative who was always at his side, henpecked by his wife Nastaziia, and surrounded by rapacious and corrupt relatives, Skoropadsky has been blamed for exacerbating social relations by taxing some Cossacks, converting free peasants to dependent labourers, and distributing the Hetmanate's land fund to Russian and Ukrainian landlords. Hurzhii's study is certainly a corrective to these stereotypes. He represents the hetman as a moderately pro-Russian pragmatist who attempted to placate Peter while at the same time following clear policies intended to preserve the Cossack system, develop the Hetmanate's economy, and stem the decline of its fighting capacity. Although Hurzhii's study is rich in detail, including some

archival sources, his “revisionist” interpretation does not differ significantly from Melnyk’s, who in turn, follows an interpretation proposed by Viacheslav Lypynsky, the founder of the state school.

The difficulty of maintaining Ukrainian institutions in the reforming and centralizing empire of Peter I is brought home by a fine new study by Viktor Horobets. Based on extensive archival research, this candidate dissertation focusses on the first Little Russian College (1722–27). Designed as the chief instrument for imperial administrative incorporation of the Hetmanate, the Little Russian College was the first instance in which a regular imperial administrative body was simply superimposed on the Hetmanate’s administrative, judicial, and administrative structure. All that differentiated it from other imperial colleges was its location in Hlukhiv, then the Hetmanate’s capital. Acting Hetman Pavlo Polubotok and the Ukrainian administration resisted the takeover of the college with a strategy of non-co-operation and continuous appeals to St. Petersburg, a campaign that so infuriated Peter that he had the acting hetman and the entire general staff arrested. These arrests enabled the Little Russian College to take over and restructure the Ukrainian administration and finances. By 1725 there were more than sixty functionaries, all of them from Russia, working at the college’s office. Traditional Ukrainian historiography has described these activities as both brutal and chaotic. Horobets, however, shows conclusively that while the college may have been brutal, it was also quite effective, particularly in streamlining and greatly expanding tax revenues. For the first time, all revenues were forwarded directly to Russia, obliterating any distinction between the Ukrainian and imperial treasuries. Thus the Hetmanate was well on the way toward complete amalgamation with the empire. However, the death of Peter I, some adroit lobbying by the future hetman, Danylo Apostol, and a struggle between the Little Russian College and the Hetmanate’s largest and most powerful Russian landowner, Prince Aleksandr Menshikov, brought instead the abolition of the Little Russian College and a partial restitution of Ukrainian autonomy, including a separate (but centrally) controlled fiscal system.

In addition to textbooks and research monographs, scholars have published several collections of documents dealing with early modern Ukrainian statehood. *Konstytutsiia ukrainskoi hetmanskoï derzhavy*, a republication of the Constitution of 1710, has probably the most openly political implications. The constitution, negotiated and drafted at the election of the émigré hetman Pylyp Orlyk, states that “Ukraine on both sides of the Dnipro River shall be free forever and ever from foreign domination” (p. 13), a point made in the book’s introduction by the then justice minister Serhii Holovaty. Although the 1710 Constitution was implemented only for a brief moment in a very small part of Ukraine, it is, without doubt, the clearest theoretical expression of Ukrainian statehood, desire for freedom, and constitutional order—all, as indicated by Holovaty, articulated well before the American Declaration of Independence. This is primarily a coffee-

table book printed in antique script on imitation eighteenth-century paper with minimal footnoting and scholarly apparatus. The constitution is presented in four languages: the original Ukrainian chancellery and Latin versions along with good modern Ukrainian and English translations.

Melnyk's political history of the Hetmanate in documents is a reader for students sponsored by the Ministry of Education. It has a very good selection of documents on the policies of the Russian government from the rule of Hetman Skoropadsky until the abolition of Ukrainian autonomy (1708–86). Missing, however, are the political ideas or aspirations on the Ukrainian side.

Finally, Kyrylo Vyslobokov has prepared and republished the only collection and codification of laws completed during the existence of the Hetmanate—the Law Code of 1743. This work is not a reprint of the first published edition prepared in 1879 by the outstanding legal historian Oleksander Kistiakovsky. Vyslobokov, in fact, has published a newly discovered copy of the law code, officially submitted for review to the Senate, which could be considered the final version. He compares this version with all other extant copies and provides in the introduction not only a fundamental study of the juridical norms and practices of the Hetmanate, but also a commentary on how these norms reflect the development of society.

While the recovery by post-Soviet historians of past scholarship is quite substantial, there are readily noticeable gaps (particularly when it comes to works written and published in the West). For example, most of the authors reviewed seem to have no knowledge of Dmytro Doroshenko's *Hetman Petro Doroshenko: Ohliad ioho zhyttia i politychnoi diialnosti* (New York: Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., 1985), which runs to more than 600 pages, Orest Subtelny's *The Mazepists: Ukrainian Separatism in the Early Eighteenth Century* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1981), or this reviewer's *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate, 1760–1830s* (Cambridge: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1988), even though Ukrainian translations of the latter two works were published recently in Ukraine.³ Moreover, in their search for early-modern statehood, they have not come to grips with the central issue: the problem of legitimacy. Having been created by the Cossack “sword,” the Hetmanate could not justify its existence except under some legitimate ruler's protection. The search for legitimacy also marked Khmelnytsky's foreign policy and marital alliances. The lack of legitimacy also had a great impact on a newly formed elite that had to justify its

3. Orest Subtelny, *Mazepyntsi: Ukrainskyi separatyzm na pochatku XVIII st.* (Kyiv: Lybid, 1994); Zenon E. Kohut, *Rosiiskyi tsentralizm i ukrainska avtonomiia: Likvidatsiia Hetmanshchyny, 1760–1830* (Kyiv: Osnovy, 1996).

status either by an appeal to tradition or law (this is touched upon by Vyslobokov).

Post-Soviet reconstruction of the history of the Hetmanate has just begun. The research agenda thus far has been rather modest. My agenda for the rediscovery, recovery, and reconstruction of the history of the Hetmanate would include the following priorities.⁴ First and foremost it is necessary to re-examine the origins and early development of the Hetmanate within a larger geopolitical context. This is a call for traditional political history that has been previously so coloured by the end result—Russia's absorption of Ukraine—that the place of Ukraine within the sixteenth- to eighteenth-century international order remains somewhat obscured.

Survival as a semi-independent political entity required that the Cossack Hetmanate have good relations with at least two out of three powerful neighbours—a situation that frequently proved to be impossible. The Cossack polity constantly had to balance the conflicting pressures from the regional powers. As a result, at various times Cossack Ukraine sought protection from all the major powers—Muscovy, Poland-Lithuania, the Ottoman Empire, and Sweden. In order to gain a new perspective on Ukrainian-Russian relations, it is necessary also to reconsider Ukraine's non-Russian options.

The whole question of Russian-Ukrainian relations has to be recast from that of "union," "reunion," "alliance," "confederation" or "protectorate" to that of determining the actual interests and policies of the two sides. There are important questions to be considered: What did Khmelnytsky attempt to accomplish by negotiating the Pereiaslav agreement? What were Muscovy's goals in Ukraine and Eastern Europe? At what point did the interests of both of them converge or diverge?

The most obvious mutual political interest was opposition to Poland-Lithuania. Khmelnytsky and some of his successors wanted to establish some larger Cossack political entity at the expense of Poland-Lithuania. Yet, for a great part of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Muscovy pursued a policy of peaceful and even good relations with Poland. Khmelnytsky, prior to the Pereiaslav agreement, repeatedly had to plead and entice Muscovy into an anti-Polish coalition. Just a year later Muscovy negotiated a truce with Poland (1656) denying Khmelnytsky the primary benefit of the Pereiaslav agreement. By the Truce of Andrusovo (1667) and the "Eternal Peace" of 1686 Muscovy made peace with Poland and acceded to the partitioning of the Hetmanate into the

4. For a much more detailed discussion of some of these priorities, see my article "Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century: An Agenda for the Study of Politics," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 17, nos. 1–2 (Summer–Winter 1992): 3–16.

Polish-ruled Right Bank and the Russian-ruled Left Bank. Every hetman up to and including Mazepa schemed to recover Right-Bank Ukraine—an interest that clashed with Muscovy's desire to maintain peaceful relations with Poland.

Muscovite attitudes towards incorporating Ukraine should also be reconsidered. On the whole, it is assumed that after Pereiaslav the tsar laid claim to "Little Russia" as a possession in perpetuity. Indicators of this new reality were the change in the tsar's title and the requirement that the Ukrainian population pledge allegiance to him. However, during much of the seventeenth century Muscovy treated the Hetmanate as expendable or of secondary importance. In dealing with Poland, Muscovy seemed much more concerned with affronts to the tsar's title or with the tsar's candidacy to the Polish throne than in claiming possession of "Little Russia." Major questions need to be investigated: Did Muscovy view the seventeenth-century Hetmanate as a perpetual part of the tsar's possessions, or were the Cossacks merely marginal and dispensable allies to be bartered away for a Polish peace? Was Muscovy ready to give up not only the Right Bank but all of Ukraine? (Giving up Ukraine was advocated by Afanasii L. Ordin-Nashchokin, who was in charge of Muscovite foreign policy in the 1660s.)

Any study of the development and the demise of the Hetmanate should be placed within the context of the evolution of the Russian Empire. In the seventeenth and early eighteenth century there were two state-building projects: the Hetmanate and Imperial Russia. The Hetmanate project was incomplete in that it failed to create a stable independent political entity. It was successful enough, however, to exist as an autonomous part of the Russian Empire. How did these two state-building projects clash, and how did they accommodate each other? The adoption of Western absolutist patterns may be one key in explaining the change in Russia's policies towards the Hetmanate in the eighteenth century. Western absolutist states were characterized by increasing state control and activism, particularly in rationalizing government, increasing state revenues, and encouraging development. Peter I, who consciously imitated Western administrative models, began the policy of extracting increasingly greater economic and human resources from the Hetmanate. For reforming monarchs such as Peter I and Catherine II, Ukrainian autonomy was considered a hindrance in the pursuit of rational governance.

At the same time, one has to remember that the fate of autonomy frequently depended more on court politics than on theories of government or the development of a Russian state structure. For example, Ukrainian autonomy was renewed in 1727 partly owing to the adroit court lobbying by Danylo Apostol, and again in 1750 when Kyrylo Rozumovsky was elected hetman as a result of his brother's morganatic marriage to Empress Elizabeth. By the mid-eighteenth century, Ukrainians were beginning to play an increasing role in the Russian

imperial political system, allying themselves with various court factions. The Ukrainian role in court politics is still hardly known or understood.

The Ukrainian entry into imperial politics resulted in the co-optation of many Ukrainians into the imperial service. The Ukrainian clergy's impact on the Russian Church has been well documented. But did the Ukrainian secular elite have an impact on imperial politics? David Saunders posits that the Ukrainians played important role.⁵ Was such co-optation a "pernicious loss" to Ukraine? Did these Ukrainians see any contradiction between serving the empire and maintaining their own autonomous institutions? These questions merit serious consideration.

Integration of elites raises the question of the formation of the Russian imperial and Ukrainian political outlooks and the interrelationship between the two. This would entail a thorough investigation into the origins and evolution of what could be considered the Little Russian idea and its relationship to the concept of the three branches of the "All-Russian" nation. An important task in studying Ukrainian-Russian relations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is determining the Ukrainian roots, original purpose, and subsequent transformation of the concept of the three branches of an "All-Russian" nation—Great Russian, Little Russian, and White Russian.

These are some of the major issues that need to be addressed. Post-Soviet historians have taken the first steps in tackling some of them. They have rediscovered, partly recovered, and, in some instances, reconstructed the history of an early-modern Ukrainian political entity, the Hetmanate. They have successfully incorporated the previously proscribed scholarship of the state school and national populist historiography published in Imperial Russia, Ukraine, and the Soviet Union. Post-Soviet historians have also broken some new ground on the question of the Hetmanate's origins, self-conceptualization, internal cohesion, and relationship with Russia. As they continue rediscovering and reinterpreting early-modern Ukrainian statehood, there is little doubt that their efforts will also be utilized in the (re)construction of a Ukrainian national myth.

5. David Saunders, *The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture, 1750–1850* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1985).

Reviews

Mykhailo Hrushevsky. *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. Vol. 1. *From Prehistory to the Eleventh Century*. Translated by Marta Skorupsky. Edited by Andrzej Poppe and Frank E. Sysyn with the assistance of Uliana M. Pasicznyk. Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1997. lxiv, 602 pp. \$79.95 cloth.

Mykhailo Hrushevsky published his ten-volume *History of Ukraine-Rus'* between 1898 and 1936. A century after its initial publication, the first volume, translated here into English as the first in a projected eleven-volume series sponsored by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies and its Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research, continues to command attention and respect. The main body of the text is prefaced by two introductory essays, one on the entire series by its editor-in-chief, Frank Sysyn, and the second on volume one by Andrzej Poppe. It is followed by Hrushevsky's own editorial notes, by two excursuses on the Primary Chronicle and the Normanist Controversy, and by Hrushevsky's extensive bibliography, all of which have been annotated and verified by Poppe. The editorial team's supplemental material coupled with the highly readable translation helpfully situate Hrushevsky's contributions and conclusions in their historical and historiographic contexts. They thus make this wide-ranging and detailed account accessible to English-language readers, whether they be attracted to it by their interest in early and medieval Slavic history or in Hrushevsky and his own era.

As its subtitle suggests, volume one treats the history of Ukraine-Rus' and the Ukrainian nation from shadowy prehistoric times. Hrushevsky begins his narrative with a discussion of the two main components of his subject—the territories that ultimately constituted Ukraine and the people dwelling on them. After an introductory overview in chapter 1, he devotes the next two chapters to descriptions of geographic features of the region, as they were forged by receding glaciers at the end of the Ice Age, and of the development of early human society from the Neolithic Age to the late Iron Age, when Slavs had become predominant.

The main body of the text, however, concentrates on the five centuries of Ukrainian history from the appearance of Slavic settlements in eastern Europe

to the end of the reign of Volodymyr the Great in 1015. Hrushevsky presents his arguments and conclusions on this period in the next six chapters. Their general contours, reproduced in numerous editions and translations of the volume as well as in summaries incorporated into subsequent historical literature that has adopted or debated them, are familiar to many readers. Hrushevsky traces the Great Slav migration of the third to sixth centuries that resulted in the settlement of the southern group of East Slavs in the mid-Dnipro basin. At its greatest extent this population, identified by Hrushevsky as the Antae described in Byzantine histories, occupied territories stretching from the Danube across the Black Sea steppe to the lower Don River. Only under pressure from Hungarians and Turks migrating into the Black Sea steppe did these ancestors of the Ukrainian population retreat to their core lands along the mid-Dnipro river. In the region around Kyiv, one tribe, the Polianians, also known as the Rus', gradually gained ascendancy over the neighbouring tribes and, by the eighth century, fashioned the early Kyivan Rus' state governed by its indigenous dynasty. Whereas the early princes of this state depended upon their retainers, including Scandinavian Varangians, to defend their realm and enforce their rule, Volodymyr the Great, employing dynastic linkages and Christianity as a common religion, forged stronger bonds among its component parts to create a more sophisticated state.

Although the volume ends with a focus on the Ukrainian-Rus' state, Hrushevsky's history is about the Ukrainian nation. This perspective distinguishes his work from the competing historical approach that privileges the state, its institutions, and its rulers. The statist perspective, emphasizing particularly dynastic continuity, led Russian historians to claim the heritage of old Rus' or the Kyivan state for Muscovy and its successors. Hrushevsky acknowledged a weak political development among Ukrainians, who were often ruled by and divided among alien states. He argued nevertheless that non-political factors—ethnographic features, material culture, social organization and customs, economic and commercial activity, and urban development—took precedence over the political. They characterized the Ukrainian nation, and by observing and understanding them it was possible to discern the social and cultural processes that shaped the nation's historical development. From this perspective the Ukrainian nation displayed continuities, including its constant presence on its territories, that enabled it to survive despite temporary and shifting rulers. The era of old Rus' thus constituted a stage in the history of Ukraine.

The value of this volume for modern scholars, however, rests not only with Hrushevsky's well-known contributions to the controversies over the place of the early Kyivan Rus' state in Ukrainian and Russian history and the origins of its founders and ruling dynasty. His methodology is also noteworthy. To gather evidence for his argument, Hrushevsky relied heavily on sources drawn from non-historical disciplines, such as anthropology, archeology, and linguistics. He made skilful and discriminating use of traditional literary sources, ranging from

treatises written by the ancient Greeks to the Primary Chronicle, the reliability of which he doubted and which he used with extreme caution. By equating the Polianians and the Rus', he also justified the use of Arabic and Byzantine sources on the Rus' to amplify his account. His approach lends a relevance to his work that transcends its insights specifically into early Slavic history. It offers an instructive model for modern social historians, who similarly de-emphasize the state and subject matter defined by its boundaries and who stress instead topics related to nationhood, society, and culture. The *History of Ukraine-Rus'* is equally valuable for historians concerned with the development of nationalism and the formation of national identity and national consciousness in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which Hrushevsky not only recorded, but to which he deliberately contributed. For making the benefits of this volume available to historical investigators in all these areas, its editors, translator, and publisher are to be commended.

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Ihor Ševčenko. *Ukraine between East and West: Essays on Cultural History to the Early Eighteenth Century*. The Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research Monograph Series, No. 1. Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1996. xx, 234 pp. \$34.95 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

In these twelve overlapping essays, five of them published for the first time, Ihor Ševčenko, one of America's leading exponents of the Byzantine tradition and the Slavs, explores the disparate cultural forces that helped mould the land of his ancestors from the tenth to the seventeenth century.

He uses Kyiv's St. Sophia Cathedral, with its western baroque features in generally Byzantine Greek architecture, as a launching pad for an exploration of Ukraine as a cultural frontier zone. Of course, similar contrasting architectural influences can also be seen in the Kremlin, and Western influences in Ukraine came chiefly from Catholic countries and were filtered through Poland. The impacts of Humanism and Protestantism were limited. The arguments for Ukraine's Western affiliation hold only up to a point. Ševčenko knows this, but he has to engage a readership that has a sentimental attachment to Ukraine. He also tries to engage students who need help in narrowing the immense conceptual distance between their own world and that of medieval Rus'. Hence he invokes the understandings of a Japanese tourist and compares Byzantine model books displayed during Bible readings to today's slide lectures. But though Ševčenko

tries to make his work accessible, he never compromises with his readers, and though he examines evidence intently, he is never narrow in approach.

His essay on Byzantium and the Slavs is concerned with influences ranging from the political to the linguistic and with their limits. He explains Byzantine diplomatic formalities, its symbols and regalia (copied by the West), and how Moscow was to plunder Byzantine ideas to construct its own state ideology. He raises interesting questions too: was St. Elias first chosen as the patron saint of Rus', for example, because he was Basil I's favourite saint, or because he was associated with thunder and lightning and might therefore attract worshippers of the pagan god Perun?

However, Ukrainian allegiance to what Dmitrii Obolensky termed "the Byzantine Commonwealth" was soon to be challenged by Rome, and at a time when Byzantium's power was fading. As the Mongol threat receded, the non-Slav Lithuanians became masters of Ukraine. The consequent shifts and stresses form the agenda of the remainder of the book. Ševčenko first examines the line taken by the Patriarchate of Constantinople in the critical fourteenth century, when Lithuania and Moscow competed for the seat of the metropolitan see, the source of political legitimacy. Moscow, the rising power demographically and financially, eventually triumphed; but Lithuania merged with Catholic Poland, and, as a result, Ukrainians in Lithuania were torn in two. Then, when Byzantium fell to the Turks in 1453 the Orthodox everywhere had to accommodate themselves to the disappearance of the very source of their religious and cultural identity.

Claiming that Byzantium had fallen from the faith at the Council of Florence, Moscow adopted its imperial mantle, claimed "perfect Orthodoxy" for its rulers, and created the myth of the Third Rome. Ukrainians, however, were bereft, caught between loyalty to the old faith and to their Catholic rulers. The elite was gradually won over by the privileges of Catholic nobility and the advantages of a Jesuit education; the rest of the population was pressured to conform by an increasingly aggressive Catholic Church. Ševčenko shares the discomfort of the Orthodox Ukrainians under siege.

Then came a reaction, fired by the creation of the Uniate Church, with the introduction of the Gregorian calendar and other issues. Ševčenko's account of the Ukrainian defenders of Orthodoxy is of particular value. Kopystensky, Zyzanii, Boretsky, Vyshensky, and others fought the Jesuit Skarga and his minions with their own weapons, notably venomous rhetoric (ironically, most of them hailed from Galicia, which later became a Uniate stronghold, and had been able to access elements of a Jesuit education). The publication of the Ostrih Bibles and Zyzanii's vernacular-Church Slavonic dictionary also helped. So did the recreation of an Orthodox hierarchy, though it was Cossack violence that turned the tide. Poles and Catholics were eventually ejected from eastern Ukraine, but at the price of Russian protection. On the other hand Russia herself

was to draw on Ukraine as a conduit of Latin learning. The school of Petro Mohyla became an important intermediary in this.

In his short capstone essay Ševčenko states that by 1700 there was “a distinct linguistic, cultural, and, in some sense, political entity on the territory of Ukraine” and that a communal consciousness was beginning to emerge among its elites (p. 187). That, however, is as far as he will go. Ševčenko knows that it would be anachronistic to use the word “national” and that national and historical consciousness was weak among Ukrainians until the nineteenth century. The book may contain an occasional weak argument or questionable judgement. However, it presents an impressive range of erudition, offers valuable new insights, and is a very welcome addition to the growing body of literature on pre-modern Eastern Europe.

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Burlaka, Halyna, comp., and Liubomyr Vynar, ed. *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevskoho*. Kyiv, New York, Paris, Lviv, and Toronto: Ukrainske istorychne tovarystvo and Natsionalna akademiia nauk Ukrainy, Instytut literatury im. T. H. Shevchenka, 1997. 399 pp.

Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866–1934) was not only the greatest Ukrainian historian of modern times and the first president of the independent Ukrainian state of 1918, but also an extremely active man of affairs whose literary and cultural impact can hardly be underestimated. In the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the re-emergence of independent Ukraine, he has become a national symbol rivalling the national poet, Taras Shevchenko. Thus it is a service to both scholarship and the Ukrainian nation that Halyna Burlaka, Liubomyr Vynar, and their colleagues have begun the process of collecting and publishing Hrushevsky's previously little-known correspondence.

Hrushevsky was a very prolific letter writer indeed, and the letters contained in the volume under review provide a sample of his contacts, interests, learning, style, and character. Most of the letters are preserved in the archives of the Institute of Literature of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in Kyiv. Their recipients are primarily literary figures and writers rather than political figures or historians. Thus, while they do not provide a panorama of all of Hrushevsky's interests, they do give a good indication of his place in the Ukrainian literary process of his day and of his influence upon various Ukrainian writers.

Hrushevsky's correspondents in this volume include Ivan Nechui-Levytsky, Dmytro Markovych, Oleksander Konysky, Ivan Franko, Osyp Makovei, Serhii Iefremov, Kost Pankivsky, Olha Kobylanska, Oleksander Kandyba (pen name:

Oleksander Oles), Panas Rudenko (Myrny), and several others. The letters to Nechui-Levytsky, Konysky, Franko, Iefremov, and Kandyba are particularly numerous, and some of them are quite important.

For example, the correspondence with Nechui-Levytsky, which began while Hrushevsky was still a young gymnasium student and continued until he moved to Lviv University to become its professor of Ukrainian history, documents the historian's early commitment to the Ukrainian national movement of the time ("I am ... a sincere and real Ukrainian," he wrote in his first letter to Nechui) and throws some new light upon his early steps as a writer of belles lettres. Only later did he change his major field to history. Hrushevsky the student turned to the established writer for advice and encouragement in his literary endeavours, and we know from the latter's letters, which have already been published, that he got it.

Hrushevsky's letters to Konysky, who was one of his most important early political mentors, are particularly revealing about the young historian's move to Lviv and his accommodation to the Galician political scene. Konysky had promoted a compromise with the dominant Galician Poles, but Hrushevsky quickly came to believe that the compromise was a fraud and made a sharp turn towards Franko and the opposition.

Hrushevsky's letters to Ivan Franko reveal the closeness of the co-operation between the two men during the first decade of Hrushevsky's stay in Galicia and say much about the disagreements between them that arose at the onset of Franko's illness in 1905. The historian's letter to Franko of the night of October 20–21, 1906, is particularly striking, indeed astounding, and gives a clear picture of the emotional trauma in which the conflict with his closest friend and collaborator put him.

Hrushevsky's letters to Iefremov also tell something about how the historian dealt with various Ukrainian writers and literary critics. These letters are models of businesslike efficiency and close co-operation and give no hint of the disagreements that broke out between the two men during the revolution and reached the point of open animosity during the 1920s when they had to co-operate in various activities of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

By contrast, the letters to Kandyba reveal a greater degree of political agreement between the two men. (Kandyba, who wrote under the pen name Oleksander Oles, was also Hrushevsky's favourite Ukrainian poet.) They became particularly expressive during Hrushevsky's period in exile in Vienna, when he was considering returning to Soviet Ukraine. Hrushevsky actually encouraged Kandyba to return as well.

In general, this volume of Hrushevsky's letters confirms what we already knew about the brusque, businesslike efficiency of Hrushevsky's scholarly activities. They are testaments to a man in a hurry, a man who wanted to get something done, and had little time for idle sentiments or leisurely reflections.

Almost all of the letters seem to have been written in somewhat of a rush. The Hrushevsky cursive was not only a form of penmanship; it was a way of dealing with people.

Perhaps the two most personal letters in the volume are Hrushevsky's introductory letter to Nechui-Levytsky of 1884 and his tortured note to Franko of 1906. The first can be read as a kind of cultural credo of an aspiring and hopeful youth. The second reveals something about the intertwining of national commitment and personal friendship during Hrushevsky's maturity, and his absolute confusion as to how to deal with what later became clear was a severe bout of mental illness on Franko's part.

The strength of this collection of Hrushevsky's letters lies in the historian's early years and his life in Galicia to 1914; the revolution and the Soviet period are less well represented. In fact, the last decade of Hrushevsky's life is not represented at all. Thus this volume needs to be supplemented by further ones dealing with these later periods and with letters to political and academic figures other than writers. Only when this is done will we have a fuller picture of the diversity of Hrushevsky's interests and a wider panorama of his influence upon Ukrainian national development.

Nevertheless, *Lystuvannia Mykhaila Hrushevskoho* tells us something real about the historian's character and role. It is a finely produced volume with explanatory annotation on the various letters, pictures of both Hrushevsky and his correspondents, and samples of the historian's handwriting. The cover design is also very attractive. Halyna Burlaka and her colleagues can be justly proud of their achievement.

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Claus Remer. *Die Ukraine im Blickfeld deutscher Interessen: Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts bis 1917/18*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag, 1997. 408 pp.

This is the first extensive study of how leading German conservative circles perceived Ukraine in the decades before and during the First World War. The book is based on a dissertation finished in Jena, East Germany, in 1984. Before publication, it was thoroughly reworked and updated with Western (first and foremost West German) literature up to the middle of the 1990s.

Remer states that his survey of German expansionist, militant social forces, aims, and motives allow us to speak of a negative yet imperialistic approach to Ukraine. Such an approach fell out of fashion in the 1920s, but it was "recultivated" (p. 5) during the Third Reich. The topic itself is important, because it

raises the more general question of continuities and discontinuities in German attitudes and policies toward Ukraine in the last hundred years.

The setting is well known: growing nationalism intertwined with the economic interests of the principal European powers, particularly Britain, Germany, and Russia, which affected the political integrity of such weaker powers as the disintegrating Ottoman Empire ("*Mitteuropapolitik*"). To a certain degree the conservative and reactionary German elites also tried to integrate the non-Russian peoples of the tsarist empire into their policies, exploiting the anti-Russian sentiments of these peoples' national leaders and their search for aid and support abroad. Remer defines a remarkable continuity in this policy of disintegration or decomposition ("*Randstaatenpolitik*") during the First World War; still, the peak of aggressive rhetoric during the annexation and expansion of 1914–15 was followed by more temperate language as the military situation changed in 1915 and 1916. Before 1914, official Germany did not formulate a specific Ukraine policy (p. 77), and even for German capital the Baltic lands and Russian-ruled Poland were the foremost regions of economic penetration into the East (p. 118).

Cultural figures such as the conservative philosopher Eduard von Hartmann, who in 1887–88 supported the idea of an independent Kyivan kingdom in the future, were an exception. But growing anti-Russian sentiments in German society were shared some years later by some influential Baltic German historians and Slavists, such as Theodor Schiemann and Paul Rohrbach (his views are discussed on pp. 126–29). Ukraine became part of a more general economic policy, which defined German interests not only in southeastern Europe but as far east as Persia. Because England was perceived as Germany's principal rival before the First World War, influential German political leaders became increasingly interested in good or improved economic relations with the Russian Empire.

During the First World War, Ukraine was seldom specifically discussed in the *Denkschriften* of representatives of German industry (such as Thyssen, Erzberger, or Krupp), who formulated the political and economic aims of German imperialism (p. 177). In general they left the political future of Ukraine unclear, unlike that of Poland or the Baltic lands. The influence of the Ukrainian national movement, described in German articles, pamphlets, and books on Ukraine, grew, but was not considered strong or strong enough. To a certain degree the "case of Ukraine" was left unclear because it was affected by the question of what interests the Habsburg Empire would pursue in Eastern Galicia and Bukovyna (p. 220). Remer summarizes Germany's wartime perception of Ukraine as follows: the nationalistic elites spoke about Ukrainian independence when Ukraine was beyond real German influence, but when such political and economic influence became a reality, they spoke only of German interests (p. 242).

Remer's book is carefully researched and well balanced. But his conclusions are not all that new. The weakness of his book stems from his approach. He defines the economic relationship as constituting the basis of German perceptions of Ukraine, and therefore defends his use of the term "imperialism" (p. 6). That this was so is indubitable. But it does not provide a theoretical explanation for the question of how German economic, political, and cultural leaders and their positions concerning Ukraine were interrelated in imperial Germany.

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Vasyl Ulianovsky. *Tserkva v ukrainskii derzhavi (doba Ukrainskoi Tsentralnoi Rady)*. Kyiv: Lybid, 1997. 197 pp.

———. *Tserkva v ukrainskii derzhavi (doba Hetmanatu Pavla Skoropadskoho)*. Kyiv: Lybid, 1997. 319 pp.

Bohdan Andrusyshyn. *Tserkva v ukrainskii derzhavi (doba Dyrektorii UNR)*. Kyiv: Lybid, 1997. 174 pp.

This three-volume set discusses the role that religion, in particular the Orthodox Church, played in the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–20. It also touches upon many issues related to the Russian Revolution, discussing, as it does, that the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian hierarchy played in Ukraine. In the centre of these studies is the history of church-state relations in Ukraine under three consecutive Ukrainian governments—the Ukrainian Central Rada led by Mykhailo Hrushevsky, the Hetman State of Pavlo Skoropadsky, and the UNR Directory led by Symon Petliura.

In the first volume, Vasyl Ulianovsky discusses the literature and sources related to the topic. Both he and Bohdan Andrusyshyn gained access to previously unresearched materials in various Ukrainian and Russian archives, and it is the previously inaccessible materials that they found there that make these three volumes extremely interesting. With few exceptions, almost all authors of earlier works on the history of Ukrainian religious movements during the revolutionary years had to rely on the memoirs of participants in the events and on contemporary newspaper accounts. Emigré archives and the archives of the Western powers added little to the published sources and could not substitute for the unavailable archives of the Ukrainian governments and church institutions that ended up in Bolshevik hands.

Ulianovsky and Andrusyshyn have extensively consulted the archives of the departments and ministries of all three successive Ukrainian revolutionary governments that dealt with religious issues. They also worked with the archival materials of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine, including the transcripts

of the proceedings of the First All-Ukrainian Orthodox Council of 1918. These and other earlier inaccessible archival sources allowed them to present the history of church-state relations under the three Ukrainian national governments in unsurpassed detail.

The research that Ulianovsky offers in his two volumes will change many of the dominant perceptions of the Central Rada's and Hetman State's religious policies. It shows that Central Rada officials were much more involved in religious affairs than was previously believed; and portrays the Hetman State's attempts (especially under the minister of confessions Vasyl Zinkivsky [Vasili Zenkovsky]) to Ukrainianize the Orthodox Church to be much more successful than was thought earlier. Andrusyshyn's volume does not challenge the traditional view on the UNR Directory's religious policy; however, it contains an enormous amount of new material detailing the official policy toward the Orthodox Church and other denominations.

There are substantial differences in the ways that Ulianovsky and Andrusyshyn present their material and in their respective views on the events that they describe. Ulianovsky carefully avoids taking sides in the religious conflict in Ukraine at the time of his study, but there is little doubt that he tends to sympathize with the moderate group in Skoropadsky's government, which was represented by Minister Zinkivsky and the head of his ministry's Scholarly Committee, Prof. Petr Kudriavtsev. These officials, while supporting the Ukrainianization of the Orthodox Church, tried to avoid open confrontation with the Russian and Russophile clergy in Ukraine, headed by Metropolitan Antonii (Khrapovitsky). On more than one occasion Ulianovsky demonstrates his negative attitude toward the "uncanonical" ways that the Church was Ukrainianized, and he remarks critically about the leaders of the pro-Ukrainian clergy in his second volume (pp. 126–29). Andrusyshyn, on the other hand, openly sides with the Directory and never questions its "uncanonical" attempts at introducing church autocephaly from above. He also condemns the Russophile clergy for resisting the this government-sponsored autocephaly.

The two authors' differing views on broader issues in the history of church-state relations in Ukraine has also resulted in obvious contradictions between them when it comes to historical facts and details. One example of such confusion can be found in the sections of Ulianovsky's second volume devoted to the activities of the Scholarly Committee under Minister Zinkivsky. Ulianovsky writes that the committee was abolished by the UNR Directory (p. 55), but Andrusyshyn claims that its work stopped once the Bolsheviks captured (pp. 49–52). Among other shortcomings, one could mention Andrusyshyn's unconventional reproduction of whole phrases from a document or book without using quotation marks. See, for example, his discussion of Petliura's letter to Volodymyr Kedrovsky on p. 10 (cf. Symon Petliura, *Statti, lysty, dokumenty*, vol. 2 [New York, 1979] 568); or his bibliographic notes on Opanas Andriievsky and

Oleksander Lototsky on pp. 13 and 15 (cf. Ivan Pidkova and Roman Shust, eds., *Dovidnyk z istorii Ukrainy*, vols. 1–2 [Kyiv, 1993, 1995], 1: 26 and 2: 176) and on other Ukrainian political and church activists. One could also question the level of knowledge that both authors have about works written in Western languages. A number of such works are listed in their bibliographies and mentioned in their historiographic reviews. But these works are not cited or discussed in the narrative sections of any of the volumes.

Despite these and some other shortcomings, Ulianovsky and Andrusyshyn have made a major contribution to Ukrainian church history. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any new study on the role of religion in the Ukrainian Revolution that would not take into account their research and especially their archival findings.

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Shchodennyk Arkadiia Liubchenka. Edited by Iurii Lutsky [George S. N. Luckyj]. Lviv: M. P. Kots, 1999. 384 pp.

Like the protagonist of a Sophoclean tragedy, Arkadii Liubchenko appears on the pages of his diary as a larger-than-life figure, a favourite of the gods, and a defender of his nation. He is a refugee from Soviet repression, driven across Europe by the events of World War II into ever more miserable circumstances and finally, inevitably, sickness and death. And yet, at the same time, he is a hero of Ukrainian culture, a living specimen of the renaissance of Ukrainian culture in Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s, a courageous survivor of Stalin's terror, and a shining beacon to all those who feel that the upheaval of the war and the defeat of the Soviet Union is likely to bring a new era of growth and development for Ukrainian culture. Liubchenko's personality is full of contradictions. He is a charming *bon vivant*, an eternal optimist, an urbane, sophisticated champion of high culture and civilization. And yet he is also a sickly grumbler, a spiteful and unreliable companion, and a colossal megalomaniac. He is erudite, intelligent, fearless, cunning, persistent, and well mannered. He is also a malicious and faithless husband, a neglectful father, a Machiavellian opportunist, and a vicious, disgusting anti-Semite.

The diary opens with an entry for November 2, 1941, which begins with the words "Ukraine is resurrecting!" Liubchenko is in Kharkiv, which has just been occupied by the Germans. The sentiment in the first sentence is purely wishful. What he describes, in fact, are the difficulties in establishing basic order. There is no water, electricity, or food. But Liubchenko is involved in establishing a newspaper, *Nova Ukraina*. This gives him purpose, energy, and the inspiration

to believe that Ukraine, its people, its culture, and its welfare are all on the upswing. In fact, things are otherwise.

Early in 1942 Liubchenko spends almost three months in hospital owing to his recurring stomach ailment. His marriage breaks up shortly thereafter, and he and his seven-year-old son, Lesyk, begin their migration westward. First stop: Kyiv, where in June 1942 Liubchenko joins his mother and brother and a host of notables from Ukraine's artistic and cultural elite. Here he meets and confers with Hryhorii Kostiuk, Ivan Kavaleridze, Ulas Samchuk, Dokiia Humenna, Vasyl Krychevsky, and others. Liubchenko gives brief, often unflattering descriptions of the people he meets. His world, however, is populated not only with notables, but also—through correspondence—with many of the cultural figures of German-occupied Ukraine and—through his dreams—with the most notable personalities of the Ukrainian renaissance, particularly his close friend Mykola Khvylovy but also Les Kurbas, Mykola Kulish, Pavlo Tychyna, Maksym Rylsky, Iurii Ianovsky, and others.

Liubchenko's ailments land him in hospital again, but they also win him a medical pass to the west. With Soviet forces advancing on Kyiv, in March 1943 Liubchenko arrives in Lviv. His son, who fell ill just before the departure date, joins him later. Western Ukraine offers Liubchenko the opportunity to escape the acute miseries of war and seek treatment for his ailment. It also allows him to indulge his spiteful depreciation of the provincial character of Western Ukrainian culture and the materialism of its inhabitants. His daily life involves contacts with the leading figures of Ukrainian culture and politics: Volodymyr Kubijovyč, Ievhen Malaniuk, Sviatoslav Hordynsky, Rostyslav Iendyk, Volodymyr Blavatsky, Iosyp Hirniak, George Y. Shevelov, Mykola Shlemkevych, Iurii Stefanyk, Iurii Lavrynenko, Oleksa Veretenchenko, Mariia Strutynska, and many, many others. It also involves indulging his sexual appetite, selecting from an apparent queue of admiring women, among them the wives of some of his benefactors and associates.

Life in Galicia is not all sex and relaxation, however. On November 18, 1943, Liubchenko is arrested in the Morshyn resort by the Gestapo and taken for interrogation first to Stryi and then Lviv, where he spends two and a half months in the notorious prison on Łąski Street. He describes his arrest eight months later, and the interrogation only a year later, when he is already in Potsdam. It is never clear whether the Gestapo suspects him of being a Communist spy or an OUN terrorist. But in Liubchenko's mind he is clearly the victim of persecution by the long arm of Soviet agents, who are spreading lies in order to discredit and destroy him. Surprisingly, even this arrest does little to shake his abiding faith in German policy.

By mid-1944 Liubchenko is on his way westward. The itinerary runs through Sanok, Krynica (with an excursion to Cracow), Żegestów (a resort on the Poprad River), Bratislava, Bad Kissingen, Graz, Marburg, Vienna, Wrocław, Frankfurt am Oder, Berlin, and Potsdam. The trip is a harrowing tale of bureaucratic

wrangling, daily struggles for the essentials of life, escaping Allied bombs, living in a railway boxcar, and dreaming of a better future.

Liubchenko's diary offers a wealth of information for the researcher, from the details of life in war-torn Germany to the often naive politics of Ukrainian nationalists. In the foreground at all times are figures such as Mstyslav Skrypnyk (later the patriarch of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church), who took Liubchenko under his protection and, in return, received a variety of critical descriptions and negative evaluations in the diary. For these and other remarks, the reader will, no doubt, come to despise the self-serving, egotistical author. But his skill as a writer and the fascination of the material evidence he provides will certainly compensate the reader's perseverance. This is a must-read for anyone who is seriously interested in Ukrainian politics and history during World War II. It is a document of exceptional importance.

This is not the first attempt at publishing Liubchenko's diary. As the editor, George Luckyj, notes, however, previous partial and censored publications cannot be considered reliable. Here we have the complete, unexpurgated, and unflattering text. But even this edition could be much improved. The reader needs help in making sense of the material at hand, and the absence of an index is a very serious problem. A map or two would have been most welcome. The brief list of personalities appended to the diary only emphasizes the need for a more thorough guide. Luckyj and his publisher are to be congratulated for their courage in publishing such a controversial work. It is a shame that they did not do more to make this a serious, scholarly edition.

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Hiroaki Kuromiya. *Freedom and Terror in the Donbas: A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland, 1870s–1990s*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. xiv, 357 pp. U.S. \$44.95 cloth.

Hiroaki Kuromiya, the author of the highly acclaimed *Stalin's Industrial Revolution: Politics and Workers, 1928–1932* (1988), adopts in his new book a different, regional, approach to the Soviet *longue durée*. This methodological change cannot be attributed solely to the opening of the formerly classified local archives and the current possibility for Western scholars to travel freely to what once was a Soviet periphery. On a more fundamental level, Kuromiya's new work inaugurates a significant change of focus in the mainstream American historical scholarship. During the last decade several books have demonstrated that the field was moving from studying Stalinism in general to investigating the everyday strategies of domination, survival, and resistance in particular Soviet

cities and regions. *Freedom and Terror in the Donbas* takes this transition one large step further by focussing on the social history of a non-Russian province.

Ukraine's social history during Stalin's time had been studied before the present era of archival revelations, most notably by Bohdan Krawchenko and George O. Liber. However, Kuromiya's approach to the subject is different. Rather than tracing the effect that Soviet social transformations had on the Ukrainian nation, he studies Stalinism itself through its refraction in a Ukrainian region. Though highly sensitive to the nationalities issue, Kuromiya is primarily interested in such fundamental categories of Soviet "civilization" as violence, terror, and tensions between management and labour. As an important industrial region and ethnic borderland whose population historically embodied "the characteristics of the wild field—freedom, militancy, violence, terror, independence" (p. 12), the Donbas provides rich material for such a study, and in his "regional history" Kuromiya succeeds admirably in illuminating the principal traits of the Soviet body politic.

The book's source base is impressive. Kuromiya has widely consulted the archives in Moscow, Kyiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk, including the former KGB archives in the Donbas. The degree to which he is familiar with present-day Ukrainian and Russian scholarly and newspapers is even more striking. It would not be an exaggeration to say that he provides an exhaustive political and social history of the Soviet Donbas up to the late 1940s.

Kuromiya demonstrates that social and ethnic antagonisms persisted in the Donbas throughout its history. Tensions between management and workers outlived both the revolution and the purge of "old specialists," as did the latent forms of Ukrainian-Russian rivalry and anti-Semitism. The Civil War and the Famine resulted in popular hostility toward the regime and in workers' and peasants' bitterness toward the exploiting Soviet elite; the latter was perceived as helping the Kremlin to fuel the Great Terror, which hit the Donbas hard. Building on his main thesis about the interaction of "freedom" and "terror" as two principal historical paradigms in this frontier steppe region, Kuromiya hypothesizes that Stalin terrorized the Donbas to the extent that he did "because it symbolized freedom" (p. 340). One wonders, however, to what degree the mythical vision of the Donbas as "free steppe" survived in Stalinist society. Paradoxically, the Donbas may have provided refuge for various stigmatized groups precisely because of its modern profile as an industrial hub, where dekulakized peasants and other "enemies" could disappear into the anonymous mass of workers.

Though rich in fascinating details, this book never loses its main theme, the persistence of societal strife despite supposed systemic political and economic changes. Kuromiya's treatment of the whole postwar period in the book's last chapter is necessarily cursory, but it succeeds in linking the social and ethnic turmoil of the *perestroika* years with the conflicts of the previous hundred years.

With *Freedom and Terror in the Donbas*, Kuromiya has at once made a valuable contribution to Ukrainian history, Soviet regional studies, and the historical analysis of Stalinism. Ukrainian specialists should welcome this well-researched and sophisticated work as an example of the new scholarship undermining the traditional division between "Russocentric" Sovietology and "ethnic" Ukrainian studies.

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Hryhorii Hrabovych [George G. Grabowicz]. *Do istorii ukrainskoi literatury: Doslidzhennia, ese, polemika*. Kyiv: Osnovy, 1997. 608 pp.

The publication of a major book by George G. Grabowicz is a significant event, given the public and scholarly profile of the author. Grabowicz, the holder of the Dmytro Čyževs'kyj Chair in Ukrainian Literature at Harvard University, is the author of *The Poet as Mythmaker: A Study of Symbolic Meaning in Taras Ševčenko* (1982; Ukrainian translation 1991) and several other publications on Shevchenko; of a book-length critique (1978, 1981) of Čyževs'kyj's *History of Ukrainian Literature*; and of articles on Ukrainian-Polish and Ukrainian-Russian literary relations, Ukrainian literary history, mainly of the nineteenth century, individual authors from the sixteenth century to the twentieth, and theoretical questions pertaining to literary history, especially in the context of the post-Soviet transition. He translated into English and furnished with an introduction Roman Ingarden's phenomenological study *The Literary Work of Art* (1973). In the 1980s Grabowicz was an initiator of scholarly links and important discussions between specialists in Ukrainian literature in Soviet Ukraine and those in Western countries. He was a key player in the establishment of the International Association for Ukrainian Studies. He is one of the very few scholars writing about Ukrainian literature in recent decades whose work has given rise to debates outside of academic circles. These debates have, for the most part, been based on misunderstandings, but misunderstandings of considerable cultural significance.

With one exception, all nineteen of the longer and shorter articles gathered in *Do istorii ukrainskoi literatury* have been published previously in English (six), in Ukrainian (eight), or in both languages (four); the earliest of them appeared in 1972. The book, therefore, provides an opportunity for a re-acquaintance with texts already familiar to every serious student of Ukrainian literature. Their juxtaposition permits the reader to experience with particular intensity, and in various contexts, the critic's repeated encounters with the issues that concern him: the canon; periodization; relationships between literary phenomena and socio-cultural states of affairs; relationships between cultures,

especially those that reflect asymmetrical power relations; and authority and dignity in culture. The collection brings into convenient perspective the theoretical interests that underlie Grabowicz's criticism, and facilitates a general view of his critical method. Finally, the book provides the occasion for a sustained encounter with the flair and panache of Grabowicz's critical voice—its urbanity, intercultural erudition, intellectual sovereignty, and, from time to time, its post-colonial passion.

The nineteen chapters are apportioned to four parts: "The Theoretical Scaffolding," "Perspectives and Interrelationships," "Foci," and "Discussions, Polemics." The first includes three speeches delivered at various joint forums of Ukrainian and Western scholars between 1985 and 1990, as well as a long previously unpublished study in the history of literary reception, which will be discussed separately below. The first three items are the most programmatic in the book. They issue a series of often explicit challenges to Ukrainian literary scholarship in both the East and the West (but more especially in the East): to attend to the often bicultural and multicultural contexts in which Ukrainian literature has existed, and to broaden the category "Ukrainian literature" to include texts that were penned in other languages than the Ukrainian but may be seen to participate in a Ukrainian cultural system; to review the Ukrainian literary canon, ensuring that it embraces figures and texts previously excluded for bad reasons and questioning the presence there of others whose value is not self-evident in a post-Soviet environment; to abandon previously enforced simplistic models of literature in favour of more refined ones capable of reflecting upon the "mutual agency of codes, functions, and reading publics" (p. 22); to comprehend the task of the literary historian as "researching the [literary] process and its dynamics, as well as the paradigms and historiographical formulas that have inserted themselves between us and that process" (p. 33); and, most radically, to break with the corrupting habits that a totalitarian system inflicted not only upon its servants, but also upon its opponents, in order to step over "that final threshold between traditionalism and individualism that the individual must cross on the path to a real modernity" (p. 45).

The second part brings together Grabowicz's remarkable surveys, first presented at a series of conferences at McMaster University, of Polish-Ukrainian and Russian-Ukrainian literary relations, as well as of the theme of Jews in Ukrainian literature. Grabowicz is a virtuoso of the survey article: periodization gives structure to his vision of the literary and cultural process, while a wealth of empirical fact renders it credible.

The third part contains Grabowicz's close, always original, and not infrequently provocative readings of authors, texts, and particular cultural phenomena. For example, Ivan Vyshensky takes shape not as the "progressive" satirist predictably imagined by Soviet criticism, but as a figure whose strident Byzantine traditionalism against the background of a seductive Western

secularizing humanism reflects the collision in the Rzeczpospolita between Ukrainian-Belarusian society and the Polish-Lithuanian elite, and within Ukrainian-Belarusian society between the traditionalists and those already inclined to seek social equality with the elites of the Commonwealth. Kasiian Sakovych's verse eulogy for the Zaporozhian hetman Petro Konashevych Sahaidachny, by contrast, is disclosed, within its seventeenth-century Ukrainian-Belarusian context, as a text uniquely conversant with the Renaissance notion of a leader's loyalty to a sovereign higher than the prince or the state in its particularity: to the universal *res publica*. Emigré critics believed that Pavlo Tychyna's 1930s compromise with the Soviet regime was accompanied by a collapse in the aesthetic quality of his poetic output. Grabowicz, on the other hand, argues that Tychyna's opus is characterized rather by consistent development than by a radical break.

The final part of the book, "Discussions, Polemics," contains a short and surprisingly non-polemical discussion of Serhii Iefremov's populist, nation-oriented literary criticism, the previously mentioned polemical analysis of Čyževs'kyj's *History of Ukrainian Literature*, and Grabowicz's rejoinder to Ivan L. Rudnytsky's intervention in the discussion of that analysis.

The polemical impulse is clearly one of the motivating forces of Grabowicz's criticism. It gives rise to some of his most forceful writing and leads to provocative formulations and theses, some of which, however elegantly argued, remain contentious. In the opinion of the present reviewer, for example, Grabowicz's own quotations do not support his view that the aesthetic transformation (capitulation, according to conventional émigré opinion) of Tychyna, of which his poem "Partiia vede" is symptomatic, is adequately described as the outcome of a "movement toward traditional burlesque and folksy [*prostonarodnykh*] forms in combination with elevated, bookish language reminiscent of the Ukrainian *vertep*" (p. 348). Or, again, however illuminating the arguments advanced to assert the error of Čyževs'kyj's model of Ukrainian literature at certain periods as "incomplete," the fact remains that "incompleteness" is not an illogical metaphor for the situation of an oppressed literature whose readers are all familiar with prestigious literatures possessing broader stylistic and generic registers. (There is no need to repeat here my arguments in my review of Grabowicz's *Towards a History of Ukrainian Literature* [Cambridge: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1981] in the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 9 (1984), no. 1: 100–6.)

An important notion that Grabowicz uses in the debate with Čyževs'kyj and in practically all of his writings is that of the "system"—a term that he never defines directly and whose provenance he never discusses, but whose meaning accrues from such passages as the following: "For [the discussion of] many crucial questions, not only of genre and style, but of the stratification and differentiation of literature, of the emergence of norms, of the integration of

influences, and so on, an essential prerequisite is the concept of system [*systemnosti*]. Naturally, the concept of system has synchronic and diachronic dimensions.[...] the question of the dynamics of change [here] becomes especially important" (p. 17); "Today what interests us is [...] literature as an assemblage of norms and values, as a system" (pp. 214–15); "Literature—a national literature—is a system.[...] It is a system that, like the culture of which it is a part, expresses the life, values, experiences, etc., of a group, and like that culture it is *by its very nature complete*" (author's emphasis; p. 527, quoted here from the English-language text, *Towards a History of Ukrainian Literature*, p. 87). "System" is, in fact, a code word signalling the importance of attention to the complexity of overlapping contexts, each with its own evolution, that attend every literary phenomenon; it is a warning against failure to take into account the institutional framework in which a literary work emerges, or the attitudes and expectations that it confronts in the various cultures that notice it (or fail to notice it).

Grabowicz is sometimes explicit about the theoretical frameworks that he invokes. His study of reception aesthetics (pp. 46–73) and his discussion of the notions of "voice" and "point of view" (pp. 386–9) are cases in point. On the other hand, his sometimes oblique and in-passing definitions, and his use of such terms as "discourse," "code," and "deconstruction" without definition and occasionally without clear connection to the Foucauldian, Saussurian, and Derridean contexts to which they belong, fit into the rhetoric of theoretical informality that he cultivates. "I have not seen myself," Grabowicz explains in the preface, "as a consistent adherent of any one theory or methodology. I believe that, up to a point—and one would need to reflect further on this—rigorous coherence and monolithic consistency in the selection of tools are incompatible with the broad sweep of the topics in history and cultural studies that are addressed here" (p. 10).

The conceptual crispness of his essay on Ingarden, evidently, is not appropriate to the voice that Grabowicz elects for his work on literary history. This voice builds theoretical considerations into a rhetoric with a long and dignified tradition in Central and East European literary criticism: the rhetoric of common sense and of connection to major issues of society, politics, and culture that concern, or should concern, every aware member of the intellectual community. In this rhetoric of common sense, humanist values can be assumed. Even the possibility of subjective yet authoritative aesthetic judgments is axiomatic. Grabowicz refers to "artistic flaws" and literary efforts that are "by no means always aesthetically successful" (p. 315); he acquiesces in the notion of "a certain level of aesthetic achievement" (p. 574); and he expresses the opinion that "a phenomenon such as Socialist Realism by its very nature has limited aesthetic value or is altogether bereft of it" (p. 574). Clearly, the voice that speaks in the broad historical studies has no time for quibbles about the

grounds for the possibility of aesthetic judgment. It is, in the end, the voice of a seriously committed critic—committed not, of course, to an ideology, but to the dignity and worth of his subject, Ukrainian literature. Grabowicz's readings are not only exercises in innovative and thought-provoking scholarship; they are also always demonstrations that Ukrainian literary texts sustain analysis with fine instruments—many of them are, to use some of his favourite terms, *salonfähig* and *comme il faut*—and that the systems in which they are embedded are fascinatingly complex. His repeated return to the study of the social and cultural systems in which Ukrainian cultural phenomena were located, often disadvantageously, is part of the same project, as are his proposals to include within the scope of Ukrainian literary studies not only the heritage of Kyivan Rus', but also of the multilingual heritage of the Ukrainian lands in the Rzeczpospolita. There is an unannounced post-colonialism at work here: a direct rejection of the narratives of the imperial centres, but an equally firm rejection of exclusive narratives of national self-assertion.

Grabowicz wants a literary history that attends to the complexities of the production and reading of literary texts in a multicultural environment in which the relative dignities of the neighbouring and overlapping cultures are in a state of flux. The most recently written chapter in the book, the previously unpublished study "Theory and History: 'Horizon of Expectations' and the Early Reception of the New Ukrainian Literature" (pp. 46–136), glimpses the possibility of such a history in the theory of reception, a critical movement that achieved a certain currency mainly in the German-speaking countries in the 1970s and 1980s.

The chapter begins with a résumé of the classical text of reception theory, Hans Robert Jauss's *Literaturgeschichte als Provokation der Literaturwissenschaft* (1969), and an account of the objections raised against it (for example, that a particular reading community's "horizon of expectations" cannot be established empirically and that Jauss's proposal to treat it as implicit in the work itself is tautological; or, again, that Jauss's proposal to judge the level of artistry of a work by the extent to which it oversteps and broadens the audience's horizon of expectations reduces the notion of artistic value to novelty). In the event, Grabowicz does not defend Jauss systematically against his critics, and the subsequent, and fascinating, historical section of the chapter is not very Jaussian at all (and is, perhaps, all the better for not being so). A short and therefore perhaps rather lean account of the evolution of the "collective self-image" (p. 81) projected by writers of Ukrainian literature from the beginning to the end of the nineteenth century is followed by the real subject matter of the article: a history of Russian opinions about Ukrainian literature, and things Ukrainian in general, for the same period.

The story begins with the "discovery" of Ukraine in travel literature, memoir, and the like. Then comes the recognition of Ukraine as a historical

object. Romanticism highlights Ukraine as a reservoir of ethnographic variety and charm; Gogol's early work is the "ideal objective correlative" (p. 106) of such a view. A fundamental shift occurs in 1840 with the appearance of Shevchenko's *Kobzar*, which renders impossible the contemplation of Ukrainian literature as a cosy supplement to the Russian and ushers in the hostile, indeed vituperative, interventions of Vissarion Belinsky against the very idea of a literature in the Ukrainian language. (Here Grabowicz breaks the taboo in Ukrainian literary criticism, inherited from Soviet times, against quoting at any length the astonishingly vile anti-Ukrainian diatribes of the "revolutionary democrat.") In the second half of the century "the marginalization of all things Ukrainian becomes the companion of growing and increasingly aggressive Russification" (p. 128). The concluding harmonization of the narrative that has been told with the conceptual framework of reception theory does not greatly augment the force of the study. In the end, this is a history of opinion, written as a generalized story on the basis of particular views expressed by particular people. Whether the history of a readership's expectations can be written at all remains a moot point.

Just as moot is the larger question of the possibility of a history of literature. In 1978 the title "Toward a History of Ukrainian Literature" read like a statement about the inadequacy of previous attempts to write such a history, on the one hand, and a promise to do it better, on the other. Today it signals the author's resignation: "the very idea of a 'history of literature' claiming to encompass the whole process with its external and immanent features, and to present it with the presumption of authority, is considered in the context of current literary theory to be something of an oxymoron and an illusion" (p. 7). The goal may well be ephemeral. But, as Grabowicz's book eloquently demonstrates, the journey in pursuit of it can be rewarding.

One should not conclude without mentioning the reassuring and luxurious physical presence of the book: its excellent hardcover, generous margins, fine paper, and pleasantly readable type. One would like to know how much of the translation was done by Vasyl Ivashko, who is acknowledged in the preface (p. 12), given that Ukrainian versions of the text appeared in many places before this publication. In any event, the Ukrainian text reads as well as does vintage Grabowicz in English.

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Lubomyr A. Hajda, ed. *Ukraine in the World: Studies in the International Relations and Security Structure of a Newly Independent State*. Cambridge: Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 1998. xviii, 362 pp. U.S. \$18.95 paper. Distributed by Harvard University Press. Also published as *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20.

A decade of tumultuous events in Europe has still not produced a final, stable political shape. The Western powers have expanded their political influence deep into the former Soviet bloc, consolidating that influence through NATO expansion and through harmonizing the political economies of at least some states with European Union (EU) regimes. Yet patterns in large parts of the eastern half of the continent remain fluid. The eastern boundaries of the Euro-Atlantic community, and indeed of EU Europe, have yet to be established. While the reach of American political influence extends eastward beyond the Black Sea, the EU effort to anchor European eastward enlargement lags far behind, still grappling even with the problems of welding the Visegrád states onto the structures of the EU, not to speak of its daunting agenda in southeastern Europe. And while the Russian state has spent a decade trying to cope with decline, Russia's political elites currently indicate every intention of trying to halt and reverse the reduction of Russian influence in the former Soviet sphere and perhaps to challenge aspects of the emergent European international political system being built by the Western powers.

Right at the heart of this zone of fluid cross-currents stands the new Ukraine. And all the question marks over the completion of Europe's post-Cold War international political order can be summarized in a single question: what will happen to Ukraine? As Zbigniew Brzezinski keeps reminding us in *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* (New York: Basic Books, 1997), Ukraine is "pivotal." Or, as Sherman W. Garnett has put it in *Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), Ukraine is the keystone in any final East European settlement.

If Ukraine is fully integrated into the Euro-Atlantic community, the European political space will effectively exclude Russia. If Ukraine becomes a subordinate political ally of Russia, then Russian influence will return to Europe. If Ukraine were to be integrated into EU Europe, the entire socio-political dynamics of the EU would be transformed. Just by being there, Ukraine is a big player—or plaything—in European politics.

At the same time, the very fact that Ukraine has such unique geopolitical importance presents its political leaders with exceptionally complicated problems of developing a viable international strategy, not least when its environment remains so fluid. Since its emergence as an international actor at the start of the 1990s, it has found itself to be at the centre of potentially rival fields of force,

even if, so far, the main international actors involved—Russia and the United States—both have strong countervailing interests in maintaining Ukraine's stability. And because of the fact that the rise and consolidation of the Ukrainian state has been accompanied by a dramatic decline of Ukraine's economic base, the new state has found itself unable to convert its potential power resources into a strong capacity to shape its own international environment. It has thus found itself all too frequently in a reactive ad hoc mode of responding to this or that new pressure or potential crisis suddenly appearing on Kyiv's horizon. This is a thoroughly unsatisfactory situation not only for Ukraine, but for European security.

Both Presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma have made no secret of where they want Ukraine to fit in. They have both worked tirelessly to convince the leaders of Western Europe, including Europe's most important power, the United States, that Ukraine has a European mission and that its destiny must lie within the structures of Western and Central Europe. At the same time, Ukraine's commitment to a Western-oriented European identity leaves open its definition of its path towards its assertion of that identity. That path could lie through Ukraine seeking to join the "lower" ranks of the accession states of Central Europe seeking to enter the EU in the first decade of this century. It could also lie through Ukraine joining a group of states marked by an orientation towards rapid entry into NATO, but without perspectives of early entry into the EU. Yet another variant could involve Ukraine being "Finlandized" as a state that is socio-economically European but retains a neutrality in the international political system underwritten by both NATO and Russia. Finally, Ukraine's path to Europe could lie through its acting as a "bridge" between Russia and the West, aiding Russia itself to orient towards its own integration into the structures of the western part of the continent.

The often dramatic, complex, and immensely important story of how Ukrainian governments have tried to find a secure place for Ukraine's development has been woefully and potentially dangerously under-reported, under-studied, and under-discussed in the Western world over the last decade. Government officials in the main capitals and insider policy intellectuals have been increasingly riveted by the issues at stake. But the academic and journalistic communities have lagged far behind.

At last the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University has produced a substantial collection of articles on Ukraine's international relations since the end of the 1980s. The volume itself illustrates the Western academic world's sluggish intellectual response to the challenging reality of Ukraine: the book has had to rely heavily upon two sources of expertise—insider policy consultants, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Sherman Garnett, F. Stephen Larrabee, and Stephen Burant, and a handful of specialists from the Ukrainian diaspora, such as Roman Solchanyk, Taras Kuzio, and others. Restructuring and redeployment

of our large contingents of academic Soviet experts from Moscow—watching to Ukrainian studies is proving to be as slow as restructuring in the former Soviet space itself.

At first glance, the collection is unsatisfactory. Its subtitle suggests that we are being offered a case study shaped by the general theme of building newly independent states out of the former Soviet Republics. The table of contents suggests that we have an encyclopedia on Ukraine's relations and contacts with almost every corner of the globe, diplomatically ensuring equal coverage for each region: 20 pages for Canada, 22 for the United States, 20 for the Middle East, 25 for Western Europe, and so on. Because the book is based on papers presented at a conference in Washington in December 1996 and updated through 1997, it does not take the story far into the second half of the 1990s.

Yet, this is, in fact, an extremely valuable collection, indispensable for those wishing to understand the evolution not only of Ukraine's international relations, but also of basic issues in the international politics in the eastern half of Europe during the 1990s.

The book begins with two scene-setting essays. In an incisive piece, Brzezinski, who has done more than anyone else in the West to bring home to us Ukraine's importance in international power politics, reiterates this theme in what we are (tantalizingly) told is an abridged version of his 1996 conference speech. Ukraine's foreign minister, Borys Tarasiuk, follows with an article both underlining Ukraine's international importance and providing a valuable account, with new information, about the development of Ukraine's international relations before the assertion of independence in December 1991.

Those not familiar with the emergence of the Ukrainian state and the environment confronting it in the 1990s should turn next to two articles at the end of the book: John Jaworsky's "Ukraine's Armed Forces and Military Policy" and F. Stephen Larrabee's "Ukraine's Place in European and Regional Security." Jaworsky complements Tarasiuk's account of diplomatic origins with an account of the Ukrainian government's extraordinarily successful peaceful separation of the Ukrainian armed forces from the Soviet military apparatus in late 1991 and early 1992. As Jaworsky rightly says, this was "one of the greatest—and, to date, most poorly recognised—successes accompanying the drive for Ukraine's independence." Jaworsky also shows how, despite the appalling financial crisis facing the Ukrainian armed forces and the daunting problems of restructuring them, the Ukrainian officer corps has remained depoliticized and loyal to Ukraine's civilian political leadership, in contrast to the frequent episodes of political tension between the political and military leaderships in Russia over the last decade.

Larrabee provides an admirably succinct and comprehensive survey of the evolving international structural framework that has confronted Ukrainian governments during the 1990s, and of their efforts both to influence and adapt

to this framework. He notes the remarkable success of President Kuchma in developing a strong relationship with Boris Yeltsin and in resolving so many very difficult and complex problems between the two countries. This achievement is all the more puzzling when we appreciate the Russian domestic traumas associated with coming to terms with Ukrainian independence, traumas lucidly explained by Roman Solchanyk in his essay "Ukraine, Russia, and the CIS." Larrabee seeks to offer an explanation of the Russian-Ukrainian detente in the late 1990s, one that stresses the Russian government's fears that growing U.S. influence in Ukraine in the context of NATO enlargement prompted a more conciliatory Russian policy on a range of issues from border recognition to economic relations. But we still lack an authoritative study of Russia's Ukrainian policy in the 1990s.

Sherman Garnett, on the other hand, provides an admirably clear and informative account of the evolution of policy towards Ukraine on the part of the other major actor shaping its international environment, the United States. In a study that combines insider expertise with remarkable frankness, he traces the dynamic evolution of U.S. policy from its extremely hesitant beginnings towards the so-called "Strategic Partnership" of the late 1990s. The one gap in his treatment is lack of contextualization of Washington's Ukraine policy in the wider U.S. orientation towards both Russia and the Black and Caspian Sea areas.

One of the most valuable essays in the book is Stephen Burant's "Ukraine and East Central Europe," by far the best short account of these relations so far available in English. Some consider that the great failure of Ukrainian foreign policy during the Kravchuk period lay in Ukraine's absorption in its relations with the great powers and in nuclear issues rather than concentrating upon deepening its links with its Visegrád neighbours. The basis of this argument lies in the suggestion that Ukraine might have been able to clamber aboard the Visegrád bus before it set off on its journey westwards. Burant shows that this option was not, in fact, available to Ukraine. He does so by illuminating the foreign-policy agendas and Ukrainian policies of the Visegrád countries at this time.

The fact that Ukraine did not have the option of joining the Central European bus in the 1990s was not only or mainly the result of the policy choices of the Central European states themselves: it was above all a consequence of the perceptions and interests of the West European powers, processed through the EU. This is an area where the volume remains weak. Olga Alexandrova, one of the few Sovietologists in Western Europe who has sought to bring Ukraine and its problems to the centre of our attention, provides a useful general study of changing West European perceptions of Ukraine in the 1990s. But what is lacking and needed is work by specialists on the foreign policies of the main West European states, above all Germany, on how they have situated Ukraine in their shifting national strategies during the last decade.

Also lacking in the book is sufficient attention to the political-economy dimension of Ukraine's international relations. A number of contributors, notably Larrabee and Kuzio, stress the importance of this dimension. But it is not addressed in detail. Two issues should be singled out for special attention: first, the fact that whatever the internal institutional structure of the Ukrainian economy, it is difficult to see how the EU's political-economy regime for East Central and Eastern Europe can be a powerful anchor for Ukraine's economic development in the short or medium term. That regime will not allow Ukraine to become again the breadbasket of Europe, and more generally the EU's trade regime creates difficulties for Ukraine that are likely to grow rather than diminish once parts of Central Europe, notable Poland, are absorbed into the EU. The Kohl government, in its last phase in office, did come up with some imaginative ideas of linkages between EU needs and Ukraine's industrial potential, but these ideas seem to have fallen by the wayside.

These problems, too often glossed over in the West, form an important backdrop to the reluctance of the EU states to declare unequivocally that Ukraine falls within the frontier of Europe as the EU defines it and thus has the right to eventual membership in the Union. EU Commission officials have made such statements, but the EU Common Strategy on Ukraine approved at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 was notable for its silence on precisely that question.

The other crucial political-economy issue, or rather nexus of issues, lies within Ukraine itself. On one side, there is the battle to provide a social and institutional framework that will end Ukraine's economic decline, rebuild domestic confidence in the Ukrainian state, and provide that state with sufficient resources to shape its own environment. Larrabee rightly stresses that this remains the cardinal security challenge facing the Ukrainian state. It is perhaps asking too much for a survey of these issues to be contained in a book of this sort.

But another side of this internal Ukrainian political economy is central to any understanding of Ukraine's international relations: its internal social-power structure inevitably tends to shape its external orientation and linkages in a profound way. And that structure has remained, in the 1990s, rather strongly harmonious with the structure of the political economy in Russia. While Ukraine has sought to strengthen its political and security linkages with the Euro-Atlantic world during the 1990s, communicative linkages between Ukraine's economic operators and the outside world are far more organic and intensive with Russia than with the West. If, at any moment in time, international political relations appear dominant in a state's international relations, these linkages of political economies may ultimately become determinant. A Western policy towards Ukraine that fails to find a way of generating strong, dynamic linkages with the country and its elites in this area is bound to be half-baked. During the 1990s

such linkages were established in the financial field, but really only there. And these kinds of links are not enough in the long term: indeed they may even be counter-productive in the search for strong, stable constituencies in Ukraine for its Euro-Atlantic mission.

This set of issues concerning Western policies towards Ukraine is signalled by Garnett when he stresses that "the positive momentum in U.S.-Ukrainian ties cannot survive without allied support.... Crucial economic and political supports for sustaining this momentum require European resources and leadership" (p. 117). Despite its scope and detail, the EU's new Common Strategy towards Ukraine falls far short of the needs that Garnett highlights.

Though this dimension of Ukraine's international relations is not addressed in *Ukraine in the World*, it remains an extremely valuable contribution to our understanding of central features of the new world that we must come to terms with—a world including Ukraine. The volume's essays on other aspects of Ukraine's international relations—notably with Canada and Turkey—not touched on here will be valuable for specialists, and the fifty-six pages of key documents at the end, some of which are otherwise not available in English, give the book added worth.

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Yaroslav Bilinsky. *Endgame in NATO's Enlargement: The Baltic States and Ukraine*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999. xviii, 149 pp. U.S. \$55.00 cloth.

Yaroslav Bilinsky has written a book in support of NATO membership for the Baltic states and Ukraine. The reader should therefore not expect carefully weighed arguments for and against these countries becoming members of NATO. Professor Bilinsky's book has an explicit political message, based on an impressive amount of material that he has gathered on the development of NATO-Baltic and NATO-Ukrainian relations. This material is useful for anybody who wishes to acquaint himself with what has happened in the relations between these countries and NATO since the demise of the Soviet Union. In my opinion, however, the book is not very successful in terms of the author's main enterprise: convincing the reader that the Baltic states and Ukraine should become members of NATO.

To be convincing, Bilinsky should not only have presented the arguments *for* NATO membership for these countries; he should also have discussed and refuted the most frequent arguments *against* their membership, which he does not. It is also surprising that Bilinsky's arguments for membership are almost

exclusively of a *Realpolitik* kind. In essence, his argument is that Ukraine and the Baltic states are threatened by a revanchist Russia and that the West is morally obliged to save them from this threat. There is very little discussion of one of the most frequent official NATO arguments *for* enlargement, namely that the preconditions for a country's membership in NATO (such as a democratic system, no territorial disputes with neighbouring countries, and civilian control over the armed forces) in themselves increase stability in Eastern Europe.

The text contains a number of dubious statements. One example is the author's interpretation of Baltic history: on p. 9 he writes that "All three countries had been democratic independent states between the two world wars." But surely he must be familiar with the authoritarian coups d'état in Lithuania (Smetona) in 1926 and in Estonia (Päts) and Latvia (Ulmanis) in 1934. It is also difficult to square Bilinsky's statement on p. 40—that "Ukraine's present economy has not yet taken off at full speed, despite macroeconomic stabilization and the exchange of currency. But it is making genuine progress"—with most IMF and World Bank reports on the Ukrainian economy since independence. As well, this reviewer wonders what the author means when he writes about "the relatively harsh, but *deserved* treatment of the Russian minorities" in the Baltic countries (p. 13, my emphasis). Exactly what have these minorities done to deserve to be treated harshly? Does Bilinsky think that they should be punished collectively today for what Molotov and Ribbentrop did in 1939?

In his conclusion Bilinsky writes that the 1997 treaty between Russia and Ukraine was "obviously an attempt by Russia to keep its southern neighbour out of NATO." But Ukraine was not *forced* to sign this treaty, and, in fact, the negotiations were largely initiated by the Ukrainian Presidential Administration. The Ukrainian Parliament also ratified the treaty long before the Russian Duma did. In truth, the Kuchma administration expended so much effort on concluding a treaty of co-operation and friendship with Russia because it would facilitate closer relations between Ukraine and NATO. That this would be the result was also the major reason why the Russian Duma hesitated in ratifying the treaty.

Bilinsky takes the Russian threat to the Baltic countries and Ukraine for granted. He quotes Henry Kissinger's phrase that "Russia is in, but not of, Europe" (p. 3), and he implicitly claims that not containing Russia by enlarging NATO is equal to "not stopping Hitler" before World War II (p. 4). He seems to rule out totally a scenario where Russia comes to terms with the independence of these countries and develops good relations with them. As for the viability of the Russian threat, Bilinsky does not discuss Russia's economic and military weaknesses. Even if he were right about the lack of ambiguity regarding Russia's military ambitions towards these countries, an analysis of the Russian ability to follow up on these ambitions would have been warranted.

Books that take a stance on important issues are sometimes a refreshing change from more mainstream, impartial analyses. Professor Bilinsky's is one

such book. Even though its argumentation has not convinced this reader, it is a welcome contribution, for it provides much information about what has happened in Ukraine's and the Baltic states' relations with NATO.

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Catherine Wanner. *Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998. xxviii, 255 pp. U.S. \$50.00 cloth, U.S. \$18.95 paper.

The post-Soviet leadership in Ukraine quickly identified creation of a nation-state as its main priority in the early 1990s. This formidable task included fashioning a national identity that would be meaningful to its citizens, would reflect the nation's independence from the Soviet Union and from Russia, and would unite what many saw as a populace divided by ethnicity, language, and history. The process by which the state sought to mould this new identity has been the topic of many studies, most of which have focussed on questions of nationalism and the role of the state.

Burden of Dreams provides a broad perspective on these processes. Utilizing her substantial anthropological field research, Catherine Wanner illustrates the dynamic between state, society, and individual. Her focus is on identity creation as a dynamic process that represents a "negotiated settlement" among a variety of state and societal groups. Wanner argues that the Ukrainian situation is one in which identity is being created in the shadow of the collapsed Soviet empire. She effectively illustrates the way in which the state and, in some cases, specific societal groups have attempted to create a historically based identity for Ukrainian citizens and the way these citizens, in turn, have reacted.

Burden of Dreams provides a very brief background on the pre-independence period, in particular focussing on the rise of Rukh and the nature of the "Soviet identity." Although this is obviously not the focus of her work, Wanner's evocative descriptions of the complex social networks of *blat* and gift-giving—in Soviet times and after—should be required reading for the new generation of students for whom life in a deficit economy is already confined to the pages of Soviet history.

The heft of the book lies in its chapters devoted to the "sites of contestation" over history and identity: the school system, festivals, the official calendar, and shifting politics surrounding monuments and street names. Wanner's choice of "sites" provides a crosscut of nation-building arenas, including both public and private initiatives. The chapter on the school system is a case in point. Wanner analyzes official textbooks and curricula of the early independence era as official

use of history to create identity. At the same time, she integrates research on private schools that have far more freedom in their curricula and represent a (granted, limited) set of private initiatives.

The chapters devoted to the Chervona Ruta music festival, the state calendar, and monuments are particularly interesting in that they show the reaction of the population to the use of history to create a new identity. In each case, Wanner shows contestation over the presented narrative. For example, her description of the cynicism toward commemorative ceremonies and holidays highlights the manner in which individuals transform intended commemorations to fit their personal beliefs and needs. The book's vibrant narration of the politics behind renaming streets and replacing monuments throughout Ukraine adds an important physical aspect to understanding collective memory and identity. As Wanner shows, fights over use of public space are particularly acute given the legacy of monument propaganda under the Soviet Union.

Burden of Dreams is an exciting investigation of the ways in which history and memory are utilized by various groups to negotiate a post-Soviet identity. Wanner's style presents the benefits of anthropological research methodologies to a broader audience, bringing theory to life through widespread use of individual narratives. Future analyses could build on this work by extending the time frame to determine how discourse at these sites has shifted over time. These could also be enhanced by greater focus on regional aspects of history and the ways in which location affects the discourse on history and identity.

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Andrzej A. Zięba. *Ukraińcy w Kanadzie wobec Polaków i Polski (1914-1939)*. Cracow: Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Instytut Polonijny, 1998. 404 pp.

Before they emigrated to Canada, Galicia's Ukrainians and Poles had lived together for centuries. In the counties of mixed settlement at the eastern periphery of Galicia, the familial and territorial bonds that united both groups were still stronger than the nationalist ideologies that would soon divide them. In Canada both groups shared the same socio-economic interests and faced the same negative stereotypes. They settled next to each other, mingled at local celebrations, read each other's newspapers, campaigned together during municipal and provincial elections, and continued to intermarry even when nationalist agitation and animosities grew more acute during the 1920s. It is therefore disconcerting to realize that Ukrainian Canadian attitudes to Poles and

Poland have been almost completely ignored by historians. The present volume, which explores the relatively uncharted terrain where immigration history and international relations intersect, goes a long way to fill this void.

The book consists of two parts. The first part (chapters 1–4), based almost exclusively on secondary sources, sketches the social and cultural trends that place the political events and diplomatic manoeuvring discussed in the second part in a broader context. In these introductory chapters the author focusses on emigration patterns, official attitudes to mass emigration, the emergence of a Ukrainian community in Canada and its integration into the Canadian polity, and the transformation of Ukrainian immigrants from “Ukrainians living in Canada” into “Canadians of Ukrainian origin.” While he has read virtually every article and monograph on the Ukrainian experience in Canada, it cannot be said that Zięba has always done so with a discriminating eye. This is especially apparent in the treatment of religious differentiation, where Mennonite proselytization among Ukrainians is placed on a par with that of the Methodists, and in the discussion of Roman Catholic attitudes toward the immigrants, which is based on articles by Ukrainian Catholic priests and lay activists. Important English- and French-language studies of the Roman Catholic church in Canada are absent from Zięba’s otherwise very impressive bibliography.

Zięba raises a number of interesting and provocative issues in these chapters. The most controversial concerns the strength, influence, and vitality of Russophilism in Canada. It is true, as Zięba indicates, that many immigrants were natives of the easternmost counties of Galicia, where Fr. Ivan Naumovych had sown the seeds of Russophilism and whence many peasants tried to migrate to Russia in 1892. But to suggest that the conflict between Russophile and Ukrainophile “visions of national development” was a central process in the history of Ukrainians in Canada, that “the dimensions of the Russophile national apostasy” were exceptionally large from the Ukrainian point of view, and that “the Russophile current” “was dominant in the spiritual life of Ukrainian immigrants in Canada” before the 1920s is an exaggeration. Zięba provides little, if any, new evidence to buttress these contentions. The fact that two-thirds of the “Russians” recorded in the 1921 census may have been Ukrainians (“Ruthenians”) should not be taken as evidence of the immigrants’ Russophile sympathies; rather, it simply reflected the bias of many census takers (especially in Alberta), who routinely recorded as “Russians” all persons who identified themselves as Ukrainians or Ruthenians.

When he scrutinizes Russophile activity during the movement’s heyday (1914–23), Zięba’s account actually undermines such sweeping assertions. Unlike the Ukrainophiles, who established many periodicals and a large network of local institutions, the Russophiles had to recruit transient organizers and editors in the United States, and were financially beholden to the Holy Synod and provincial Liberal parties eager to abolish Ukrainian-English bilingual schools. The fall of

the tsarist regime permanently crippled the Russophile movement. By the late 1920s only the Russian Orthodox followers of the Galician Russophile Bishop Adam Phillipowsky rejected Ukrainian identity outright and styled themselves "Carpatho-Russians." When many of these joined the Ukrainian Orthodox church during the 1930s, only a handful of Lemko and Carpatho-Rusyn congregations, sustained by contacts with compatriots in the United States, actively rejected identification as Ukrainians.

Zięba is on much firmer ground when he explains the failure of Russophilism in Canada. Because religiously enterprising Galicians made their way into every denomination, including Russian Orthodoxy, old-country regional divisions did not coincide with denominational differences in Canada. As a result, the clannish and homogeneously Orthodox Bukovynians fell under Galician domination within the Russian Orthodox church and did not articulate a separate identity based on regional and denominational allegiance. The fact that six Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox jurisdictions competed in Canada by the 1930s also impeded the triumph of Russophilism and meant that most Bukovynians came to identify themselves as Ukrainians.

The second part (chapters 5–8) examines Ukrainian Canadian attitudes to Poles and Poland during the First World War (1914–18), the immediate postwar period when the map of Europe was being redrawn (1919–23), and the remaining interwar years (1923–39). Drawing on a prodigious amount of research in newspaper and manuscript collections in Polish, Canadian, and American archives, these chapters focus on the reaction of the Ukrainian Canadian press and activists to European events and on the measures adopted by Polish diplomats and consular officials in response to various Ukrainian initiatives. Zięba not only makes excellent use of the Borden, Meighen, Mackenzie King, Bennett, and Woycenko papers at the National Archives of Canada in Ottawa and the Bobersky, Elcheshen, and Seleshko papers at the Ukrainian Canadian and Educational Centre in Winnipeg; he is also the first historian to tap the records of various Polish ministries (internal, foreign, religious affairs) and the Polish embassy in London to study Ukrainian Canadians. The result is a monograph that offers fascinating behind-the-scenes glimpses of the hopes, ambitions, prejudices, and calculations that motivated minor actors on the fringes of major historical events.

Although old-country disputes reverberated in Canada before the First World War, Zięba argues that Ukrainian-Polish relations began to deteriorate after 1914. At the outset of the war prominent Ukrainians in Canada and the United States, like their compatriots overseas, were inclined to look to the Central Powers for the realization of Ukrainian political aspirations. Zięba does a masterful job of unravelling the actions of Austrophile elements in Europe, the United States, and Canada before their illusions were shattered by the 5 November 1916 Austro-German manifesto, which promised a Polish Kingdom. He also suggests

that pamphlets published in 1915 and 1916 to bring the Ukrainian issue to the attention of the Western public began to disseminate negative stereotypes of the Poles. They not only warned against the restoration of "historical Poland," but also labelled Poles as oppressors of the Ukrainian people. In Canada, relations were further strained when Ukrainians, eager to remove the stain of Austrophilism, responded to the November 1916 manifesto by maintaining that it was the Poles who stood to benefit most from the Central Powers, and by petitioning the government to permit the formation of Ukrainian volunteer divisions to fight against the Central Powers and the Poles. The Ruthenian Forestry Battalion fiasco and the Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk exposed the hollowness of these claims.

The interest of Ukrainian Canadians in old-world politics was most intense—and their hostility toward Poland and the Poles was most tangible—between 1919 and 1923. During these years they circulated petitions, raised funds, inundated Western capitals with telegrams and memoranda, dispatched delegates to Paris, and received Ukrainian emissaries. Zięba is aware that much of what transpired resembled a comic opera, with rumours of profiteering and extravagant living, infighting among Ukrainian National Republic and Western Ukrainian National Republic (ZUNR) representatives, cynical attempts by Canadian politicians to exploit Ukrainian concerns about Eastern Galicia, and Ukrainian efforts to extort money for their cause from the Conservatives. Nevertheless, his treatment of Ukrainian Canadian efforts on behalf of their countrymen is very balanced. Poland needed four years to establish its sovereignty in Eastern Galicia, and this, Zięba concedes, was primarily because of the dogged determination of Ukrainian activists in North America. Ukrainian lobbyists convinced Canadian MPs to raise their grievances concerning Eastern Galicia in Parliament (May 1919, February 1923), and they pressed Canadian governments to broach the issue in London and instruct Canadian delegates to raise it at the League of Nations (September 1921, September 1922). As one contemporary observed, Conservatives and Liberals were "consumed with anxiety to conciliate Ukrainian voters in the [Canadian] west," and this gave Ukrainian lobbyists considerable leverage (although, as Zięba's excellent reconstruction of events surrounding the 1921 federal election and the ZUNR Liberty Loan fiasco suggests, there were limits to the largesse that could be extracted even from a Conservative government eager to make amends for its wartime legislation). Such Canadian gestures, even if they were mere tokenism, reminded the Great Powers that the Ukrainian issue had yet to be resolved, and they were a source of some anxiety for Polish diplomats, who realized that Ukrainians in Canada had the clout to raise issues unfavourable to Poland at international gatherings.

At the same time, Zięba shows that efforts to mobilize and tap the financial resources of Ukrainian immigrants promoted the dissemination of negative stereotypes of Poles and Poland. Weeklies such as *Kanadyiskyi farmer* and the

Catholic *Kanadyiskyi ukrainets* described Poles as “a barbarian nation” of “executioners, murderers, and hyenas” who were “mercilessly and systematically” “killing the Ukrainian population of Eastern Galicia.” Zięba suggests that the Catholic weekly was especially prone to such virulent statements because it was trying to compensate for the tactful and diplomatic—but very unpopular—behaviour of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky during his 1921 Canadian visit. Ultimately, it was the ZUNR representatives Ivan Bobersky and Osyp Nazaruk who did most to poison Polish-Ukrainian relations. Instructed not to criticize Symon Petliura’s diplomacy by their hosts and unwilling to provoke Ukrainian Canadian communists, they lashed out at Poland as the Ukrainian people’s greatest enemy. Slide shows featuring scaffolds and corpses and sweeping statements about “Polish crimes” drove this message home. Poles who reported assaults and robberies at this time interpreted such acts as Ukrainian vengeance provoked by the agitation. Significantly, these appear to have been the only instances of politically inspired violence between Ukrainians and Poles in Canada.

International recognition of Poland’s sovereignty in Eastern Galicia, growing disenchantment with old-country politicians, and the everyday concerns of Ukrainian Canadians promoted a degree of accommodation with Poland after 1923. During the 1920s the Polish state financed Ukrainian emigrant-aid societies, and Polish consular officials urged Canada to classify Ukrainians as “preferred” immigrants, hoping thereby to rid Poland of its “minority problem.” Strategies were elaborated to ensure that influential immigrants co-operated with Polish consular officials, and several prominent Ukrainian Canadians, who are identified by Zięba, expressed a desire to work with Polish officials. Even after the Polish state responded to arson and sabotage by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) with brutal “pacification” measures, the older, established Ukrainian Canadian organizations adopted a much more restrained attitude toward Poland than did organizations established by recently arrived veterans of the Polish-Ukrainian War in Galicia. While the newly established Ukrainian National Federation raised funds for the OUN, helped its emissaries travel across Canada incognito, and pinned its hopes for Ukraine on Germany (until March 1939), older organizations, such as the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League (USRL), rejected OUN terrorism and dictatorial methods, issued ultimatums to the Nationalists, and worked with the London-based Ukrainian Press Bureau to mobilize public opinion against the “pacification” and to stymie OUN influence. After 1935, Canadian officials, who had raised Ukrainian grievances at the League of Nations once again in 1931, became more guarded in their dealings with Ukrainians after receiving confidential dossiers on the OUN from Polish diplomats.

Although Zięba is correct to suggest that the struggle between Ukrainian Orthodox/USRL “liberals” and OUN/UNF “nationalists” reflected emerging

differences between Canadian and Galician Ukrainians and helped to forge a distinct Ukrainian Canadian identity, his discussion of this process overestimates the old-country allegiances of the Ukrainian Catholic church and clergy. While he notes the moderate tone of Bishop Vasyl Ladyka's official statements on Poland, Zięba fails to appreciate the depth of opposition to the OUN among the Ukrainian Catholic clergy. Nor does he realize that *Kanadyiskyi ukrainets* did not reflect the views of the Ukrainian Catholic eparchy after 1927, that Hetmanite influence within the church had been discredited by 1935, and that priests such as Fr. Vasyl Gigeichuk (not Pavlo Gigeichuk, as Zięba incorrectly identifies him), who may have duped Canadian officials and helped OUN emissaries enter Canada, were a small minority. During the 1930s the church and its clergy were involved in a series of confrontations, primarily at the parish level, with UNF branches that were trying to exploit the church for partisan ends. Moreover, by the late 1930s the Ukrainian Catholic church (unlike the Ukrainian Orthodox) had a very sizeable contingent of Canadian-born and -educated priests. These priests had little personal knowledge of Ukraine and little sympathy for Ukrainian nationalism, and they considered themselves Canadians (of Ukrainian origin). USRL ideologues may have challenged nationalist assumptions in their publications, but by 1939 Canadianization had proceeded much further among young Ukrainian Catholic priests and professionals.

One may take issue with some of Zięba's interpretations or regret that he has not told us more about the attitudes of ordinary Ukrainian and Polish Canadians, but one cannot deny that he has added a new dimension and made a very significant contribution to the study of Ukrainian Canadian history. It is hoped that his book will stimulate other historians to probe more deeply into the social, cultural, and political dimensions of Ukrainian-Polish relations in Canada. In the meantime, no serious student of Ukrainian Canadian history, or Canadian immigration history for that matter, can afford to ignore this book.

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A Lexical Atlas of the Hutsul Dialects of the Ukrainian Language.

Compiled and edited from the Fieldnotes of Jan Janów and His Students by Janusz A. Rieger. Warsaw: Semper, 1996. 397 pp.

Janusz Rieger, a professor at the Institute of Slavic Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, has written a number of important scholarly works on Ukrainian dialectology, Slavic onomastics, Polish-Ukrainian linguistic contacts, the history of the Polish language in the territories east of Poland proper, and the history of the Russian language. He is author or co-author of fifteen books, of

which this lexical atlas is the most recent. It is based on the Hutsul and Pokuttian dialects recorded by the late Professor Jan Janów, by Janów's students, and by a number of other dialectologists during the years 1924–38, and on Rieger's own studies of these dialects.

The atlas contains an introduction, a bibliography, a list of villages, a list of maps, a chapter on Hutsul dialectology and the history of the present atlas, lexical maps, two appendices, one showing phonetic and morphological maps and one on the main Hutsul isoglosses, commentaries, conclusions, résumés in Polish and Ukrainian, an index of the words shown on the maps, two examples of Janów's transcriptions, and two examples of Stefan Hrabec's transcriptions in 1936 and 1937.

In addition to Janów's material, who did the most work on the Hutsul dialects and amassed a large quantity of dialectological materials, Rieger also used the materials published and collected by Stefan Hrabec, Karol Dejna, Władysław Kuraszkievicz, Przemysław Zwoliński, and Franciszek Lewandowski. Rieger notes, and rightly so, that "the information that Hrabec and Lewandowski gathered from their questionnaires, as well as Janów's (and Dejna's) unnumbered notes, provided a good basis for the geographical presentation of Hutsul and Pokuttia vocabulary and its differentiation, and also for the demonstration of Romanian, Hungarian, and Polish influences on Hutsul dialects, as well as archaisms and regional differences within those dialects."

Of the ninety Hutsul villages that appear in the maps, seventy-six were studied by the linguists named above. Fourteen others (nos. 166–212), now in Rakhiv raion, were taken from Josyp Dzendzelivskij's *Linhvistyčnyj atlas ukrajins'kyx narodnyx hovoriv Zakarpats'koji oblasti URSR (Leksyka)*, 3 vols. (1958, 1960, 1993). The village of Rakhiv has been omitted, however, while the village of Luh, whose inhabitants speak a Transcarpathian rather than Hutsul dialect, has been erroneously included.

The book's 234 lexical maps are grouped thematically, according to terms for kinship (maps 1–22), social status (maps 23–30), time (maps 37–42), clothing and adornments (maps 68–82), fauna (maps 87–99), dairy products (maps 160–69), sheepherding (maps 192–201), and other subjects.

In Appendix I (maps 235–45) Rieger examines phonetic features, including the retention of *a* after soft consonants in some dialects and *e* in others (*pšenyč'a*, *nedil'a* ~ *pšenyč'e*, *nedil'e*); initial *ja-* *je-* (*jama*, *jabluko* ~ *jema*, *jebluko*); *i*, *y* < **o* (*bib*, *mism* ~ *byb*, *myst*); voiced ~ voiceless final consonants (*bib* ~ *bip*, *viz* ~ *vis*); initial soft *s'-* ~ hard *s-* (*s'uda*, *s'udy* ~ *suda*, *sudy*); soft ~ hard final *s* [*-s'* ~ *-s*] (*ščos'* ~ *ščos*, *kolys'* ~ *kolys*); and so on.

In the morphological maps (nos. 246–54) Rieger examines several features: (1) parallel forms of neuter nouns in the singular instrumental case (*tel'atem* ~ *tel'em*, *kuratam* ~ *kurem*); (2) parallel dual forms in the nominative and accusative (*dvi viwcy* ~ *dvi viwč'i*, *dvi nedily* ~ *dvi nedili*); (3) parallel forms of

possessive adjectives in the singular genitive and accusative (*meji, tveji, sveji ~ moji, tvoji, svoji*); (4) parallel endings *-t ~ -ø* in the third person singular and plural for verbs of the first and third conjugations (*beret ~ bere, robjet ~ robje*, etc.); (5) parallel forms in the first-person singular and plural past tense (*byw sme ~ byw jem, xodylsme ~ xodylem*); and (6) the additional conditional first-person singular form *kobyx ~ kobym* in verbs in the past tense (*kobyx maw ~ kobym maw, kobyx znaw ~ kobym znaw*, and so on). In his commentaries on the maps Rieger notes that the older generation uses *kobyx* with conditionals, while the younger generation uses *kobym* (p. 341, no. 254).

It would have been useful if Rieger had included several maps showing important phonetic and morphological features, such as retention of the old reflex *-hje* in *[-ja]*, *[-jê]* with or without doubling of the previous consonant (e.g., *vesil'la ~ vesil'a* or *vesil'l'ê*), and indicating which forms of the future tense are used most often in these dialects—the analytic (e.g., *búdu kazáty ~ búdu kazáv*) or the synthetic/analytic (e.g., *kazátymulkazáty mu ~ mu kazáty, kazátymeš/kazáty meš ~ meš kazáty*). (On p. 26, however, he does mention the future tense and cites such examples as *mu pysaty, mete itý, budete jixaty, budim ity, budeš nočuvatil/nočuvau*.)

Rieger mentions that in his 254 commentaries (pp. 295–341) on the maps he has retained the spelling of the original records. But this is not always true: soft and semi-soft consonants are transcribed identically (p. 295); semi-voiced consonants are shown as voiced; unstressed *y^e* is rendered as *é*; and opened *a^e* has been changed to *ä*. The transcription of geminated consonants has also been changed. Instead of a line over the consonant (*š̄, ž̄*) a colon has been used instead (*s:, z:*). Nonetheless, Rieger's commentaries contain much rich factual material and occasionally provide many more examples and explanations than the maps.

Other positive features of this atlas are the résumés in Polish and Ukrainian and the index of dialectal words that were mapped. However, accents are not indicated throughout the book. They are completely absent in the maps, the conclusions (except in the brief paragraph about accentuation on p. 345), the résumés, and the word index.

Soft consonants (*d', t', n', l'*) and semi-soft consonants (*z', s', r'*, and others) are indicated using the identical prime (*d', t', n', l'; z', s', r'*, and others). This quite widespread form of simplified phonetic transcription does not accurately reflect the real situation in a dialect. Primarily in the southwestern dialects of Ukrainian, including the Hutsul and Pokuttian, there are three types of softening: soft consonants (*d', t', n', l'*), semi-soft consonants (*ž', z', s', r'*, and others), and softened consonants, especially before *t* (*b, p, v, m, f*).

Another positive aspect of this atlas is that Rieger has supplemented it with fourteen settlements from Dzendzelivs'kyj's *Linhvistychnyj atlas*. It is a pity, however, that he has left out three Hutsul settlements located in present-day Romania on the Vișeu River, which flows into the Tysa about eighteen

kilometres west of Rakhiv. The dialects spoken in those villages are an extension of the unbroken belt of Hutsul dialects found in Romania, in the villages of Vyšavs'ka Dolyna (Romanian: Valea Vișeului), Bystrjy (Bistra), and Krasnyj (Crasna), which were studied in 1932 by Ivan Pan'kevych and described in part one (p. 12) of his *Ukrajins'ki hovory Pidkarpats'koji Rusy i sumežnyx oblastej* (Prague, 1938).

Rieger mentions that the lexicon of the Hutsul and Pokuttian dialects had been strongly influenced by Romanian, Hungarian, and Polish. Unfortunately, however, he does not indicate anywhere which words are borrowings from those languages. There has been some debate about whether certain words are Romanian or Hungarian by origin—for example, *legin'* (maps 23 and 24) and *gazdá*. (For some reason, the latter word is missing in the atlas even though it is widely known and used not only in the Hutsul dialects, but also in the dialects of Bukovyna, Pokuttia, and Transcarpathia.)

The positive aspects of Rieger's *Lexical Atlas* notwithstanding, one technical deficiency must be mentioned: the original maps were obviously reduced in size for publication, and consequently the numbers on them indicating settlements are so small that they are hard to see without a magnifying glass. There is also one important omission in the list of abbreviations for works cited: the writings of the prominent Ukrainian dialectologist Fedot Zhylyko, which provide a detailed classification and description of the lexical, phonetic, and morphological features of all Ukrainian dialects.

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Yuri Andrukhovych. *Recreations*. Translated, with an introduction, by Marko Pavlyshyn. Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1998. 132 pp. \$29.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Yuri Andrukhovych's *Recreations* is one of very few English-language translations of contemporary Ukrainian literature published in the 1990s. That fact, together with the excellence of the translation and the high aesthetic quality of this edition, make this publication a major event in Ukrainian literary culture since Ukraine achieved independence in 1991. Written in the fall of 1990, Andrukhovych's *Rekreatsii* appeared in the first issue of the journal *Suchasnist* to be published in Ukraine, in January 1992. Until then the journal had been a leading literary, cultural, and political forum among Ukrainian émigrés since the turn of the 1960s. The appearance of Andrukhovych's novel in the first issue to be published in Kyiv scandalized many of the journal's older subscribers; they were shocked and offended by what they deemed to be a preponderance of

profanity and sex in the novel. *Rekreatsii* was re-published in 1997 in an anthology of Andrukhovych's writings entitled *Rekreatsii: Romany* and then on its own later that year.

In many ways, *Recreations* reflects life in Ukraine in the late 1980s and early 1990s—a time of mega-festivals at which Ukraine's inhabitants re-evaluated and reaffirmed their national consciousness. In the novel, inspired by the energy that then pervaded Ukraine, Andrukhovych has applied a tragicomic, carnivalesque interpretation of life (an interpretation that formed his creative ideology and that of his fellow writers Oleksandr Irvanets and Viktor Neborak as members of the Bu-Ba-Bu literary grouping) to the changing political world around him. Against this socio-political backdrop, the author sets out to define Ukraine's post-colonial identity.

Recreations and Andrukhovych's subsequent novels, *Moskoviada* (1993) and *Perverziia* (1997), have assumed a central position in current discussions of contemporary Ukrainian literature. Attracting the spotlight because of Bu-Ba-Bu's self-promoting, genre-crossing performances and the notoriety elicited by the negative reaction to the publication of *Rekreatsii* in *Suchasnist*, Andrukhovych will enter the new millennium as the writer whose works have drawn the lion's share of attention from critics of Ukrainian literature throughout the world. His creative undertakings are eagerly anticipated by readers and analysts of Ukrainian literature. His poetry and short prose have been translated into German, Polish, English, and Russian. Of his novels, *Recreations* has also been translated into Polish, and Michael Naydan's English translation of *Perverziia* is forthcoming.

Recreations is the story of four young Ukrainian poets who meet in a fictitious town in the Carpathian Mountains in western Ukraine to take part in a festival staged to revive Ukraine's national spirit. The novel follows the thoughts and actions of these four men (and one of the poet's wives) through their participation in the festival. Andrukhovych utilizes a style of narration that alternates between the voices of several different characters; this allows for excursions into the thoughts of the various characters and for the presentation of different points of view on the unfolding action. Driven by the witty dialogue of its protagonists, *Recreations* maintains a fluid pace as the plot develops, and Andrukhovych's consistent injection of humour and action make it a highly readable work of fiction. Scenes depicting sex, drinking, mystery, and horror-fantasy colour the novel's underlying probing of the past, present, and future of the Ukrainian identity.

Andrukhovych employs postmodern techniques to deconstruct clichés of both Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian culture. These devices include playing with the authorities of History and Time and jumbling Ukrainian myths and symbols. The myth that is most directly attacked is that of the Ukrainian poet as a leader and guardian of the Ukrainian national idea. The four poets in *Recreations* are

narcissists who see themselves as rock stars and, correspondingly, live a decadent lifestyle full of womanizing and partying. And yet they continue to be looked upon as heroes by the festival's attendees. Through these characters Andrukhovych introduces the contemporary Ukrainian poet as a creative individual who shuns the demands dictated by Ukrainian cultural and political history and whose cardinal responsibility instead lies within the Ukrainian language and his/her talents in working with it.

Recreations explores the identity of the Ukrainian intellectual who became free to conduct such a search with the crumbling of the Soviet world. Through continual referencing and citation, Andrukhovych samples various cultures of the world to locate a Ukrainian's position in the world. Frequent references to western Ukraine's past under Austro-Hungarian rule reveal the author's view that Ukraine and the Ukrainian intellectual are part of the European cultural tradition. In *Recreations* such references often takes the form of lists, which unite seemingly uncombinable things that are linked by the phonetic compatibility of the Ukrainian words that symbolize them. In this way Andrukhovych demonstrates that it is language (and playing with it) that is the realm wherein a writer's responsibility lies.

Throughout *Recreations* Andrukhovych displays his mastery of the Ukrainian word. His talents lie not in providing ornate, descriptive passages or mood pieces, but in reaching back into the annals of the Ukrainian lexicon, returning with archaic words, and applying them to contemporary, everyday situations. By mixing such words with contemporary slang, Andrukhovych provides for acute irony while simultaneously revealing the wealth of the Ukrainian literary language.

One of the crowning achievements of *Recreations* is the ability to touch upon serious topics while providing enticing, well-crafted scenes and witty dialogues that are a pleasure to read. It is a novel that refreshes the Ukrainian language and proves that Ukrainian literature can be edgy, enjoyable, and hip. In *Recreations* Andrukhovych has managed to capture the language, movements, and energy of a particular period in Ukrainian history. He presents it to the reader in a form that addresses both the celebratory, carnivalesque spirit of that time and the serious issues that pervaded it and the years that were to follow.

Marko Pavlyshyn's English-language translation of *Recreations* masterfully retains most of the original's inherent qualities. Andrukhovych's wandering narrative technique is captured in the translation. As a result, the plot evolves according to the original and retains its fluidity and pace. In the passages containing a character's lengthy, stream-of-consciousness thought processes (such as those of Marta Martofliak on pp. 87–9 and 111–15), Pavlyshyn does not succumb to breaking up Andrukhovych's long sentences into several shorter ones; instead he provides the reader with an excellent English-language rendition

of Andrukhovych's delvings into a woman's mind as she ponders her marriage and sexuality.

The backbone of *Recreations* is its dialogues: that is where Andrukhovych's particular sense of humour mostly resides. Pavlyshyn accurately performs the difficult task of retaining the timing and subtle nuances of these dialogues. Humour can often be a localized entity—the Ukrainian sense of humour may not always transfer well into the English language, and vice versa. And Andrukhovych's humour, which is spiked by the dismissive and sarcastic statements in the novel's dialogues, is particularly difficult to convey in English. Pavlyshyn, however, succeeds in doing this through a careful utilization of adjectives, and the reader comes away with a good portrayal of the humour that is so essential to Andrukhovych's prose.

As mentioned earlier, Andrukhovych assembles lists for stylistic reasons and as a means of communicating his interpretation of what he believes constitutes the Ukrainian identity today. *Recreations* contains one major list, which counts off the participants in a masked procession during their march through the centre of the town as part of the festival's activities. This list (one of the novel's most remarkable moments) coagulates the names and titles of various ethnic groups, professions, and other figures from several periods that, in the author's mind, constitute the Ukrainian spirit. Some of them are included for euphonic purposes. Collectively the words in this list constitute a rhythmic march through various centuries and layers of society. Pavlyshyn wisely forgoes the virtually impossible task of attempting to replicate the cadence of the original passage. Instead, he digs up English terms for the more than one hundred Ukrainian names in the list and thereby successfully recreates the sense of carnival permeating Andrukhovych's novel.

The one area where Pavlyshyn is not always successful is in the difficult task of translating the Ukrainian slang found throughout the novel. Again, it is the author's use of slang, alongside more formal and lyrical phrases and sentences, that provides for much of the novel's humour. Pavlyshyn is able to convey these contrasts, but his choices of English slang equivalents to their Ukrainian counterparts are sometimes inappropriate. The novel's main characters are young, hip intellectuals with street smarts and street credibility. They express themselves using the profanity-filled lingo of Ukraine's Ukrainian-speaking bohemian community of the late 1980s and 1990s. Andrukhovych has them speak in this way to flesh out their decadent nature in what is a continuous challenging of the image of the intellectual in the Ukrainian cultural tradition. In the translation these characters lose some of their edgy image. At times Pavlyshyn uses rather dated English slang equivalents—someone using them today would hardly be considered “hip” or “cool.” Thus, although “dunderhead” (p. 21) and “clodhopper” (p. 23) are English-language equivalents for “bevez” and

"odoroblo" respectively, Marta's use of these words in *Recreations* ages her beyond her years.

An inaccurate translation of a slang word can also diminish the resonance of a key statement. For example, in the conclusion to a long scene in which Ukraine's new, young intellectuals meet the kind yet condescending Dr. Popel, a representative of the émigré elite, the poet Nemyrych addresses the doctor as "old codger" (p. 34). The original "*staryi mudache*" is much more derogatory and biting and is important in representing the former's attitude of the latter.

Slang is an aspect of language that is highly dependent on place and time. It is natural that in translating such vocabulary a translator would rely on equivalents in the native slang of his or her generation. This seems to be what Pavlyshyn has done. To readers of Pavlyshyn's generation, his choices may effectively help them to imagine the world that Andrukhovych describes in his novel. However, it would have been more appropriate if the translator had used English-language slang that corresponds temporally with the slang that Andrukhovych and his generation used in Ukraine. That Pavlyshyn has not done so, however, is but a minor flaw. What is more important is that his translation succeeds in making its readers aware that the novel's characters are speaking in slang. Pavlyshyn's introduction and footnotes allow the English-language reader to appreciate Andrukhovych's novel more fully. The introduction sets the stage for the time when the novel's action takes place. Andrukhovych likes to cross-reference the names of various figures from Ukrainian cultural history with those of his contemporaries; this is one way in which he characteristically blends various periods of time. The footnotes provide essential information for understanding this technique of Andrukhovych's, and they help the reader to understand the insider jokes found in the novel.

Volodymyr Makarenko's illustrations (which are not found in any of the three Ukrainian editions of *Rekreatsii*) accent the journey-like aspects of the novel's plot. Their seemingly hurried quality nicely compliments the chaotic cultural tornado depicted in Andrukhovych's novel.

One unfortunate, though minor, error found in *Recreations* is the translation of the title of Andrukhovych's third collection of poetry, both in the introduction and in the blurb on the back cover: *Ekzotychni ptakhy i roslyny* (1991) should have been translated as *Exotic Birds and Plants* and not *Exotic Plants and Flowers*.

By publishing *Recreations*, the CIUS Press has performed a great service for the study of contemporary Ukrainian literature in the English-speaking world. It could not have chosen to issue a better translation than that by Marko Pavlyshyn, one of the best literary critics of Ukrainian literature today, with a good, analytical knowledge of Andrukhovych's writing that, undoubtedly, facilitated his excellent translation of this important novel. Pavlyshyn's translation should be attractive to the new generation of readers in the Ukrainian diaspora who are

interested in Ukrainian literature but lack the necessary language skills to read it in the original. More importantly, it should serve to introduce a large portion of the world's population to one of Ukraine's most talented writers and to the vibrancy of contemporary Ukrainian culture. Yuri Andrukhovych's *Recreations* captured the excitement, chaos, and uncertainty that arose on the eve of Ukraine's achievement of independence. Marko Pavlyshyn's translation introduces people outside Ukraine to the carnival that continues to take place in Andrukhovych's native land today.

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Janice Kulyk Keefer. *Honey and Ashes: A Story of Family*. Toronto: HarperCollins Canada, 1998. xiv, 338 pp. \$27.00 cloth.

At the end of her "memoir" *Honey and Ashes*, Janice Kulyk Keefer asks herself whether she found what she was looking for on her trip back to the old country, to the Ukraine from which her parents and grandparents had emigrated. Has she succeeded in placating the querulous voices of the past that have echoed, sometimes disruptively, through her life as a writer, daughter, mother, and wife in her native Canada? Her answer to herself is supple and gratifyingly ambiguous: "Perhaps home is only this: inhabiting uncertainty, the arguments desire picks with fear. Not belonging, but longing—that we may live in the present without craving the past or forcing the future."

Keefer recounts the story of her mother's parents, along with her efforts to understand their experience. Her grandfather, Tomasz, emigrated to Canada from Staromischyna, then on the edge of the Polish-Ukrainian border, in 1927. He planned to make enough money to buy more land in Poland, but on returning found the repressive political atmosphere more difficult than the hardships of blue-collar work in the West. Her grandmother, Olena, resisted his invitations to join him for several years, succumbing only a decade later, when she arrived in Canada with her two remaining daughters, one of them Keefer's mother. The grandparents' struggle to establish themselves while overcoming the usual obstacles forms one strand of the book's narrative. Keefer shuttles between the two countries as she tries to reimagine the details of her grandparents' and mother's early lives. Her book is a self-conscious act of rescue, as well as an homage, an offering charged with deep affection, to the memory of these pioneers.

Most searches for origins are assimilated by the desire for a certainty that declares: *Here. Here on this rock stands my foundation. From this I rose; on it I have stood all along*; there is no need to return to that which you have never

left. The finer the questing intelligence, the less likely is it to be satisfied by partial answers or incomplete investigations, because the journey is, by its nature, infinitely regressive. At what point do you stop stalking a root? The anthropological, archeological, and geological records available to twenty-first-century voyagers rush to convey us into prehistory, with or without Darwin. Most searches end earlier, of course, terminating at the final station to which family memory or documents are able to transport us—usually three or four generations back, to great grandparents, though we know well that the real founding fathers ruled long before a fantasy of gold spawned the age of exploration and all after. One of the more exhilarating moments in *Remembrance of Things Past* occurs when Marcel Proust observes that a certain character can trace her family back to the first century, and suddenly we see how far the root can plunge: two-thirds of Western civilization soi-disant paddling in the gene pool of a single clan. For most of us the road trails into the mist of personal prehistory far sooner. That the sum of such zealously monitored breeding can, as Leslie Epstein points out, add up to less than zero in moral terms is a different matter.

Keefer's impulse goes beyond a desire for mere certainty about origins. Her astonishment at the dramatic changes in scenery that the last generation has witnessed, moving from a space where "women soaked flax and dyed wool with onion skins" to a place where it's now possible to send e-mail around the world from a cell phone, is understandable. She is striving to articulate the continuities persisting through such radical and yet possibly superficial transformations, which, in any case, can't alter the heart's underlying desires. Her urgency is animated by an even fiercer longing for a kind of absolute union, a Platonic consummation of the family romance: "I want more than ... the bread and butter of family love. I want to cut the stitches that keep my mother and me from knowing each other as equals.... I want to meet, in my mother, that sweet-toothed child so full of mischief and need ..."

Where we decide to terminate our search for origins says much about our motives, as well as about the ways that our age encourages or compels us to define ourselves. While they are political—and therefore relative—constructs, nations provide convenient parameters for most people seeking to establish a definition of self and serve as shorthand for conveying all kinds of information to others about who we are, or rather how we see ourselves, as well as how we wish to be regarded by others. Someone who declares himself an Iraqi at Canada Customs is likely to provoke a different response than someone who presents the blue passport of a U.S. citizen, despite the similarities in genetic material.

Keefer is broadly informed and sensitive to the implications of claiming a Ukrainian, or partly Ukrainian, identity. Both here and in a brilliant essay, "'Coming Across Bones': Historiographic Ethnofiction" (in *Writing Ethnicity*, ed. Winfried Siemerling, vol. 57 (1995) of *Essays on Canadian Writing*, 84–104), she comments on the problems of inheriting a history as politically intricate and

morally unresolved as Ukraine's. She is especially sensitive to Jewish themes and to the complexity of Ukrainian-Polish relations, and she writes with a generous knowledge of the grounds of difference. Moreover, her insistence on presenting a history that cuts both ways, "showing Ukrainians as both oppressed and oppressors," reflects the only viable stance for anyone aspiring to be more than a publicist for a party.

Beyond the relative nature of a political identity is the one that's created through a personal relationship to a particular rural or urban topography: just as it is possible to fall in love with an idea (the idea of democracy, say), so too it is even easier to discover or generate passionate attachments for streams, trees, coffee shops, and museums—not to mention one's neighbours. The world has always been divided between those able to forfeit such continuities for the thrill of discovery and those whose commitment is to a place; and for some reason Cain the wanderer often resents Abel the farmer. Those immigrants who leave willingly—out of wanderlust or a desire to improve their material circumstances—inevitably regard the place that they quit differently than people forced to emigrate by dire political and economic traumas.

Whether or not most Ukrainians in the West belong to the latter group, political refugees have been the more vociferous branch of the clan, and this is part of what defines their relationship to the past: they have talked about themselves amongst themselves, maybe too much, and they may have missed opportunities for connecting outside their circle, thereby reinforcing a habit of isolation. Keefer is among the first writers of Ukrainian ancestry to stand wholly outside: she is an important imaginative writer first of all. Only secondly should the noun "writer" be modified by "Canadian," followed by a subordinate clause introducing the word "Ukrainian." Like all pioneers, Keefer must do a lot of work simply to clear the field.

A skull discovered in sub-Saharan Africa suddenly shifts our species' entire sense of its origins—and a memoirist is as much at the mercy of *objet trouvé* as any archeologist. The artifacts that Keefer unearths and brings up for reflection will trigger various responses, depending on the contexts supplied by the reader. On a personal note, it was astonishing, and seemed more than coincidental, to read Keefer's meditation on a slim booklet that she discovered by chance in her grandfather's library. Published in 1931, it is titled *Western Ukraine under Polish Yoke: Polonization, Colonization, Pacification* and describes "Polish brutalities against Ukrainians in eastern Galicia." I, too, had found the same sad, odd volume in my own grandfather's library. While reading it, I was further drawn into the story by the fact that my grandfather's brother Volodymyr Zahaikevych, deputy-speaker of the Polish Sejm, was cited as a leading spokesman against the atrocities. As the story told by that booklet had absolutely no meaning to anyone else around me, it had remained one of many inert pieces of information unlikely to find its place in the mind's scale model of the past—that is, until Keefer

identified it. Her witness gave the object a fullness, an objectivity that it lacked so long as it remained suspended in a solitary consciousness. History and genealogy are subdivisions of archaeology, and in the case of Ukraine we can expect that further excavations, in the form of private memoirs, as well as more formal histories, will yield fragments inspiring, alternately, dread, boredom, and awe and leading to frequent reappraisals of a famously unstable past.

The project of this memoir seemed an inevitable one for Keefer: "For however Canadian I know myself to be, I feel defined in some way by this other country I've hardly set foot in, whose language I can barely speak. It's as though I looked down on a bright day to discover I had two different shadows, leaning in opposite directions, touching at the base." The palpable intensity of her need to bring various parts of her psyche into the play of awareness simultaneously does not always translate into terms that the reader can accept, however. While Keefer's style can be epigrammatic (e.g., "In my mother's and my aunt's memories of the Old Place, food is the face of desire," p. 49), her voice seems naturally lyrical. Interrogating a group of wedding photographs, she writes: "What happened to the brides themselves, the radiant young women with their pompadours and platform shoes? They walk inside the whiteness of the wedding gowns and vanish, like trees in mist." Such haunting flourishes can give way, however, to paragraphs of philosophical reflections and questions that clot the story and yank the reader out of her narrative. Keefer's questions disorient because, if we read closely, we pause to consider such directives from an author; and if we actually took her questions to heart, our hearts would burst, or simply go bust, from the burden. Mostly the questions remain rhetorical because her wonder has not yet become ours.

Keefer's discursiveness and her reliance on expository fragments may be part of a deliberate aesthetic. In "Coming across Bones," she quotes Michael Fisher: "using fragments or incompleteness to force the reader to make the connections ... is not merely descriptive of how ethnicity is experienced, but more importantly is an ethical device attempting to activate in the reader a desire for *communitas* with others while preserving rather than effacing differences." The ethical device has long reflected an aesthetic for some leading contemporary poets, as well as for philosophers of displacement such as Theodor Adorno and E. M. Cioran. Fragments may feel intellectually surer than the artifice of a more conventionally articulated structure; at the same time, they can feel emotionally unsatisfying, over-privileging the intellect at the expense of a reader's other needs. As Proust observed somewhere, "What intellect restores to us in the name of the past isn't the past." The dimensions of the imagination include intellect as only a part of the edifice of recreated perceptions.

And yet, the recreation of Ukraine by the child of émigrés presents specific aesthetic challenges. Fragments and inquisitions are one way of acknowledging the difficulties. The story of Ukraine's past has not yet been gathered together

and fleshed out into a master narrative by Ukrainians who stayed put in Staromischyna and elsewhere over the last, horrific century—or at least not in any way that has found a place in the consciousness of the emigration's children. Until we understand how those who stayed regard their own history—not the official one, of course, but the one that counted in a real way in people's lives—writers born elsewhere may do little more than piece together crazy quilts, inspired patchworks with vivid swatches of colour full of projections, alongside occasionally credible speculations. Fiction and poetry (and, to a lesser degree, memoir) are precisely designed as vessels for such subjectivities even as they transcend them through the objectifying demands of art. Moreover, because North American readers continue to require a clearer and fuller context into which they might fit the Ukrainian tale, writers who take Ukraine for material must break into their stories by explaining and at times rationalizing areas of history. When the name Kyiv stirs in the reader a gallery of associations the way that Paris or Calcutta or Dublin do, then the nature of the writer's work will shift; imagination will shake off some of the dust of pedagogy and really take flight.

The clearer our past, the surer our future—or so we persuade ourselves, whistling in the dark. I have always misconstrued Jesus's reply to His mother on the occasion of His first miracle—"Woman, what have I to do with thee?"—as an announcement of distance from things human. In my misunderstanding I went further, rationalizing His behaviour by imagining that the response to Christ's question is Mary's (and so human memory's) presence at the foot of the cross. And so, I told myself, we honour our families even as we reject any absolute demands on our identity made by kinships of blood, granting our ultimate allegiance only to the embodiment of justice, mercy, and wisdom, wherever it arises.

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Vasyl Lisovy. *Kultura — ideolohiia — polityka*. Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo im. Oleny Telihy, 1997. 352 pp.

The author of this collection of articles is one of those rare philosophers whose intellectual brilliance is matched by a profound sense of civic responsibility and moral courage. As a Party member, in 1972 Lisovy addressed an open letter to the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union protesting the arrest that year of many Ukrainian writers and artists and calling for democratic reform in the Party. He paid dearly for this action—seven years of hard labour and three years of exile. After serving his full sentence, he

continued to be persecuted by the Soviet authorities. It was only in 1990 that Lisovy was reinstated at the Institute of Philosophy in Kyiv. Prior to his arrest his primary fields of interest were analytical philosophy and the philosophy of science. In the last decade he has devoted most of his attention to the philosophy of the social sciences and political theory. The volume represents his contributions to his new area of interest.

The sixteen papers collected here were originally delivered in classrooms, at conferences, and in round-table discussions. Only six of them have been published earlier. The collected papers may be grouped into three subject areas: (1) seven papers deal with basic social or political concepts, such as culture, civilization, ethnos, nation, civil society, ideology, and politics; (2) four papers outline and evaluate the contributions of Mykhailo Drahomanov, Dmytro Dontsov, Volodymyr Starosolsky, Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky, and Dmytro Chyzhevsky to Ukrainian political thought, political history, or philosophy; and (3) five papers deal with miscellaneous topics such as elementary education, a political manifesto, a party platform, the political influence of Communists in Ukraine today, and the problem of political "rehabilitation."

The first group of papers constitutes the core of the volume and Lisovy's main contribution to political thought in Ukraine. For this reason, it will be the focus of my attention. The papers of the second group demonstrate an analytical style and balanced judgment, which make them excellent introductions to this group of thinkers. The final group of miscellaneous pieces shows the range of Lisovy's engagement in the immediate, everyday issues of cultural and political life. His critique of the manifesto of Young Ukraine is a model of sympathetic, constructive criticism.

The articles in the first group are constructed on a common pattern: after analyzing the ways in which a number of key concepts are used in contemporary Western social and political sciences, Lisovy uses the concepts to establish an important substantive thesis. Thus, after distinguishing several senses of culture and civilization, he asserts that cultures are not subject to natural determinism and cannot be accessible to the methodology of the natural sciences. Although the method of the social sciences has been defined in different ways by different schools, there is no doubt that it is distinct from the method of the natural sciences.

In the paper "Ethnos and Nation," Lisovy distinguishes the concepts of ethnic and political nations and contends that the typical national state in Western Europe was not created by an already formed political nation, but rather the state and the nation developed together, with the state helping the ethnic nation (the dominant ethnic group) to unify the other ethnic groups into a political nation. In a paper on political ideologies Lisovy shows that any ideology involves not only beliefs about the world but also values; therefore, ideology cannot be replaced by (value-free) science in political life, where choices are unavoidable.

It is evident from this that a democratic state differs from a Communist one not in lacking an ideology, but in embracing a very different ideology.

The argument in the two articles on nationalism turns on the distinction between nationalism as a general principle (that every nation should have its state) and nationalism as a specific ideology. Lisovy points out that no European state is ethnically pure: the so-called national states consist of a single ethnic majority whose language, political symbols, and traditions are accepted by the ethnic minorities, which, together with the majority group, form one political nation. This, in his opinion, is the pattern of state building that Ukraine should follow.

The paper "Political Culture: The Political Culture of Ukrainians" begins with a distinction between a value-neutral and a value-oriented concept of politics and outlines the development of Ukrainian political culture. Lisovy argues that the Russification policies of the tsarist and Soviet regimes hindered the Ukrainian ethnic nation's development, a process that has still not been completed. The recent adoption of Ukrainian as Ukraine's official language is a compensatory measure for past discriminatory policies against the language and a necessary step for the development of national consciousness among large segments of the Ukrainian ethnos. Lisovy argues persuasively that the seemingly liberal demand for Russian-Ukrainian bilingualism in predominantly Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine is, in fact, a hypocritical attempt to preserve Russian unilingualism and to prevent the consolidation of the Ukrainian political nation.

The most important paper of the collection is "The Phenomenon of Citizenship." It uses most of the concepts analyzed in the other papers and introduces two new ones—the concepts of citizen and civil society—to tackle the formidable question of how to shape Ukraine into a modern European state. To understand the nature of this state, Lisovy contends, one must have a clear grasp of the nature of civil society that uses the state to govern itself. According to the author, civil society is characterized today by two essential features—democracy and political nationality. To define it as a democracy is to say that it is a pluralistic society that guarantees individual rights, abides by the rule of law, and settles social or political conflicts through rational dialogue, not force. What unifies such a society into one whole is the fact that it is a political nation, and the typical Western political nation is not ethnically homogeneous, but consists of an ethnic nation and ethnic minorities that accept its political culture. Ukraine, in Lisovy's estimation, does not measure up to these standards of civil society. Because neither democracy nor independence was won by a broad civil and national movement, the necessary conditions for civil society—a civically minded citizenry and a political nation—do not exist in Ukraine. They have yet to be created.

The advocates of a return to a supranational state like the former Soviet Union, of course, oppose the formation of a political nation and a new nation-state of Ukraine. Others favour a state and political nation that would be called Ukrainian, but would bear no Ukrainian cultural features. Lisovy rejects this policy as a threat

to Ukrainian culture, an offence to the majority ethnic group, and a source of political instability. The only way to build a truly independent and stable state in Ukraine, he argues, is to create a political nation with Ukrainian cultural features, such as language, Ukrainian political symbolism, and traditions. This is also the most desirable alternative according to the principle of cultural pluralism, for such a state will guarantee the survival of a distinctive Ukrainian culture. To create a Ukrainian political nation it is necessary, first, to consolidate the Ukrainian ethnic nation and, second, to persuade the ethnic minorities to adopt the Ukrainian language and political traditions without renouncing their own languages and cultures. The main obstacle to this, Lisovy claims, is the intolerance for any ethnic features other than Russian that was instilled not only in Russians but also in Ukrainians by the tsarist and Soviet regimes.

Lisovy emphasizes the point that a political nation must be created to ensure not only statehood but also democracy. Today Ukraine is ruled by a bureaucratic class of "Red feudal lords," which uses the state for its own interests. Its rule rests on a "feudal-Communist" mentality, a historical hangover from the despotic bureaucratic state of the tsars and commissars. The author identifies the key features of this mentality as class egoism, dependency on the state, and moral, political, and legal nihilism. It is this outlook, which is shared by the rulers and the ruled, that has to be overcome if civil society is to gain control of the state. The way to overcome it, according to Lisovy, is through public dialogue that exposes its inconsistencies and destructiveness and promotes a new worldview and new way of thinking.

Here lies the duty of intellectuals and the task of the mass media. What is needed to build a civil society capable of sustaining a democratic Ukrainian state is a new, broad-based civil movement with clearly articulated and well-grounded political demands, not pompous slogans. Although the ruling class and the state it controls oppose such a movement, Lisovy believes that conditions for it are ripe and that Ukraine's situation is by no means hopeless.

Lisovy's writings are a ray of hope on a generally bleak political and cultural background. Their theoretical depth, ideological fair-mindedness, clear style, and logical coherence are atypical of Ukrainian political literature. To clear the stage for serious philosophical dialogue on the basic political issues in Ukraine, he explicitly rejects the intellectual cynicism of Communist ideology, which reduces ideas to mere expressions of class interest, and the undisciplined, poetic style that is characteristic of Ukrainian philosophical writing. His own work provides the best example of the kind of dialogue that is needed today to exorcise ideological stereotypes and overcome the ingrained mental habits of the past.

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Ilse E. Friesen. *Earth, Hell, and Heaven in the Art of William Kurelek*. Oakville, Ont.: Mosaic Press, 1997. 193 pp. \$19.95 paper.

The details of William Kurelek's life are well known—in no small measure from his candid 1973 autobiography (*Someone with Me*, which appeared under the same name in an edited form in 1980), a detailed 1986 biography by Patricia Morely (*Kurelek: A Biography*), and numerous reviews and articles about him. But the jury is still out as to what to make of his artistic legacy. Ilse Friesen's examination of Kurelek's oeuvre calls for much greater respect.

The genesis of her book was an attempt to mount a major retrospective of Kurelek's paintings on the occasion of the centenary of Ukrainian settlement in Canada in 1991. This exhibition was supposed to tour four cities in Ukraine and then move on to Rome, London, and Toronto. The undertaking was severely set back by the sudden illness and death of its main promoter, Ola Kolankiwsy, a founder and director of the Niagara Falls Art Gallery and Kurelek Collection. Its death knell came soon after with the chaos that followed the disintegration of the Soviet Union. By this time, however, Dr. Friesen, an associate professor of fine arts at Wilfred Laurier University in Waterloo, Ontario, had been brought on board and had prepared the text for the exhibition's catalogue. She subsequently developed it into this larger study.

It seems that Friesen was personally moved by Kurelek's work, and over time she developed a great appreciation for the artist. She ultimately concluded that art scholars have not afforded him the respect and attention he deserves. Friesen states this candidly in the final chapter of her book: "Kurelek's art has baffled and even embarrassed leading art historians and critics, who have therefore included him only marginally in textbooks on Canadian art.... Art criticism must some day come to terms with the fact that William Kurelek succeeded in creating his own determinedly non-conformist artistic rules and otherworldly visions and ambitions."

Friesen has a point. In many respects Kurelek is still remembered best as a landscape artist and painter of scenes from everyday life. His legacy is seemingly sustained by his more "pleasant" and accessible works. This is not surprising, given the sheer volume of such works (Kurelek was able to churn out three such paintings, which he described as "potboilers," in a day) and their wide circulation in a multitude of picture books published toward the end of his life and shortly after his death in 1977. But Friesen may be overstating her case in suggesting that the discomfiting and socially challenging aspects of Kurelek's art have been virtually ignored. It is precisely the psychological edge and personal vision that this "modern-day Jeremiah" (a label I much prefer to "the Canadian Breugel") brought to his art that established his reputation and will sustain it in the future. Kurelek had the ability to convey an underlying sense of unease into seemingly prosaic scenes, almost as if Hitchcock had forsaken celluloid for

canvas. And he *knew* that twentieth-century humankind had spun out of control and was heading for ruination and damnation. People had to be made aware of this, and Kurelek voiced his wake-up call in his art.

It is hard to ignore this sort of unrelenting—or uncompromising (depending on one's point of view)—vision. That said, Friesen is correct in suggesting that the deeply religious and darkly apocalyptic aspects of Kurelek's works are not always dealt with forthrightly in reviews of his art. She seeks to rectify this by examining his work in toto. The result is a highly informative overview with much background on and insight into Kurelek's paintings. It is a very worthwhile read for anyone interested in his work. But it falls short of making a strong case for a fundamental reconfiguration of Kurelek's place in the constellation of celestial artists.

The central concept of the book (and presumably the non-exhibit that spawned it) is very good—an examination of Kurelek's work divided thematically in terms of how he dealt with Earth, hell, and heaven (with a chapter on Christ as the bridge between Earth and heaven). But much of the material is narrative or technical, with digressions on interpretive points as they arise. The themes serve more as a convenient device for organizing a painting-by-painting retrospective of Kurelek rather than the specific focus of the study.

It may be that the author is too sympathetic to her subject matter. Certainly she is gentle in terms of accepting at face value Kurelek's claims that he suffered at the hands of an overbearing father (hence his fragile mental state) and that he was largely self-taught as an artist. Morely's biography, notwithstanding its shortcomings, brings definite shades of grey to these sorts of black-and-white assertions.

Moreover, Friesen seemingly would not care—or dare—to drag Kurelek through the mud of Jungian or other psychological interpretation; in Kurelek's case, this could yield very interesting results. She even takes issue on this matter with George Y. Shevelov, who used this approach in a essay for an exhibition booklet accompanying a 1987 Kurelek exhibition at the Ukrainian Museum in New York.

As a result, we end up with a work that sheds much light on Kurelek's work but does not venture into the dark recesses of his troubled soul. It is certainly a useful contribution to the literature about the artist, but, I hope, not the last word.

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CANADIAN SLAVONIC PAPERS

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
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г—h	к—k	х—kh
г—g	л—l	ц—ts
д—d	м—m	ч—ch
е—e	н—n	ш—sh
є—ie	о—o	щ—shch
ж—zh	п—p	ю—iu
з—z	р—r	я—ia
и—y	с—s	ь—omit
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